

European welfare chauvinism: A study of deliberative forums in five countries

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Abstract:

The protection of welfare rights of “natives” and only natives, has become a winning political formula throughout Europa. The debate is fuelled both by migration flows from Non-EU-countries and flows within EU-countries. In the latter case some of social rights are secured by EU-legislation. The welfare chauvinist attitudes of the public have so far primarily been analysed by means of survey items, e.g. the one made available by the European Social Survey. In this paper we describe these attitudes by means of qualitative material obtained by deliberative forums conducted in the UK, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Slovenia in 2015. The aim is to understand the background of the attitudes measured in the survey studies and to spot potential public consensus positions. Besides qualitative discussion, the participants in the five deliberative forums also conducted a pre- and post-surveys, which enables us to link quantitative survey responses with qualitative data material.

Introduction

A number of European countries experience an increased inflow of migrants. This is both migrants coming from outside Europe as in case of Syrians fleeing from the still ongoing civil war (2011) and migrant from other EU-countries as in the case East Europeans looking for better job opportunities in primarily the North Western part of Europe. This development has not only shaped the public debates about migration but also public debates about the welfare state. One of early predictions was increased ethnic diversity would make the European publics less supportive for the welfare states arrangements. The background for this prediction was the American experience where the ethnic diversity, especially the presence of a black deprived minority, has been decisive for the public resistance towards poverty relief programs such as the former AFDC-program, Medicaid and food stamps (Gilens 1996, Gilens 2000). A number of studies have tried to verify or falsify this prediction connecting stock or flows of migrants to general public attitudes to the European welfare states. The results have been rather inclusive – as always depending on method and data – which in our interpretation at least demonstrates the absence of a general law-like connection between ethnic diversity and public support for welfare states as e.g. implied in the writings of Alesian & Glaeser (2004). In the European context with a popular welfare state already in place (in contrast to the US case) and with a multiparty party system making it possible to combine anti-migrant-, anti-EU- and pro-welfare-attitudes (in contrast to the two party system of the US) ethnic diversity is more likely to

lead to welfare chauvinism. In the moment of writing this “welfare for our kind” seem to be a winning political formula in a number of European countries. Thus, the anti-migration sentiment is not linked to an anti-welfare-state sentiment. On the contrary the anti-migration sentiment is linked to a pro-welfare-state sentiment. The formula was pioneered in Denmark and Norway in the late 1980s by the so-called progress parties (Andersen, Bjørklund 1990) and refined by the Danish people party (Schumacher, van Kersbergen 2014). With roots in the former Progress Party, the Danish people party developed a new anti-migration, pro-welfare and anti-EU party. According to Schumacher & Kersbergen “*this party’s electoral success and influence on government policy has motivated diffusion of welfare chauvinism to the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) and to a lesser extent to the Sweden Democrats (SD), The Finns (PS) and the French National Front (FN)*”. Working on party manifesto data, Eger & Valdez (2014) show how this “welfare for our kind” has become a pivotal element among the new-right-parties in Europe. As the new-right parties successfully exploit these European political opportunity structures, their position is likely to come to influence the position of main stream political parties and actual policies. There are a number of examples of national legislation, which limits the social rights of migrants while maintaining rights for natives. National parliaments are free to do so in the case of non-EU-migrants, while the EU-treaties (and their interpretation by the EU court) do protect some of the rights of EU-migrants. The latter has made the new right-wing parties able to fuse their EU-skepticism and their anti-immigration position, which has become a serious challenge for the free movement of labour within EU; in the UK-case it even came to jeopardize the whole EU-membership.

The previous studies of these welfare chauvinist attitudes in the publics has almost exclusively been based on quantitative survey studies (Mewes, Mau 2012, Mewes, Mau 2013, Reeskens, van Oorschot 2012, Van der Waal, Achterberg et al. 2010, Van Der Waal, De Koster et al. 2013, Gerhards, Lengfeld 2013). This is naturally for good reasons as representative survey studies are excellent at describing the scope of public welfare chauvinism. One of the key findings from the many studies based on the European Social Survey (ESS) (Mewes, Mau 2012, Mewes, Mau 2013, Reeskens, van Oorschot 2012, Van Der Waal, De Koster et al. 2013) is that the vast majority in most European support what can be labelled conditional access for migrants. Asked about when migrants should have the same welfare rights as native very few support giving the same rights “immediately on arrival” but it is also a minority that would “never” give migrants the same rights. The other predefined answer categories in the ESS was length of stay in the country (at least one year), tax payment (at least one year) and citizenship.

The paper contributes to this emerging literature by means of qualitative data collected in five European countries, Germany, UK, Norway, Denmark and Slovenia. The overall research question is *what rationales can be found behind welfare chauvinist public attitudes in Germany, UK, Norway, Denmark and Slovenia?* It is a standard limitation of quantitative survey studies that they provided little insight into the rationales behind the survey answers. So far the theoretically deduced theses about the rationales of the publics have mainly been tested by means of the strength of correlations between the predefined categories of the researcher, e.g. between position at the labour market and degree of welfare chauvinism. Furthermore, the cost of the cross-country comparability provided by

the ESS is it' rather abstract items. The ESS data do e.g. not distinguish between various migrant groups. Therefore, a simple sub question is *what kind of migrants do the public have in mind when welfare chauvinist attitudes are expressed?* A national quantitative study by Hjorth did e.g. distinguish between Swedes' attitudes to give welfare entitlements to respectively Dutch and Bulgarians and found significant differences (2015). However, it remains an open question whether the Swedish public actually makes such distinctions or whether this group-sensitivity is imposed by the research design. A second limitation of the previous research is the inability to distinguish between access to various types of welfare schemes. Therefore, a second sub question is *what kind of welfare schemes do the public have in mind when welfare chauvinist attitudes are expressed?* A national quantitative study by Larsen (2016) did distinguish between Danes' willingness to give East European workers access to eight different welfare schemes and found clear differences. However, again it is an open question whether this schemes-sensitivity was imposed by the research design and whether the researcher choose the welfare schemes that the public actually had in mind when the issue of migrants' entitlements was discussed. Finally, the dominant survey methodology is not able to study the dynamic of attitude formation. Of special interest is *what kind of consensus position could be formed in public discussion?* Such potential consensus positions are interesting as they are likely be used by new-right-wing parties that want to expand the electoral base (i.e. leaving the "radical" position of never granting any welfare rights to migrants) and by main-stream parties that want to form compromises.

Theories of welfare chauvinism

The study of attitudes towards social entitlements of migrants is placed at a cross-road between the many studies of attitudes to migration/migrants and the many studies of attitudes to welfare schemes/redistribution. Thus, both strands of literature have been used to theorize the background for public welfare chauvinist attitudes, which leave us a with large number of macro-meso- og micolevel theories. However, one why to provide an overview is to look at the (imagined) rationales behind welfare chauvinist attitudes at the micro-level. We distinguish broadly between self-interest, ethnic prejudices and sociotropic concerns for the nations.

Reluctance to grant migrants social rights could be rooted in self-interest; following a long tradition both in studies of general attitudes to migration and general attitudes to welfare schemes. The main argument is that welfare chauvinist attitudes derive from competition (imagined or real) for resources (jobs, benefits, and services) between natives and migrants. In this setup welfare chauvinist attitudes are believed to be strongest among those who stand to lose the most if migrants are granted social rights. This is often operationalized as the lower strata of society; those in precarious jobs, unskilled workers or those living on welfare benefits. These groups are believed to face the strongest competition from migrants on the labor market (that could be attracted by generous rights) and those with strongest self-interest in not sharing limited resources (in the case migrants fall short of work). This could lead lower strata of society to a uniform across-program rejection of granting social right to migrants, which is often what is theorized in previous studies (a pionering article in this field was

Scheve, Slaughter 2001). In contrast, the upper strata are believed to have less to lose as face less competition on the labor market and are less dependent on welfare benefits and more to win by having cheap labor in the country.

The second main explanation for welfare chauvinism has been the lack of shared identity with migrants. The basic argument is that support for social policies is rooted in a feeling of mutual shared identity among the members of a given nation (e.g. Miller 1993). This is an understandable argument as the nation state formed the boundaries of the democracy, the political mobilization and the class compromises that fostered the modern welfare state. It is easy to imagine that citizens form a hardline between those outside and inside the boundaries of the nation state. In a simple sense everyone are welfare chauvinists; no one seems to imagine that e.g. the Norwegian people's pension should be paid to a Malaysian woman who has never been in Norway. Thus, migrants constitute a grey zone between those who are included and excluded from the nation. In this framework, variations in welfare chauvinism could reflect fundamental attitudes about what it takes to become part of the nation. The distinction between ethnic and civic nation perceptions has been prominent (e.g. Kohn 1961, Janmaat 2006) and previous research has often assumed those with ethnic nation perceptions to be uniformly against any kind of inclusion of migrants. At the micro-level a broad strand of social psychological literature has theorised how this concern for the ethnic in-group and the prejudiced for the ethnic out-group is established; absence of intergroup contact being one the explanations (Allport 1954, Pettigrew, Linda R. Tropp 2005).

To these two main explanations one could add a third explanation, which one can label sociotropic reasoning. The argument is that welfare chauvinism could (also) be rooted in concerns about the function of overall society. Within election research voting rooted in the overall (perceived) need of the national economy over one's own pocket book is labelled sociotropic voting (e.g. Kinder, Kiewiet 1981). This perspective is also found in studies of general attitudes to migration (see Hainmueller, Hopkins 2014 for an excellent metastudy) but can also be found within the welfare state literature. In the latter tradition, welfare schemes are seen as functional arrangements that take care of the risks that need to be covered, as another insurance company, and the tasks that need to be done, as another service provider (e.g. Barr 2001). Thus, welfare chauvinism might not (only) be rooted in calculation of self-interest or absence of (recipient focused) solidarity feelings but could also be rooted in perceptions about migration being dysfunctional for the welfare state. In such a framework, the (perceived) costs or benefits for overall society of granting social rights to migrants is likely to hold a prominent place.

In empirical studies it is not easy to keep these (and other) perspectives apart. Asked about who living conditions we are concern about van Oorschot (2006) demonstrates that European publics are more concerned about the elderly, the sick and handicapped and the unemployed than they are about the living condition of emigrants. His conclusion is that lack of shared identity makes migrants the least "deserving" to get help. However, the lack of concern could also be rooted in self-interest or socio-economic concerns. Hjorth's (2015) findings can also be given different interpretation. The willingness to give entitlement to Dutch and not Bulgarians could be a matter of ethnic prejudices (Hjorth's interpretation). However, it could also be a matter of sociotropic concerns for the Swedish

economy (as Dutch could be imagined to be a better deal for Sweden) or self-interests (as Bulgarians could be imagined dump wages in Sweden). Regressions techniques can be used to sort out the relative strength of various variables but it is by no means a bulletproof method, which the inconclusiveness of the field demonstrates. It is a general finding that lower strata in society hold stronger welfare chauvinist attitudes than higher strata but this empirical finding can both be rooted in self-interest, more ethnic nation-perceptions/prejudices or stronger sociotropic concerns. Qualitative techniques are neither a bulletproof method to sort out the rationales behind welfare chauvinism. To some extent what characterises a political winning formula is the ability both to speak to self-interest, feelings and concern for the overall nation. However, at least our hope is that a variation in our empirical approaches can give new insights in this field.

Methods and case selection


The qualitative material originates from deliberative forums conducted in Norway, Denmark, UK, Germany and Slovenia. The discussion of migrants' access to welfare entitlement was part of a larger discussion about how these five mini publics look upon the welfare state anno 2040. The forums took place in Autumn 2015. Each forum included around 35 citizens (largely representing the composition of the various socioeconomic groups). They forum discussed two full days (9 am to 4-5 pm). There was around two weeks between the two session. The first day, the group was asked a broad question about what welfare policies are and how they think they should be arranged in 2040. Immigration was introduced as a topic by the moderator a long five four other general topics. However, the first day the migration issue was not forced on the agenda by the moderator. The forum was free to choose five themes they would discuss along the day. The migration issue was chosen for discussion at day 1 in Germany, UK but not in Denmark and Slovenia (XX NORWAY not finished). Before the second day the participants were given written basic information about the size and character of migration (alongside information on other topics) and the main conclusions were briefly introduced by researchers at the second day. The second day the migration issue was forced on the agenda by the moderator in all five countries. In both days the discussion both took place in plenary sessions and in three subgroups all guided by a moderator. In the end the second day the participants voted for or against proposals put forward by the subgroups. The discussions during the two days were videotaped, transcribed, translated to English and coded by means of Nvivo.

As part of a pre- and post-survey the participants were asked three of the ESS-items related to welfare chauvinism. This what the dependent variable used in many of the previous studies *“Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here”*, a likert scale question about perception of social benefits being a reason for inflow of migrants, *“The following questions are about the effect of social benefits and services on different areas of life in [country]. By social benefits and services we are thinking about things like health care, pensions and social security. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country] encourage people from other countries to come and live here?”*, and a 11-point scale about

the perception of migrants' use of social benefits and services "A lot of people who come to live in [country] from other countries pay taxes and make use of social benefits and services. On balance, do you think people who come to live in [country] receive more than they contribute or contribute more than they receive? The answer categories and results can be seen in Appendix 1.

The country selection was not guided by attitudes to welfare chauvinism as the data material originates from a larger project. However, the countries largely represent countries where the ESS (2008) data indicated a clear potential for welfare chauvinist attitudes. This is demonstrated in Figure 1. On the x-axis is shown the average agreement or disagreement (likert scale from 1 highly disagree to 5 highly agree) in the statement that social services and benefits in the given countries encourage people from other to come and live here. Figure 1 indicates a large variation across the 28 countries included in the ESS in 2008. In most of the Eastern European countries, the public tended to disagree in the statement that the social benefits and services of their country should attract migrants. The most extreme case was Bulgaria. In all the Western European countries, the public tended to agree in the statement. Germany and Great Britain were the most extreme case. However, on average the Norwegians and Danes also tended to agree that their social benefits and services encouraged migration. Slovenia is found at the borderline with an average a little above three. On the y-axis is shown the average public perception of whether migrants receive more social benefits and services than they pay in taxes. Here the cross-country variation is smaller. Besides as few cases (Turkey, Cypress, Israel and Romania) the typically answer is that migrants receive more than they contribute with. The most extreme case was Hungary. Combining the two axes both Norway, Denmark, Germany and the UK are found in the lower-right quadrant where the public both sees their welfare states a reason for migration and thinks of migrants as someone would take more out of the welfare state than they on average put in. Slovenia is also located in this quadrant but more on the borderline due to the uncertainty about their welfare state being a reason for inflow of migrants.

Figure 1. Perception of the country's welfare state encouraging migration and perception of migrants' net gain/contribution to the welfare state. 28 country positions based on European Social Survey 2008. Five positions of participations at deliberative forums 2015 in pre-survey




BE Belgium, BG Bulgaria, CH Switzerland, CY Cyprus, CZ Czech Republic, DE Germany, DK Denmark, EE Estonia, ES Spain, FI Finland, FR France, GB United Kingdom, GR Greece, HR Croatia, HU Hungary, IL Israel, LV Latvia, NL Netherlands, NO Norway, PL Poland, PT Portugal, RO Romania, RU Russian Federation, SE Sweden, SI Slovenia, SK Slovakia, TR Turkey, UA Ukraine.

Figure 1 also includes the average position of the answers given in the pre-survey of the participations in the deliberative forums in 2015. On these two items the average position of the German and British participations resembles the attitudes of the Germans and Britons interviewed in the ESS in 2008. They are on average positioned in the lower right quadrant. The Norwegian participations are on average also located in this quadrant though the participation are less certain that migrants have a net gain from social benefits and services than were Norwegians interviewed in 2008. The Danish and Slovenia participants, however, are on average located in the upper-right quadrant. Thus, at least in the pre survey these participants saw their welfare state as an encouragement to migration but at the

same time the thought – on average – that migrants actually contributed with more to the welfare state than they took out.

Figure 2 shows the average country position on the ESS-item from 2008 about when migrants should have the same social rights as natives. The x-axis is the mean country score (building on the assumption the respondents perceive the answer-brackets as a scale; see Appendix Table 1 for raw numbers). An average score at one on the x-axis would mean that everybody in ESS survey answered that migrants should be given the same rights as natives immediately at point of arrival. An average score of five would mean that everybody answered that migrants should never be given the same rights. Ranged this way the publics in Israel and Sweden held the least welfare chauvinist attitudes in 2008, while Cypress and Hungary held the strongest. The y-axis is the standard deviation around the country mean (on the x-axis). A high score, as in Israel, indicates high disagreement (or polarisation) in the public, while a low score, as in Hungary, indicates public consensus. Despite the potential for welfare chauvinist attitudes indicated in Figure 1, the selected countries do not represent the most welfare chauvinist publics found in Europe in 2008. Slovenians held in 2008 by comparative standards fairly welfare chauvinist attitudes with little internal opposition, i.e. a location in the lower right quadrant (reference lines set by mean). However, the consensus of welfare (relative) high welfare chauvinism was not as extreme in Hungary. UK had the most welfare chauvinist found in Western Europe with relative little opposition but had an average position in the overall sample; placing it around the centre of the sampled 28 countries in the ESS. Denmark, Norway and Germany had publics with below average welfare chauvinist attitudes. However, at the same time they had large minorities holding the opposite position. Thus, the sample includes European countries with (relative) high levels of uncontested welfare chauvinism (UK and Slovenia) and (relative) low welfare chauvinism with an internal polarization (Denmark, Norway and Germany).

Figure 2: Attitudes to granting same social rights as natives. 28 country positions based on European Social Survey 2008. Five positions of participations at deliberative forums 2015 in pre-survey. Country mean and standard deviation.



BE Belgium, BG Bulgaria, CH Switzerland, CY Cyprus, CZ Czech Republic, DE Germany, DK Denmark, EE Estonia, ES Spain, FI Finland, FR France, GB United Kingdom, GR Greece, HR Croatia, HU Hungary, IL Israel, LV Latvia, NL Netherlands, NO Norway, PL Poland, PT Portugal, RO Romania, RU Russian Federation, SE Sweden, SI Slovenia, SK Slovakia, TR Turkey, UA Ukraine.

Finally, the attitudes of the participants of the deliberative forums in 2015 can be positioned in Figure 2. The average attitudes and polarisation of the Norwegian, German and British participants resembles those found in the ESS in 2008. In contrast both the Danish and Slovenian participants were less polarised than found in the ESS; positioning the Danish participants in the lower-left quadrant with (relative) high consensus on none-welfare chauvinist attitudes (at least in the pre-survey). In the Slovenian case, the participants indicated higher consensus about the welfare chauvinist position. Whether the attitude differences between participations of the Danish and Slovenian deliberative forums and the ESS is simply a selection-effect or reflects real changes from 2008 to 2015 cannot be determined by these data. In any case the added value of the qualitative

approach is not to provide aggregated estimates but to explore the background for holding welfare chauvinist attitudes.

The rationales of welfare chauvinism

In the deliberative fora there are significant differences between countries on the topic of immigration and refugee policies and how they relate to welfare. With point of departure in the three theoretical perspectives we describe the topics and policy issues which emerged in each country when discussing immigrants and refugees. It is important to notice that apart from the qualitative differences between countries that will be apparent below important quantitative differences emerged as well. The topic was more salient to discussion in some countries than others and consequently was treated more extensively. The result is that the countries where this was a big issue – such as Germany and UK – a lot of discussion and consequently data resulted from this. This is less the case in Denmark and Slovenia where the topic was less salient to vision of the welfare state in 2040.

The rationales behind British welfare chauvinism

The UK data includes a number of statements that point to the importance of self-interest. In terms of competition at the labour market, the reference point is a hard working Polish male who are willing to work for more hours and less wage. A number of respondents also found competition by higher skilled migrants intensified due to the increased cost of education in the UK. Thus, high educated migrants freely educated in the country of origin competed with natives with less educational possibilities. In terms of competition for welfare benefits and services, the British respondents were mainly concerned about migrants' access to the universal health system, NHS, and education. One basic argument was that giving access to migrants reduces the resources one can use to give health treatment and education to natives. The argument of welfare magnetism was mainly linked to NHS. Thus, a number of respondents rationalized that the free treatment in NHS motivated migrants to come to UK. A few respondents also linked the welfare competition issue to housing and even prisons. The underlying logic was that migrants' increased the strain already put on the NHS, education, housing and prisons.

The UK data also contains a number of statements that point to the importance of moral deservingness discussions. As in the other countries, the “migrants” were more or less by definition perceived as “non-natives”, i.e. a clear distinguish between outsiders and insiders were in place. Thus, “our people” is more deserving than outsiders. A number of respondents used the military veterans living in the streets as reference point in the discussion. Thus, the applied logic was that if one cannot take care of this highly deserving group of native veterans it makes little moral sense to start to give benefits and services to migrants. The least deserving migrants were clearly those so-called scroungers attracted by the NHS and other typically unspecified services and benefits. It was especially degrading if these British benefits were sent to persons living outside the UK or used to

buy real-estate outside the UK. What potentially could make the “migrants” more deserving was that he or she was actually a true refugee. Thus, in various places the UK participants operated with a distinction between real refugees that should be entitled to some rights, migrant-scroungers that should be entitled to no rights at all and hard-working migrant workers who could earn rights through insurance and years of tax payment. Being a European citizen did little to increase the deservingness; on the contrary the EU-citizens’ right was seen a particular problem that needed to be solved (especially to treatment in NHS). What could lower the deservingness of natives – typically in comparison with the hardworking migrant worker – was the status of being a native welfare scrounger (either found among young unemployed in general or among single mothers). Thus, a British speciality is that the hardworking migrants is sometimes seen as a person that could teach the local scroungers an important lesson about how to behave.

The main sociotopic concern of British respondents were about fiscal sustainability. Migrants were in general seen as a strain on the future British economy and welfare state. Therefore one of the most discussed solutions was to introduce a point-system modelled after the Australian system. The Australian migration rules (and to some extent the Canadian and American) were perceived as an effective way to only include migrants that would come to be net-contributors for the UK economy and welfare state. Another discussed solution was to put a general cap on annual migration. Thus, the argument of migration as a way to solve the fiscal problems of the future was close to absent in the British discussion. In contrast a number of respondents discussed the lack of space and overpopulation caused by migration. A sociotropic concern about maintaining authentic British culture was totally absent in the discussion. However, a number of respondents stated a number of sociotropic concerns for the current and future social order. Concerns were raised about the subgroup of criminals and even terrorists among migrants, which made another argument for intensifying the government’s administrative capacity to screen migrants before entry into UK. The migrants gathered in Calais in France functioned as a reference point in some the discussions. Finally, a number of respondents are worried about the social order in more abstract terms. Thus, concerns were raised about future riots and even internal war.

The rationales behind Danish welfare chauvinism

The Danish forum included close to no statements about direct competition between natives and migrants as expected from a self-interest perspective. There are no specific areas in which the inflow of immigrants seems to threaten the viability of existing policies and reduce service and benefits given to natives. Rather, the policies discussed in the forum are the immigration policies themselves and the overall principles of welfare policies. In regards to the latter, the two main issues were when immigrants and refugees should gain access to welfare benefits and services after arriving in the country and the overall incentives created by the welfare system. The issue of overall incentives connected with the welfare magnetism debate and questioned whether or not the current welfare rights were not too strong an incentive for potential immigrants and refugees. Thus, the welfare magnetism perception could be found be it was not framed as a competition situation. The Danish material neither

have clear deservingness discussions besides the use of refugee status to pinpoint a more deserving group. The right to deserve welfare entitlements was as a question of when immigrants and refugees had proven sufficiently that they were willing to integrate and contribute to society, i.e. a clear link to sociotropic reasoning was established. The pivotal issue was the willingness to contribute to society as the decisive criteria for being welcome in Denmark. This discussion interconnected a set of important issues: integration, work, self-sufficiency, and deservingness to the issue of contribution.

Sociotropic concerns were pivotal in the Danish discussion. The dominating focus was whether migration and giving migrant welfare entitlement for good or bad from a societal perspective. In regards to costs and benefits, the latter thematic revolved around the framing of immigrants as not only an expenditure but as a potential gain for the Danish economy. What was emphasised here was the need for labour and in particular highly qualified labour. Many participants discussed how to more effectively select the qualified, productive immigrants and avoid those less productive and consequently more costly. This distinction was primarily made between qualified western and unqualified non-western immigrants and between qualified refugees and unqualified spouses and parents arriving through family reunification. The discussion also included notions of investment, looking at the expenditures as an investment in future profit for society from increased immigration. In particular, the idea of a more selective immigrations policy which would make Denmark attractive to productive, qualified labour and be able to swiftly expel those less productive seem to unite the group of more immigration critical participants. The discussion also included sociotropic concerns about the non-economic functioning of society. This discussion interconnected a set of important issues: integration, work, self-sufficiency, and deservingness to the issue of contribution. This thematic revolved around the notion that to become part of the Danish society without threatening the stability and cohesion of society the immigrants and refugees should wish to become integrated into society. The notion of integration was brought up numerous times and the lack of integration was argued to lead to different kinds of social pathologies. The integration concept itself is used in a very unspecific manner by most participants, but from the way it is used it emerges that the integration means to contribute to society through labour market participation and self-sufficiency. This willingness to contribute was by some participants suggest be made the key requirement for permanent residency and access to family reunification.

The rationales behind Slovenian welfare chauvinism

The Slovenian forum also has very few statement about direct competition for job, benefits and services between natives and migrants. The Syrian refugees were perceived just to be on the move through Slovenia with no intention to settle; though discussion about the numbers of refugees were discussed. In contrast the prominent issues was how Slovenia could attract high qualified migrants; in the context where well-educated Eastern European left for Northern Europe (see below). The non-salience of the welfare chauvinism issue also meant that the material contains few deservingness discussions. There is, however, a number of statements about that welfare rights should naturally not

be granted to migrants in a situation where natives are not taking care of. The framing seems to be that Slovenia is still the process of building a decent welfare state for the “own kind”, which makes it morally irrelevant to suggest giving welfare rights to migrants.

The sociotropic concerns did not revolve around the contemporary problems with previous or current problems about migration. The more prominent topic in the discussions was the issue of attracting qualified labour while still retaining cultural integrity. The issue of attracting qualified labour and much needed experts was even framed by some of the participants as a question of how to retain the refugees and immigrants currently moving through southern Europe and on to central and northern Europe. Key points of this debate was that Slovenia was less attractive for the qualified immigrants than e.g. Germany, but what specifically is seen to make Slovenia less attractive is not elaborated. More generally, the lack of highly qualified experts and skilled and unskilled labour is seen as a potential threat to the Slovenian economy and attracting the right immigrants is seen as a potential solution to this issue. Much of the discussion revolves around how to create the right incentives for qualified migrants to come to Slovenia. Consequently, many of the policy issues treated revolves around this challenge. It was e.g. discussed how giving tax exemptions to migrants and offering different kinds of services or benefits could make Slovenia a desirable option for migrants with the particular skills and qualification sought after by the labour market.

The issue of cultural integrity emerges in the debate as a concern that immigration of migrants with different cultural values form a threat to the Slovenian type of society, the Slovenian identity and the language. Potentially, the inflow of different cultural values is seen to cause conflict and threaten principle such as tolerance and equality. In particular, Muslims and the practice of wearing veils are mentioned by some as representing a different and incompatible cultural values pattern, a position contested by others. The issue of cultural integrity is primarily framed as an issue of integration or assimilation, emphasising the need both to accept the majority way of life and in particular learning the Slovenian language as part of becoming a citizen. Citizenship plays in an important role in the discussion of integration as well, discussing citizenship requirements such as language skills and employability.

The rationales behind German welfare chauvinism

... to come (the data is there)

The rationales behind Norwegian welfare chauvinism

... to come (preparing data)

Forum dynamic and consensus positions of welfare chauvinism

The main methodological advantage of deliberative forums over qualitative person to person interviews is the ability to study attitudes formation in a situation where the citizen is exposed to the contrasting opinions of other citizens and is given basic information about the subject at hand. We will describe the potential forum-dynamics and consensus position by means of responses in the pre- and post-survey as well as the suggested policy proposals that received large support at the end of Day 2. The pre- and post-survey result (in raw numbers) is shown in Table 1. The pre- and post-survey indicate, as expected, a tendency to less “Don know answers” and less middle position answers (such as five on a 11-point scale or neither agree nor disagree). Thus, the participants did form opinions along the way.

Table 1. Perception of social benefits as a reason for migration, perception of net contribution from migrants and attitudes to conditions for given same rights as natives. Pre and post survey in deliberative forums. Absolute numbers

	Norway		Denmark		Germany		UK		Slovenia	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
Perception of social benefits as a reason for migration										
Agree strongly / agree	21	21	14	18	25	28	19	21	15	12
Neither agree nor disagree	8	5	7	6	4	4	9	5	11	9
Disagree strongly / disagree	4	5	13	6	4	2	4	6	10	13
Don't know	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	3
No answer	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	0
Perception of net contribution from migrants: ¹										
Receive more than the contribute (0 – 4)	13	9	10	14	15	14	16	19	4	4
5	10	9	7	4	12	9	9	4	9	8
Contribute more than they receive (6-10)	6	11	15	12	7	10	6	10	19	17
Don't know	5	3	3	4	0	1	3	1	6	8
Mean (Don't exclude)	5.0	5.2	5.8	4.8	4.1	4.4	3.7	3.9	6.7	6.4
Attitudes to conditions for giving same rights a natives:										
Immediately on arrival.	4	2	3	5	3	3	1	0	0	0
After living in [country] for a year, whether or not they have worked	2	3	5	2	4	6	2	0	0	0
Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year.	12	22	19	14	14	15	17	24	17	8
Once they have become a [country] citizen	10	4	7	7	7	7	8	5	20	27
They should never get the same rights.	0	0	0	1	3	1	2	5	0	2
Don't know	6	1	0	0	3	2	0	0	1	0
N	34	32	35	32	34	34	34	34	38	37

¹ 0 – 11 point scale.

There is little evidence that this dynamic of opinion formation lead to less welfare chauvinist attitudes. In the Slovenian case, the pre- and post-survey indicates that the participants came to hold more welfare chauvinist attitudes. 27 of the 37 Slovenian participants answered in the post-survey that equal social rights to migrants should require citizenship; reflecting a reduction in those answering that equal access should be given after tax payment for a year or more (from 17 participants to 8 participants). No one came to think that entitlements should be given immediately on arrival or independent of work. This harder attitude was formed despite a perception (both in the pre- and post-survey) of migrants being net contributors to the Slovenian welfare state and the discussion about how to increase immigration of high-skilled. In the British case the pre- and post-survey also indicates more welfare chauvinist attitudes. 24 of the 34 British participants answered in the post-survey that equal rights should only be granted after minimum a year of tax payment; leaving nobody left with the attitude that rights should be granted immediately on arrival or independent of work. Those answering “never same right” increased from two to five participants. In the post survey more British participants also indicated that the welfare state encouraged migration (21 participants out of 34), while they became a little more polarised on the issue of net contribution. In the Danish and German case close to no change on the question about access while four more Danish participants came to see social benefits and services as an encouragement to migration and four more gave to see migrants as net receivers. In the German case the participants became a little more polarised on the question about net receiver or contributor. Only in the Norwegian case do the pre- and post-survey indicate a change to less welfare chauvinist attitudes. In the post survey 22 of the 32 Norwegian participant indicate that equal rights should be given after minimum a year of tax payment; a reflecting six less indicating citizenship as a central criterion. The Norwegians did not change attitudes about the social benefits and services being an encouragement to migrants but more participants came to see migrants as net contributors to the Norwegian welfare state.

Turning to proposal that received broad support at the end of Day 2 there is indication of welfare chauvinist and none-welfare chauvinist consensus positions. The proposals that receiving support for around twenty or more of the participants are perceived as consensus positions.

In Denmark seven consensus positions emerged from the discussion, which in headlines where a) refugees should not sit in camps but should subject to swift case work (31 for, 1 against), b) everybody should contribute nobody should receive passive benefits (28 for, 1 against), c) qualified migration that can contribute to society (26 for, 0 against), d) migrants should be seen as an equal resource, which should lead to an attitude change among politicians (23 for, 5 against), e) similar rules in all of EU plus benefits adjusted to living costs (23 for, 6 against), f) family reunification only in case of economic self-sufficiency (22 for, 2 against) and g) migrants should demonstrate willingness to integrate and there should be a wish to learn the language and abide the laws (19 for, 2 against).

In Germany three consensus positions emerged from the discussion a) there should be clear guidelines for refugee policy (24 for, 2 against), refugees should be integrated via access to education, labour

market and housing (23 for, 2 against), and c) migration, including refugees should be lowered in number and a global distribution of refugees should be made (16 for, 3 against).

UK, Slovenia and Norway to come (data in preparation).

Conclusion

.... To come. Input is highly welcomed.

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