I’m developing an epistemic theory of causality.
- This focuses on rational causal beliefs and their relation to evidence.
- It is analogous to an epistemic (i.e., Bayesian) theory of probability.
- According to this view, causal beliefs aren’t beliefs about some non-epistemic causal relation – they are a kind of belief, just as, under an epistemic interpretation, probabilistic beliefs are a kind of belief (degree of belief).
- The causal facts are those causal claims that any optimal causal epistemology would deem established on the basis of total evidence.
Relevant work includes:
Jon Williamson: Calibration for epistemic causality, Erkenntnis 86(4):941-960, 2021. doi: 10.1007/s10670-019-00139-w
Michael Wilde & Jon Williamson: Evidence and Epistemic Causality, in A. von Eye & W. Wiedermann (eds), Statistics and Causality: methods for applied empirical research, pp. 31-41. Wiley, 2016. ISBN: 978-1-118-94704-3
Jon Williamson: How can causal explanations explain? Erkenntnis 78:257-275, 2013. doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9512-x
Federica Russo and Jon Williamson: Epistemic causality and evidence-based medicine, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 33(4):563-582, 2011.
Jon Williamson: Causal pluralism versus epistemic causality, Philosophica 77(1), pp. 69-96, 2006;
Jon Williamson: Dispositional versus epistemic causality, Minds and Machines 16, pp. 259-276, 2006;
Jon Williamson: Bayesian nets and causality: philosophical and computational foundations, Oxford University Press, 2005. Chapter 9.