Month: February 2023

Colloquium 2023 Call for abstracts

Call for abstracts: 5th PhiGS Graduate Colloquium

Kent PhiGS — the philosophy graduate society at the University of Kent at Canterbury (United Kingdom) —  is pleased to announce its Fifth Annual Graduate Colloquium, to take place on 21-22 June 2023 at the University of Kent, and online.

The Colloquium aims to promote discussion among graduate researchers working in the same general areas as us at Kent, where we have a wide range of topics of inquiry. Such diversity promotes the advancement of inquiry through cross-pollination between fields, and the Colloquium seeks to facilitate such fruitful encounters. We invite submissions from graduate researchers — masters as well as doctoral — on the following or related topics:

– Philosophy of mental health, especially concerning autonomy and responsibility

– Role ethics

– Philosophy of medicine, especially concerning disease definition

– Epistemology, especially disagreement and belief formation

– Gradualist approaches in metaphysics and ontology

– Pragmati(ci)st approaches in philosophy of science and metaphysics

– Approaches to mathematical semantics

– Conception of the self by liberal theories

– Evidential Pluralism and Artificial Intelligence

– Reconciling the manifest and scientific image, especially with respect to time.

Submissions should take the form of an abstract of no more than 400 words, the talks themselves being about 30 minutes in length. Abstracts should be anonymised, in PDF format, and sent as attachments to an email. In the body of the email please give name and return email address, as well as institutional affiliation and whether you wish to present at the Colloquium in person or online. We understand that it is the nature of these talks to be works-in-progress, so there is no requirement to submit a whole paper in advance: the talk, when given, is the paper. The language of the Colloquium is English. Please send abstracts to Mark Garron at mg734@kent.ac.uk, to arrive no later than 20 March 2023.

Unfortunately, we do not have funds for travel and accommodation for graduate speakers, although your own institution may be able to provide such a facility if you wish to present in person. We do, however, intend to provide light refreshments and lunch for all in-person speakers and attendees.

For further information on Kent PhiGS and its activities, please see https://blogs.kent.ac.uk/kentphigs/

SUMMARY

Fifth PhiGS Graduate Colloquium

Date: 21-22 June 2023

Venue: Hybrid. In-person: University of Kent (Canterbury, United Kingdom). Online: zoom

Last submission date: 20 March 2023

Abstract length: no more than 400 words

Talk length: approximately 30 minutes

Language: English

Contact: Mark Garron on mg734@kent.ac.uk

 

 

Phigs GRS Schedule

EXSR2 – Maps – University of Kent

15 February No Talk scheduled

22 February No Talk scheduled

1 March No Talk scheduled

8 March No Talk scheduled

15 March Mark Garron – Temporal Discounting and Temporal Neutrality 

Abstract:

In economics, some make the distinction between monetary discounting and pure discounting (Broome 1999, 47).  The problem with our money practise is that temporal distance matters in a way that spatial distance does not.  The big distinction between monetary discounting and pure discounting is that pure discounting implies a temporal discounting function applied to positive and negative experiences whereas monetary discounting only involves commodities and present beliefs about uncertainty and risk.

The ‘pure’ as opposed to ‘monetary’ distinction is a way for economists to sidestep the ethical problem of discounting. One can defend our typical money practice involving monetary discounting and still maintain the normative claim that we should treat all the parts of our conscious lives with equal regards. The intuition that we should treat all the parts of our conscious lives the same underlies what is referred to as the Temporal Neutrality Thesis.

Temporal neutrality (TN) thesis is the hegemonic view.  Temporal neutrality implies that, in order to be diachronically rational, one should have some level of cross temporal coherence in terms of preferences and an equal regard for all the parts of one’s conscious life. Temporal neutrality is a normative claim about value and valuing. It is also a prudential claim. As such, the requirement of equal regard requires some kind of valuation distinction between equal and non-equal regard. Temporal discounting (TD) is that criteria for whether an agent fails to adhere to temporal neutrality (TN). On the other hand, the Temporal Discounting thesis disputes the need for equal regard. The TD thesis justifies the presence of TD.

In this talk I am skeptical of both the TN thesis and the TD thesis. I argue that measuring TD apart from factors such as risk and changing preferences in untenable. Without a clear idea of what constitutes a pure temporal discounting function, we can’t make a sensible claim about what constitutes TN.

22 March Brian Kett -Causation – another facet or more?

Abstract:

Explanations for predictions made by AI are increasingly being sought. Explanations need understanding and a prime route to understanding is through recognising how causal mechanisms and processes occur. To establish causation, Evidential Pluralism argues that both statistical and mechanistic evidence is needed. AI models, built from learning from data provide statistical evidence for causality, but cannot provide mechanistic evidence. To gain evidence of causality it is necessary to have grasp of what causality is and how it works. This is needed as a pre-requisite to determining how we can leverage understanding and explanation from AI models.

The aim of this exposition is to look at how we currently view causation and what extra is needed to understand what causality is and how it works. It is suggested that existing theories all uncover facets of what causation comprises, but that they do not uncover the commonality of mechanisms of causality in enough detail to recognise what evidence of causality itself is needed to establish it.

After a brief review of some existing theories we propose a unifying view of causation that may help in underpinning ways to establish the mechanistic evidence for causation we seek.

29 March Hugh Robertson-Ritchie – Epistemic injustice, values based practice and myalgic encephelomyopathy

Abstract:

  • Many Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyopathy (CFS/ME) patients suffer epistemic injustice in their consultations with medical professionals.
  •  Much of this epistemic injustice is related to the different values of these CFS/ME patients on the one hand, and their medical professionals on the other hand.
  • Values-based practice supplements evidence-based practice by incorporating the values of the patient and the medical professional in medical decision-making
  • Values-Based Practice can make explicit the differences and commonalities in values between medical professionals and CFS/ME patients, giving a route to reducing medical epistemic injustice.

5 April Vittorio Serra Cancelled

Phigs For 2023

Hi colleagues,

Vittorio has passed the torch to me to run Phigs. I would like to thank him for his careful stewardship. There are a few things that need to be sorted. First is our annual colloquium. I encourage everyone to submit abstracts. I have not set a date yet as I am still feeling my way but this will probably be in June. With that in mind I will need volunteers to review abstracts.

Also, it would be nice if we could to have GRSs! I think Wednesday, early afternoon still works well. With that in mind here are some opportunities to present. Here are the dates. As you can see it is wide open so first come first serve.

All GRS talks will be Wednesday 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm . Half hour talk and half hour of discussion.

15 February No Talk scheduled

22 February No Talk scheduled

1 March No Talk scheduled

8 March No Talk scheduled

15 March Mark Garron – Temporal Discounting and Temporal Neutrality

Abstract:

In economics, some make the distinction between monetary discounting and pure discounting (Broome 1999, 47).  The problem with our money practise is that temporal distance matters in a way that spatial distance does not.  The big distinction between monetary discounting and pure discounting is that pure discounting implies a temporal discounting function applied to positive and negative experiences whereas monetary discounting only involves commodities and present beliefs about uncertainty and risk.

The ‘pure’ as opposed to ‘monetary’ distinction is a way for economists to sidestep the ethical problem of discounting. One can defend our typical money practice involving monetary discounting and still maintain the normative claim that we should treat all the parts of our conscious lives with equal regards. The intuition that we should treat all the parts of our conscious lives the same underlies what is referred to as the Temporal Neutrality Thesis.

Temporal neutrality (TN) thesis is the hegemonic view.  Temporal neutrality implies that, in order to be diachronically rational, one should have some level of cross temporal coherence in terms of preferences and an equal regard for all the parts of one’s conscious life. Temporal neutrality is a normative claim about value and valuing. It is also a prudential claim. As such, the requirement of equal regard requires some kind of valuation distinction between equal and non-equal regard. Temporal discounting (TD) is that criteria for whether an agent fails to adhere to temporal neutrality (TN). On the other hand, the Temporal Discounting thesis disputes the need for equal regard. The TD thesis justifies the presence of TD.

In this talk I am skeptical of both the TN thesis and the TD thesis. I argue that measuring TD apart from factors such as risk and changing preferences in untenable. Without a clear idea of what constitutes a pure temporal discounting function, we can’t make a sensible claim about what constitutes TN.

22 March Brian Kett- Causation – another facet or more?

Abstract:

Explanations for predictions made by AI are increasingly being sought. Explanations need understanding and a prime route to understanding is through recognising how causal mechanisms and processes occur. To establish causation, Evidential Pluralism argues that both statistical and mechanistic evidence is needed. AI models, built from learning from data provide statistical evidence for causality, but cannot provide mechanistic evidence. To gain evidence of causality it is necessary to have grasp of what causality is and how it works. This is needed as a pre-requisite to determining how we can leverage understanding and explanation from AI models.

The aim of this exposition is to look at how we currently view causation and what extra is needed to understand what causality is and how it works. It is suggested that existing theories all uncover facets of what causation comprises, but that they do not uncover the commonality of mechanisms of causality in enough detail to recognise what evidence of causality itself is needed to establish it.

After a brief review of some existing theories we propose a unifying view of causation that may help in underpinning ways to establish the mechanistic evidence for causation we seek.

29 March Hugh Robertson-Ritchie – ‘Epistemic injustice, values based practice and myalgic encephelomyopathy’

5 April Vittorio Serra