All of these seminars were held online using zoom.
20 January 2021
William Levack-Payne
Can Evidence From Association Studies Establish the Existence of Mechanisms?
The Russso-Williamson Thesis (RWT) claims that in order to establish a causal claim in medicine one normally needs to establish two things: ‘first, that the putative cause and effect are appropriately correlated; second, that there is some mechanism which explains instances of the putative effect in terms of the putative cause and which can account for this correlation’ (Williamson, 2019). This thesis seems to be contradicted by examples of medical interventions, the effectiveness of which was established based on evidence from association studies only. These appear to indicate that causation can be established based on evidence of correlation alone. Proponents of the RWT defend against this criticism with the claim that evidence from association studies can, in certain instances, suffice to establish the existence of a mechanism. Williamson (2019), provides an inference to explain how this may be the case. In this talk, I introduce the RWT, and Williamson’s inference. I, then, argue that Williamson’s inference succeeds in showing how association studies can suffice to establish the existence of a mechanism by giving criteria that allow researchers to, in principle, rule out all other possible explanations.
[Williamson, Jon. (2019) ‘Establishing Causal Claims in Medicine’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 32, 1, pp. 33-61.]
3 February 2021
Joe Jones
A Tale of Two Automations: Against Automated Post-Work Imaginaries
Automation is increasingly entering discussions regarding the future of work, both in academia and beyond. On the one hand, some scholars posit its development as a grand emancipatory moment that promises a Utopian future for all workers, along with the end of work, the end of capitalism, and the development of transhumanism. On the other, critics warn that these Utopian promises are empty, and that the real future offered by automation is decidedly more Dystopian: forced unemployment, rampant capitalist exploitation, and deep ontological loss. Both positions garner attention, support, and criticism, both in and out of academia, and discussions of automation often tend towards one camp or the other.
In this paper I will attempt to cut through this distinction, and instead offer a more realistic understanding of automation as it is developing now. I will begin by outlining these two imaginary positions, before focussing on a key text from each: the Utopian futurist John Danaher (2019), and the Dystopian futurist Martin Ford (2015). I will respond by noting some important insufficiencies with both positions, before highlighting the contrasting and conflicting definitions of automation at play. I will then offer an intrinsic definition of automation that avoids the incendiary imaginary positions of both thinkers/positions, and attempts to redress the issues highlighted. To conclude, I will offer some practical considerations of how this intrinsic definition of automation might be implemented, both personally and through policy.
10 February 2021
Joel Yalland
Testimony and Disagreement Reconsidered
Disagreement is ostensibly an epistemological matter. However, I take the literature to overlook a number of flaws. Firstly, and most importantly, is a near-universal neglect of the relation between agreement, disagreement, and testimony, and the fundamentally epistemic weight each of these holds within inquiry and considering or forming beliefs and judgments. Some authors specify no conditions for agreement or disagreement or construe them too narrowly, and others tend to focus on narrow or seemingly rare and unrealistic cases of peer disagreements.
In this paper, I will make four claims. Firstly, that in principle testimony and disagreement both have some epistemic weight, and should be credited as capable of functioning within our inquiries and belief- or attitude-forming. Secondly, it seems that any substantial or meaningful claims about agreement or disagreement must, to some extent, assume or accept testimony’s epistemic weight. Thirdly, I will argue that token cases of agreement and disagreement risk being too narrow, and any discussion of agreement or disagreement should specify what they are understood to involve.
Lastly, I will also offer some tentative suggestions that the literature’s focus on peer disagreement and rationality is excessive, and that we are better off prioritising joint inquiry, clarity, and negotiation. I take it that some of the sceptical arguments based on these narrow and seemingly rare cases make misguided claims about credibility and progress, and are based in part on unrealistic comparisons of science and philosophy.
17 February 2021
Elliot Porter
Autonomy in Dire Psychology
Bipolar and Related Disorders (BoRD) present a number of practical and theoretical challenges to our autonomy. Maintaining one’s autonomy whilst living with BoRD is a complex task and can involve a complex regiment of self-care practices and systems of support from friends, family, and clinicians. Various sorts of dire circumstance make the pursuit of autonomy, or certain conceptions of autonomy, is impossible or perverse. I take it that BoRD can create such dire circumstances, and whilst most people in non-dire circumstances can enjoy reasonable degrees of autonomy on a variety of conceptions, some people living with BoRD face a stark decision between which conceptions of autonomy they want to maintain. I suggest that a mereological analysis of the kinds of actions people living with BoRD wish to carry out can reveal what sorts of autonomy they are seeking. The things we seek to do autonomously can be understood as sums of processes, and both the size and composition conditions of those sums will have particular features depending on what conception of autonomy is in mind. As difference conceptions of autonomy are supported by radically different self-care and support regiments, clarifying how an individual conceives of the autonomy they hope to maintain can be useful in establishing their self-care and support regiments. Wider engagement with these questions might help with the generation of more and better self-care techniques that individuals can deploy as part of their regiments.
3 March 2021
Vittorio Serra
Why nominalism is bad for science (and what to do about it)
This talk will attempt to show that nominalism is not an appropriate stance to take towards science. Nominalism claims that generals are features of our language and/or reasoning but are not really operative in the world, while science purports to give us knowledge of real generals, such as laws of nature, which are operative in the world. An alternative realist view, drawn from the work of Charles S. Peirce, will be sketched which, it is hoped, will better fit our expectations of science.
10 March 2021
Nolan Cannon
Problems for the Error Theory and How to Solve Them
This paper focuses on the error theory and arguments that have their lineage in J. L. Mackie’s Ethics – arguments I call arguments from prescriptivity. The first stage of the paper offers a dilemma for existing developments of the argument from prescriptivity. In short, I argue that, either error theorists give a highly specialized rendering of what it is for ethics to be prescriptive, in which case their ensuing arguments have some force but lack scope insofar as the arguments are not widely applicable; or, error theorists give a highly generalizable reading of ‘prescriptive’, in which case their arguments have scope but lack force. At this stage, I address several issues surrounding my discussion including the internal/external reasons debate, rationality, and the role of evolution in metaethical debates. The next stage of the paper offers a brief suggestion of how to solve this problem by diagnosing where current arguments from prescriptivity go wrong and showing how framing the argument as an inference to the best explanation for the error theory would avoid the dilemma.
17 March 2021
Taymaz Azimi
No Restricted Quantfication for You! A critical response to a monist objection against ontological pluralism
Ontological pluralism holds that entities of various ontological categories exist in different ways. In opposition to this, ontological monism holds that the difference between ontological categories is a difference in nature not in being. Thus, monists triumphantly conclude that there is but one way of being. In this talk, I examine this monist claim with some rudimentary first-order logical tools, arguing that numerous problems are awaiting the monist if she goes down the path of being/nature distinction (First-order logical language is employed only in accordance with the orthodoxy of post-Quinean ontology and is not integral here in my arguments). The main objections discussed in this talk are: (i) the monist will be left with no ‘restricted quantifier’ and (ii) if she fashions something to function, semantically, as restricted quantifier she will be trapped in a vicious circle or regress of restricting the domain of the variable of the unrestricted quantifier. I aim to suggest abandoning the monistic approach in favour of an ontological system that can effectively account for various ontological categories.