Speaker: Dr Melania Nica (University of Kent)
This is a game theoretical model of behaviour by experts in the context of reputation building.
A decision maker acts over two periods on the advice of two imperfectly informed experts. Both experts are possibly biased, but in opposite directions. The underlying information is not observable, so the decision maker can only rely on the experts’ reports to determine a course of action. I show that the experts report in the opposite direction of their possible bias not only for reputational reasons, but also as a strategic response to the possibility of misreporting by their counterpart.
This model also provides a new justification for conformity: an expert might disregard her own information and send the same message as the other, not in order to look similar, but to distinguish herself. This is done by inviting comparison to the reliability of the other expert. The model is applicable to a situation when leaders from opposing political parties propose policies to an uninformed electorate.
Dr Nica will attempt to relate it to the recent political events, both in the US and UK.
Location : Maths Lecture Theatre (MathsLT)
Date : 30 November
Time : 14:00-15:00