1. Introduction

At the turn of the century, the former chancellor of Germany Helmut Schmidt praised the developed welfare states of European countries as “the hitherto latest great cultural achievements of Europeans” (Schmidt 2001: 1). One does not have to subscribe to this view to acknowledge that the European welfare states are indeed amazing social phenomena: enormous organizational and institutional arrangements supposed to promote – to varying degrees and by different means – social security, social equality, social justice, and social mobility. Modern welfare states confer rights and entitlements, redistribute resources, and offer social services and infrastructures in order to ensure an adequate standard of living, protect against social risks, support citizens at various stages of the life course, and promote personal development and social advancement; and ultimately, they reconcile the sweeping and self-endangering forces of capitalism with social integration and social order. In short, the welfare state is one of the main structural features of contemporary European societies.

For the acceptance and functioning of these enormous organizational and institutional mechanisms of redistribution, it is important that their inherent norms and distributive principles relate to moral assumptions and ideas about fairness, justice, responsibility and reciprocity within the population: As processes of redistribution always create ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in financial terms, the acceptance of social policies by citizens cannot be taken for granted (Mau 2003). This becomes even more important in times of welfare state reforms, when new social policies might create new norms and distributive principles and thereby challenge the established moral economy of institutional solidarity and welfare provision. If the resulting fractions, conflicts and contradictions between normative principles are not resolved or at least mediated, political and social dissatisfaction or even conflict occur. Moreover, while in times of welfare state expansion the growth of social benefits might mitigate such conflicts, in times of welfare state retrenchment and restructuration it is more likely that social policies chal-
Challenging the established moral economy of the welfare state will create new lines of conflict and new social cleavages (Pierson 1996, 2001).

European welfare states are unquestionably in a period of transformation, caused by long-term challenges such as intensifying international competition, socioeconomic change, and population ageing as well as by the recent Great Recession and resulting austerity programmes (see Introduction). Although radical welfare state retrenchment is rare (Pierson 1994; Starke 2006), we can observe privatization of risk management in some areas, a greater role of activation and market-affirming social policies, and the emergence of new social risks (e.g. Taylor-Gooby 2004; Clasen 2005; Hemerijck 2013; Crouch 2015). This applies not least to the German welfare state, the once prototypical example of a conservative – and, according to some observers, institutionally ‘frozen’ (Esping-Andersen 1996: 24) – welfare state characterized by status-preserving social policies institutionalized in compulsory social insurance schemes and promoting a ‘male breadwinner / female homemaker’ family model (e.g. Bleses & Seeleib-Kaiser 2004; Hassel 2010; Clasen 2011; Carlin et al. 2014).

In this chapter, we provide a descriptive overview of changes in social policies and citizens’ welfare attitudes in Germany since the 1980s. The overarching questions of our review and analysis are: Which policy changes have occurred and into which direction? What does this imply for the established institutional architecture and its fundamental principles of granting rights and benefits? How do welfare attitudes in the population develop in light of social changes and social policy reforms? In order to answer these questions, we will look at policy changes as well as accompanying changes in welfare attitudes.

The chapter is structured as follows: The next section will provide a sketch of the German economy, polity and welfare state, especially its institutionalized forms of solidarity (Section 2). This will be followed by overviews of main social policy issues and reforms since the 1980s (Section 3) and recent policy responses to the financial, economic and fiscal crisis (Section 4). In the following section, we will analyze past and present attitudes towards the welfare state in general and in some specific domains – labour market policies, old-age provision, health care, and family and social investment policies – in light of the long-term and short-term transformations outlined before.
(Section 5), followed by a conclusion discussing likely future developments of welfare provision and institutional solidarity in Germany (Section 6).

2. Germany’s political economy and welfare system in comparative perspective

Germany is the largest national economy in Europe – and the fourth-largest worldwide – and has considerable influence on the economic and political development of the European Union and the Eurozone; in this capacity, it has been a key player in the recent turn of many European countries towards austerity programmes in the wake of the financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis. Germany is also the leading export nation in Europe, the third-biggest exporter worldwide, and has the largest export surplus globally. The German economy is based on a substantial manufacturing sector with a focus on industrially produced goods such as motor vehicles, machinery, chemical and electronic products. While there are quite a few ‘global players’ among German companies, it is particularly the small- and mid-sized companies (the ‘Mittelstand’), which are often world market leaders in their economic sector, that are considered the ‘backbone’ of the German economy. The German export-driven economic model is grounded in a consensus-based corporatist polity, sectoral collective bargaining, and wage restraint by the trade unions. In the first decades after the Second World War, this model – often referred to as ‘Social Market Economy’ (Soziale Marktwirtschaft), denoting a political economy situated between the Anglo-Saxon model of liberal ‘laissez-faire’ capitalism on the one hand and a more interventionist state in other parts of Europe on the other – received widespread popular support, and it is still held in high esteem in Germany despite the erosion of its economic and social bases (Streeck 1997, 2009). From a comparative perspective, the German economy has been highlighted as a prime example of a ‘coordinated market economy’ (Hall & Soskice 2001), characterized by institutions that encourage long-term cooperative relations among firms in combination with differentiated production, incremental innovations, high levels of job security in some sectors, and high (industry-specific) skills among workers.

The political system – a federal parliamentary republic – mirrors the cooperative and consensus-based style of economic governance and can be referred to as ‘consensus democracy’ (Lijphart 1999). The constitution – literally: Basic Law (Grundgesetz) – stipulates that Germany is a constitutional, democratic and social republic and distrib-
utes power between the federal government and the governments of the regional states (Länder). On the federal level, legislative power is vested in the parliament (Bundestag) and the representative body of the sixteen regional states (Bundesrat). Since the end of the Second World War, the federal government has been formed by two-party coalitions led by either the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands; CDU) or the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands; SPD), with the liberal Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei; FDP) or, more recently, the Green Party (Bündnis 90-Die Grünen) as junior partners, although in the last decades other political parties have gained importance, not least due to dissatisfaction with welfare and immigration policies (see Sections 3 and 4).

The German welfare state is often seen as the archetype of a conservative welfare state, deeply rooted in authoritarian and paternalist strategies of modernization, still bearing the legacy of status-specific corporations, guilds and monopolies which represent a specific type of associationalism and monopolyism (Esping-Andersen 1990). This tradition implies a heavy emphasis on occupational differentiation and the recognition of particular status privileges. The conservative concept of social order and cohesion favors status-preserving policies rather than resource sharing and relates the social security system closely to the labour market. The contributory and compulsory social insurance system on which the German welfare state is built centers around labour market positions and earnings and ties the receipt of benefits to prior contributions, so that wage-earners’ rights are proportionally linked to their contributions (Bonoli 1997); this articulates a “welfare through work” ideology (Goodin 2001: 13).¹

This welfare regime has had considerable impact on family structures and labour market participation of women, as the status-preserving social insurance system – in combination with education, care, family and tax policies – encouraged a division of work in the family between a ‘male breadwinner’ who earns income and rights to benefits on the labour market and a ‘female homemaker’ responsible for care and child-rearing.

¹ However, the health care system is characterized by contributory differentiation on the one hand, and entitlement universalism on the other hand. It is a statutory insurance mandated by law for employed persons with incomes below a defined ceiling. The financing is secured by earnings-related levied wage taxes imposed on the employee and the employer with some extra governmental subsidies. Thus, access to health care is regulated through labour market integration. Groups not integrated into the labour market are covered via their relation to an income earner or on the basis of their former labour market participation (pensioners).
and receiving rights to benefits via the partner’s labour market status (Lewis 1992). However, the Achilles heel of this model is that it is based on standard, full-time employment of (only half of) the population; thus, in times of mass unemployment, non-standard employment, and population ageing – resulting in an increasing share of excluded or benefit-receiving persons in relation to contributors – this model becomes increasingly unsustainable (Lewis 2001).

The organizational and institutional core of the German welfare regime is formed by major social insurance schemes dating back to late 19th and early 20th century and covering health care, occupational accidents, old-age, and unemployment (Alber 2003). In 1995, a fifth social insurance scheme was added by the introduction of long-term care insurance, and there is also a lower tier, tax-financed system of social assistance benefits for those without sufficient entitlements. Due to the emphasis on social insurances and earnings-related distribution, the middle classes are important beneficiaries of the system. In the past, the replacement rates have been relatively high and thus protected the middle classes against the disruptions and exigencies in people’s lives. As a consequence, skilled workers, white-collar employees and civil servants – in other words: middle class people – have been strong defenders of the core welfare institutions (Alber 1986; Mau 2003).

The moral economy of its core institutions generated widespread popular support for the German welfare state. The ‘social insurance welfarism’ – which confines the collectivization of risk to members of the social insurances – preserves the status one has achieved and conserves the “existing pecking order of society” (Goodin et al. 1999: 33). Such a system is easy to legitimize because it promises the participants what they have paid for and minimizes vertical, cross-class redistribution. Thereby, it not only instills a sense of individually earned rights, but it also, as Claus Offe (1994: 129) has rightly argued, “morally undemanding” because “no one needs to believe in lofty principles of solidarity, justice, or equality to become – and remain – a rational supporter of the system (...). Its modest goal is the guarantee of income – and of relative income status! – for employees and their dependents.” Observers note that the German welfare state has been “a remarkable consensual one, without any intensive conflict between labour-force participants, on the one hand, and welfare clients, on the other” (Clasen 1994: 73).
3. **Social policy issues and reforms from the 1980s to the Great Recession**

The development of German social policy from the early 1980s to the recent Great Recession can be roughly divided into five phases: The first phase stretched from the inauguration of the Christian-Liberal government under Helmut Kohl (CDU) in 1982 to the German unification in 1990/91 and was characterized by much rhetoric and little reform. The (West) German welfare state had been on an expansionary course in the 1960s and 1970s, but from the mid-1970s onwards it was confronted with rising unemployment and fiscal problems. In 1982, the FDP left the coalition government with the SPD and partnered with the CDU, which announced a “mental and moral turn” including welfare reforms. However, while in some areas private and occupational provision was encouraged, the 1980s were dominated by continuity in welfare policies with selective, but modest cost-saving measures (Schmidt 1998; Alber 2000) rather than a turning point or a “conservative revolution” (Borchert 1995).

The collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1989/90 heralded a new phase in social policy, during which the West German welfare system was extended to the East and had to cushion the transformation from a planned economy and state socialism to a market economy. The implementation of the Western system in East Germany implied that East Germans gained access to welfare entitlements on the basis of fictitious contribution histories from their employment careers and large transfers from West Germany. Moreover, rising unemployment due to a massive decline of the East German economy was countered by public job creation schemes and the extension of early retirement schemes, while the resulting financial burdens were counterbalanced by rising contribution rates and the introduction of a ‘solidarity surcharge’ *(Solidaritätszuschlag)* on income tax and other taxes.

While the integration of East Germany into the West German welfare system did cause little direct institutional restructuration, in the mid-1990s the direction of welfare policies began to change. Even though there was no institutional disruption, the basic orientation of welfare reforms shifted towards cost cutting, benefit reductions, contribution rate stability, privatization, and marketization; hence this phase has been called a ‘latency period’ for the subsequent reforms (Nullmeier 2014: 13). A telling example is the creation of long-term care insurance in 1995 as a new pillar of the social insurance system: While this seems to represent an affirmation and reinforcement of the tradi-
tional principles of the German welfare regime, this new insurance scheme does not follow the usual model of ‘full’ insurance but only provides partial coverage against the risk of care dependency and is supposed to encourage additional private provision.

Moreover, the 1990s were characterized by high and rising unemployment as well as massive complaints by employers about lack of international competitiveness due to high costs of labour as well as rigid labour market regulations. While the political system experienced a political deadlock (Nullmeier 2014: 13), it was the German system of industrial relations that turned out to be adaptable under competitive pressure: a considerable decentralization of wage setting institutions combined with wage restraint by the trade unions increased competitiveness of the economy and has, according to some scholars, been more responsible for the good performance of the German economy before and during the Great Recession than the often mentioned subsequent labour market reforms (Dustmann et al. 2014).

The most important period of social policy change in Germany was between 1999 and 2007, as during these years the most fundamental restructuring of the welfare regime since the end of the Second World War took place (Nullmeier 2014: 13f.). The foundation was laid in 1998, when a new federal government formed by the SPD and the Green Party – the first Red-Green alliance on the federal level – under the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder superseded the 16-year chancellorship of Helmut Kohl and pledged – partly inspired by ‘New Labour’ in Britain (see Chapter 2) – to create a sustainable welfare state and to tackle mass unemployment by increasing the productivity and competitiveness of the German economy.² In the following years, major reforms in all areas of social policy were implemented: In old-age provision, a trend towards cost cutting was intensified by means of a gradual increase in the regular retirement age (from 65 in the year 2012 to age 67 in 2029), a considerable decrease in the level of public pensions, the introduction of a state-subsidized privately funded pension scheme (‘Riester-Rente’), and the introduction of a needs-based basic pension for those without sufficient entitlements. In health care the creation of quasi-markets, reductions in health services covered by the social insurance system, co-payments for

² The main reforms in 2003-2005 were implemented under the heading ‘Agenda 2010’, which alluded to the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ of the European Union and was supposed to promote economic growth and reduce unemployment by means of cuts and changes in labour market regulation, vocational training, education policies, health care policies, pension policies, labour market policies, and family policies.
additional services, and allowances for prevention measures have been predicted to benefit mainly high earners and to establish different levels of health care services for different groups of the population (Lessenich 2013).

The most controversial reforms were made in the area of labour market policies with the so-called ‘Hartz-reforms’.3 These reforms were implemented in several steps between 2003 and 2005 and included a restructuring of labour market services, funding for further vocational training, and the facilitation of new types of employment. The promotion of these types of non-standard, unsecured and often low-paid employment has been argued to strengthen precarisation and labour market stratification (Eichhorst & Marx 2011). Especially contested was the last reform (‘Hartz IV’) in 2005, which merged long-term unemployment benefits and welfare benefits to a new benefit at the level of social assistance and thus meant that even individuals with long contribution histories to unemployment insurance would end up at the social assistance level after twelve months of unemployment (or, since a reform in 2008, after up to 24 months for persons aged 50 and over). In case of refusal to accept a job, benefits are cut a further 30 per cent, and the recipient’s savings and the salary of the spouse are taken into account when calculating these benefits. Moreover, ‘one-euro-jobs’ were created, meaning that the state could employ people for one euro an hour in order to improve their chances on the private labour market. While these reforms were backed by the CDU and the FDP, they received strong criticism from trade unions and left-leaning Social Democrats and led to the creation of a new left-wing party – called Labour and Social Justice: The Electoral Alternative (Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit: Die Wahlalternative) – which merged in 2007 with the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus; the successor to the governing party of the GDR) to form a new party called ‘The Left’ (Die Linke).

Not least due to strong opposition to the welfare reforms, the Red-Green alliance could not defend its parliamentary majority in the federal election of 2005, and a ‘Grand coalition’ government between CDU and SPD under Christian Democrat Angela Merkel was formed. In this – fifth and final – period, the reform activity declined and changes were limited to minor amendments and revisions; hence, the German welfare state re-

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3 The reforms are colloquially named after Peter Hartz, the chief human resources manager of Volkswagen and head of a commission established by Gerhard Schröder in 2002 to develop recommendations for labour market reforms.
turned to its usual operation (Nullmeier 2014: 14). The most important changes occurred in the area of family policies, as the Grand coalition introduced a relatively generous tax-financed parental leave scheme (‘Elterngeld’, replacing 67 per cent of income for up to 14 months), expanded public child care facilities, and improved the opportunities for tax deductions to subsidize child costs – a policy shift which represents a break with the old style of conservative family policy and a stronger emphasis on ‘new social risks’. All this was seen as serving a twofold purpose: as a turn towards a ‘social investment’ strategy with an emphasis on the early childhood, and as serving the integration of women into the labour market by improving opportunities for combining family obligations and employment. The most recent major social policy reform was the introduction of a minimum wage in 2015 – pushed through by the SPD against resistance from the coalition partners – in response to the significant rise of temporary, unsecured and low-paid forms of employment.

Behind this variety of reform measures in different areas of social policy, one can discern some general trends of welfare reforms in Germany over the last decades: In normative and institutional (less so in organizational) respect, we can observe a departure from the conservative welfare model in regard to the emphasis on status-maintenance and the alliance with the male breadwinner family model. This re-orientation has been interpreted as a ‘double movement’ away from the conservative welfare state (Lessenich 2013): On the one hand, there is an extension of the labour force to include all groups in society, in particular women (‘employment universalism’), and, a shift towards ‘activating’ labour market policies (‘activation’). On the other hand, we can observe the introduction of elements typical of ‘liberal’ welfare state regimes; this includes a shift from public responsibility towards increased self-responsibility in regard

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4 Though some scholars have argued that “the overall level of public resources and childcare availability remain too limited to establish a clear new model” (Ciccia & Bleijenbergh 2014: 69) there is a new emphasis now on female labour participation and reconciling work and employment by providing more child care facilities.

5 In order to cater to the conservative clientele of the CDU’s sister party – the Bavarian Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern; CSU) – and against opposition even from within the coalition parties, the Grand coalition also introduced a child care subsidy for home-based care by parents in 2012. However, in 2015 this ‘Betreuungsgeld’ has been declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court on the grounds that the federal government lacked the legislative competences; thus, this subsidy, which encourages a traditional family model, will be discontinued.

6 In West Germany, the rate of female employment rose from 64.7 per cent in 1994-1999 to 71.8 per cent in 2005-2009, while in East Germany – which had already high rates of female employment due to the legacy of the GDR – it remained on a high level (81.6 per cent in 2005-2009; see DIW n.d.). In 2014, the female employment rate in Germany was 73.8 per cent and thus considerably above the EU-28 average of 64.8 per cent (Eurostat 2015).
to old-age provision and selected health care services (‘individual responsibility’) as well as a stronger emphasis on means-tested basic security benefits in the areas of old-age provision and unemployment benefits (‘needs-based basic security’). Finally, the most recent institutional and organizational shift has occurred in the area of family and child care policy with the adoption of a ‘social investment’ perspective focusing on early childhood, which merges social-democratic and liberal elements (‘social investment’).

--- Figure 1 about here ---

In relation to GDP, total social spending has remained relatively constant since the 1990s, with the lowest share in 1992 (25.0 per cent) and the highest one in 2003 (29.8 per cent). As Figure 1 shows, the share of spending for different areas of social policy has changed only slightly since the 1990s, with the most important changes being a rise in spending for children and families and a decline in spending for unemployment. While social expenditures in 2014 were financed to relatively equal shares by payments from employers, insured persons, and the state, over the years the share of payments from employers has decreased, whereas the share of payments from insured persons and the state has increased considerably; this signifies a shift in the balance of power between capital and labour (or employers and employees), but also an increasing role of taxes (as opposed to contributions) for welfare financing. Figure 2 shows that inequality of disposable incomes was relatively stable between 1991 and 2000 but rose considerably between 2000 and 2005; afterwards, it declined slightly (see Grabka et al. 2012). Among the main causes for rising income inequalities in Germany is decreasing effectiveness of government redistribution due to changes in the tax system, the public transfer system, and labour market regulations involving transfer cuts as well as lowering market income concentration (Schmid & Stein 2013; OECD 2015).

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4. The Great Recession and social policy responses in Germany

During the Great Recession, the trajectory of Germany’s economy was rather unusual: On the one hand, in the last quarter of 2008 the economy slipped into the deepest re-

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cession since the Second World War, with a decline by five per cent in 2009 – below the Eurozone average of minus 4.4 per cent – and the near-collapse of key players in the financial sector. On the other hand, the economy recovered quickly and returned to growth already in 2010. Even more surprisingly, the unemployment rate remained relatively unaffected by the recession and rose only from 8.7 per cent in 2008 to 9.1 per cent in 2009 and declined afterwards, which led economists to praise “Germany’s jobs miracle” (Krugman 2009), though one has to bear in mind that in the aftermath of the Hartz-reforms in particular the low-wage sector expanded.

This quick economic recovery has been ascribed to three major causes: First, the government responded to the crisis in the financial sector by adopting several (express) laws and thus prevented failure of major financial institutions and a ‘credit crunch’.\(^8\) Second, the ‘automatic stabilizers’ which dampen fluctuations in gross domestic product (GDP), such as income taxes and welfare spending, were more effective in Germany than in other countries, mainly because of the structure of unemployment insurance; in addition, as a major exporter Germany imported the effects of automatic stabilizers in other countries. And third, the German government introduced four economic stimulus packages in 2008 and 2009 with an overall financial volume of about 90 billion Euros. These stimulus packages also included various social policy measures, such as lower contributions to unemployment insurance, raises in child-care allowances, improved tax deductibility of health care and nursing care contributions, and lower health insurance contributions (Starke 2015).

The most important social policy measure to dampen the effects of the recession on the labour market was the use and extension of ‘Kurzarbeitergeld’, which is a short-time work scheme enabling companies to respond to declining demand by reducing the working time of their employees instead of laying them off; employees receive 60 percent of the difference between their net pay and their reduced pay from the public purse. While these subsidies are usually only granted for a maximum duration of six months, the government extended this period at first to 18 and later to 24 months. It is estimated that, as a consequence, up to 1.5 million employees – or 5.1 percent of the

\(^8\) These express laws to stabilize the financial sector were: the ‘Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz’ of 2008, which created a public fund guaranteeing the solvency of financial institutions; the ‘Finanzmarktstabilisierungsergänzungsgesetz’ of 2009, which nationalized failing banks; and the ‘Finanzmarktstabilisierungsförderungsverordnungsgesetz’ of 2009, which enabled the creation of ‘bad debt banks’.
German labour force – were on short-time work during the recession, especially in regions with export-oriented industries (Starke 2015).

Three points regarding the effects of the Great Recession and policy responses are noteworthy: First, as the economy recovered quickly, Germany did not experience the same economic and social hardships as many other European countries. Second – and possibly related to this – it has been argued that in contrast to previous economic crises the German government did not only rely on the automatic stabilizers but deliberately and actively used social policy measures to counter (the effects of) the recession.

However, the set of policy instruments was limited: On the one hand, most measures were concerned with contributions, not with benefits; and on the other hand, the most important expenditure measure – the ‘Kurzarbeitergeld’ – focused on the core industrial workforce in export-oriented sectors (Starke 2015). And third, the reliance on ‘traditional’ measures of social policy evoke the question if – in line with findings from comparative welfare state research (see Starke et al. 2013) – in times of economic crises governments fall back on traditional concepts and policies. Hence, some observers have argued that short-time work is an adequate functional response to labor market inflexibilities in coordinated market economies (Sacchi et al. 2013) and that responses to the Great Recession in Germany can be seen as a recourse to the tradition of corporatism and consensus-seeking, especially in respect of the consultations between trade unions and employers’ associations on the national and company level (Nullmeier 2014: 15). The recent wave of strikes in Germany signal a departure from the consensus culture, but there is a clear shift away from the industrial sector to the domestic services sector, where wage-setting norms are less entrenched, working conditions are often more problematic, and labour relations are more conflictual.

After recovery from the Great Recession, the German government changed its policy course and the Christian-Liberal coalition that had come into office in 2009 pursued the most extensive programme of spending cuts in German post-War history; in terms of social policy, this included benefit reductions for long-term unemployed persons and reductions in parental allowances for high-earners. Moreover, in 2009 Germany’s

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9 Other scholars argue that the preconditions for corporatist solutions – such as high trade union coverage, centralized labour relations, and tripartite forums for policy-making – had come apart in Germany and that the consultations were more an exchange of opinions and a trust-building measure than a concerted corporatist pact (e.g. Eichhorst & Weishaupt 2013; Starke 2015).
constitution was amended to include a balanced budget provision called ‘debt brake’ (‘Schuldenbremse’): From 2016 onwards, the federal government is forbidden to run a structural deficit of more than 0.35 per cent of GDP; and the ‘Länder’ are not allowed to run any structural deficit from 2020 onwards. In short, while the immediate impact of the Great Recession on welfare policies in Germany has been limited, the new ‘politics of austerity’ (Blyth 2013; Schäfer & Streeck 2013) might be the starting point for another round of welfare state restructuring and retrenchment (Obinger 2012).

In reaction to the ongoing Euro-crisis, Germany also saw the establishment of a new party, the ‘Alternative for Germany’ (Alternative für Deutschland). Starting out with a focus on economic policies, in particular as opposition to the German federal policies concerning the Eurozone crisis, it has embraced more and more populist and conservative positions with regard to migration, welfare issues, and the family. The party has fueled resentments vis-à-vis migrants and their inclusion into the welfare system, especially in relation to those who are allegedly ‘poverty migrants’ and do not come as ‘true’ refugees or asylum seekers. As such this party represents an emerging welfare chauvinism being increasingly present in European countries which draws a line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ based on ethno-national criteria. Their profile now appeals to a significant section of citizens being skeptical of increasing diversity – Germany has seen substantial immigration over the last years, including migration from the Southern European countries particularly affected by the economic crisis – and favoring closure rather than openness. The established parties – especially the Bavarian CSU and the right wing of the CDU – now see themselves pressurized by this agenda, although the majority of people express a welcoming attitude. However it can be expected that – also in reaction to denationalization, globalization and Europeanization – distributional conflicts are not only of (vertical) socio-economic nature, but increasingly ‘horizontal’ and relating to issues of values, culture, identity, and ethnicity (Kriesi et al. 2006). Those who experience themselves as losers of these processes might mobilize primarily in cultural rather than in economic terms.

5. **Attitudes towards the welfare state: Past changes and future prospects**

Our overview of long-term and short-term developments in German social policy has shown that the German welfare state has changed considerably, although mainly in the
2000s after a period of reform gridlock. Many of these reforms can be understood as a
departure from the conservative welfare state model with its focus on status mainte-
nance and a ‘male breadwinner’ family. Against this background, it is worth examin-
ing how citizens have perceived these reforms and if their attitudes towards the norma-
tive underpinnings of these reforms have changed in the last decades. Moreover, we
are interested in how people judge the welfare state’s current performance and if they
think that past reforms have prepared the welfare state for the near future. In order to
examine these issues, we draw on data from several representative cross-sectional sur-
veys\(^\text{10}\) and the literature on welfare attitudes in Germany. Our aim here is modest: We
do not want to theorize linkages between socioeconomic changes, policy reforms, and
changes in welfare attitudes (e.g. Naumann 2014), and we will barely touch upon dif-
fferences in attitudes between different social groups (e.g. Svallfors 2012); rather, we
will focus on broad attitudinal changes in the German population as a whole and
sketch out the overall ‘policy temperature’ (Soroka & Wlezien 2010) or ‘policy mood’
(Page & Shapiro 1983).

Changes in welfare attitudes in the context of major social policy reforms

One of the most marked shifts in the German conservative welfare regime has been the
turn towards universal labour market participation and the accompanying departure
from a ‘male breadwinner / female homemaker’ model towards an ‘adult worker’ or
‘dual breadwinner’ model (Lewis et al. 2008; Boling 2015). As Figure 3 shows, these
social and political changes have been accompanied by changes in citizens’ attitudes
towards female labour market participation: While in 1982 only 40.9 per cent of the
population completely agreed with the statement that ‘a working mother can establish
just as loving and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who doesn’t
work’, this share has risen steeply from 54.1 per cent in 2004 to 63.9 per cent in 2008
and 72.9 in 2012, with another 19.9 per cent tending to agree. Moreover, while in 1982

\(^{10}\) Datasets: 1) German General Social Survey (ALLBUS/GGSS): biannual survey since 1980; 2) ‘Atti-
tudes Towards the Welfare State’ (’Einstellungen zum Sozialstaat’; EZS) survey: four waves (2005 to
2008), conducted by the Goethe-University Frankfurt/Main for the German Federal Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs; 3) ‘Social Justice in the Welfare State’ (’Gerechtigkeit im Wohlfahrtsstaat’) survey:
conducted in 2007 by Ipsos for the University of Bremen; 4) International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP): annual cross-national survey; 5) European Values Survey (EVS): cross-national and longitudinal
survey in four waves (1981, 1990, 1999, 2008). Although some data are from the late 2000s, we con-
sider their use reasonable, as the major social policy reforms – except for changes in family policies –
had already been completed at this time (see Section 3).
a slight majority (52.2 per cent) of the population (completely or somewhat) agreed that ‘it is more important for a wife to help her husband with his career than to pursue her own career’, this share has fallen to 20.0 per cent in 2012; and while in 1982 70.3 per cent agreed that ‘it is much better for everyone concerned if the man goes out to work and the woman stays at home and looks after the house and children’, this share sank to 27.3 per cent. In fact, nowadays a majority of citizens say that ‘a child actually benefits from his or her mother having a job rather than just concentrating on the home’ (61.5 per cent in 2012 as compared to 24.6 per cent in 1982).

--- Figure 3 about here ---

These results indicate a substantial shift in attitudes towards female labour market participation – “from maternalism to employment for all” (Orloff 2006) – and suggest that the ‘adult worker’ model has become the norm not only in social and family policies but also among the population in Germany. In fact, a study asking why even the German Christian Democrats have adopted ‘social democratic’ family policies (Fleckenstein 2011) suggests that (changes in) citizens’ attitudes have been the main driver of change: After the Red-Green government in the early 2000s had promoted employment-centered family policies (as counterpart to increased work incentives in labour market policies), the CDU modernized its family policies to adapt it to citizens’ preferences and to mobilize the votes of young women, who were viewed as imperative for electoral success; “put differently, anticipated political gains have been at the core of the modernization strategy” (Fleckenstein 2011: 545).

Another major change in German social policy has been the shift from ‘traditional’ active labour market policies – such as counseling and job placement services, labor market training or subsidized employment – towards an ‘activation’ paradigm based on the assumption that there are sufficient job opportunities for unemployed persons and that the state has to ‘nudge’ people to take more self-responsibility for finding employment. Thus, as outlined in Section 3, the ‘Hartz-reforms’ in the early 2000s promoted a new balance between rights and obligations, made the receipt of benefits conditional upon individual efforts and cooperation, and cut the link between benefits and prior contributions for the long-term unemployed (Eichhorst et al. 2006). As attitudinal data focusing on activation policies are lacking, in line with previous studies (e.g. Aurich 2011) we used an indicator asking if people think that unemployed persons
should take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits, which is actually an even stronger statement than the realities of German labour market policy. Table 1 shows that agreement to this statement has been high already in 1990, but that it rose in 1999 and again in 2008, when agreement on a ten-point scale reached a mean value of 7.1 (although agreement in East Germany was considerably lower than in West Germany). Given that the ‘Hartz-reforms’ have been heavily criticized, the rather high acceptance rates of this norm in labour market policies seems surprising.\footnote{On the other hand, it is well established in research on welfare attitudes that unemployed persons are generally considered less deserving of benefits than other groups and that restrictive policies towards the unemployed are thus more accepted than towards, for example, the sick or the old (e.g. Coughlin 1980; van Oorschot 2000).}

--- Table 1 about here ---

The ‘activation’ paradigm in labour market policies can also be viewed as part of a broader trend in German social policy towards increased individual responsibility. This development has been most pronounced in old-age provision, where a drop in public pension levels and the introduction of voluntary but state-subsidized private pensions (‘Riester-Rente’) are supposed to encourage private provision for old age. Indeed, attitudinal data suggest that citizens largely accept the normative shift towards more self-responsibility, in particular in regard to old-age pensions and health care (see Figure 4): 76.3 percent of citizens agree that individuals should take (much or somewhat) more personal responsibility for their standard of living in old age. In health care, the acceptance of individual responsibility is on a lower level; yet, a majority of citizens also agrees that individuals should accept more responsibility for their health care provisions. In regard to unemployment, agreement to more personal responsibility is the lowest, but even here a majority of 55.3 per cent of citizens agree to this orientation.

--- Figure 4 about here ---

However, while these findings indicate that the majority of the population accepts the shift towards more individual responsibility, two reservations apply: First, studies also show that especially the older generation (60 years and older) accepts more self-responsibility, whereas in younger age cohorts agreement is lower (Nüchter et al. 2010: 85). Second, the degree of acceptance of self-responsibility has clear boundaries: On the one hand, 96 per cent of citizens maintain that the government is (strongly or partly) responsible for social security, whereas only 33 per cent say that private house-
holds are strongly responsible (Nüchter et al. 2010: 54). On the other hand, a majority of people say that they (currently) cannot afford to make private savings for old age, which applies especially to women, younger persons and those with low income (Sachweh et al. 2009: 614). This suggests that while there might be readiness for more individual responsibility in welfare provision, many people lack the financial capacities to do so. Accordingly, the state-subsidized private pension schemes are less popular than hoped for when the ‘Riester-Rente’ was introduced (Braun & Pfeiffer 2011).

A fourth major development in German social policy has been a shift towards new needs-based basic security benefits in old age and for long-term job seekers, which also represents a departure from the status-preserving nature of the conservative welfare state. Citizens are rather skeptical about this development (see Figure 5): In regard to the new basic public pension for those without sufficient entitlements, a large majority of citizens agree to the general goal of providing basic security for everyone in old age and are even willing to accept higher payments; yet, most people say that the current basic pension is insufficient and not able to protect people against old-age poverty. In regard to basic security benefits for long-term job seekers, 69 per cent of respondents defend the traditional principle of status-maintenance by agreeing that, even in case of long-term unemployment, benefits should mirror prior contributions, and a slim majority considers it unfair that only the ‘needy’ among the unemployed receive benefits. In short, the turn towards needs-based basic security benefits seems to be only accepted when compared with no social security at all; otherwise, people still prefer the principle of status-preservation that has traditionally characterized social policy in Germany (see Mau 2003).

--- Figure 5 about here ---

A fifth and final development has been a shift towards a ‘social investment’ paradigm in social policy, which is based on the idea that it is better to invest in human capital, skills and lifetime learning in order to ensure employability than to compensate for needs and unemployment (Morel et al. 2012). One of the core elements of such an approach are publically funded childcare and education programmes, and in the past years German social and family policy has embraced these ‘investment’ strategies. This shift towards ‘social investment’ policies seems to receive high acceptance (see Figure 6): For example, when asked in which area the government should spend more,
more than 80 per cent of respondents mention education, which is thus not only the most frequently mentioned policy area but has also clearly surpassed the fields of health care and old-age pensions in the past three decades. Also, when asked for which areas the government should spent more, the highest degree of support was for spending on families and children (cf. Nüchter et al. 2010: 62).

--- Figure 6 about here ---

In sum, the data and studies indicate that the population has accepted most, yet not all, policy changes and their normative underpinnings: People are most skeptical of the turn towards needs-based basic security pensions and unemployment benefits, at least when compared to the status-preserving pensions and benefits before; by contrast, there is relatively high acceptance of, and support for, female labour market participation and the ‘adult worker’ model, ‘social investment’ policies in education and child-care, more individual responsibility especially in pension policies, and ‘activation’ policies on the labour market. Obviously, the relatively positive attitudes towards most institutional and normative changes might be influenced by the considerable decrease in unemployment numbers by about two millions (from 4.86 million in 2005 to 2.87 million in 2015) and by comparisons with other European countries, which have been affected much stronger by the negative effects of the Great Recession.

Attitudes towards social conflicts, social justice, and the future of the welfare state

The shifts in normative and institutional orientations outlined before evoke the question if new lines of conflict will complement or even replace the ‘traditional’ distributive conflicts of industrialized societies. Especially prominent in the literature feature possible conflicts between families and childless people, or generational conflicts between the old and the young (e.g. Busemeyer et al. 2009; Goerres & Tepe 2010). However, in the perception of citizens these conflicts play only a subordinate role (see Figure 7): When asked about their perception of conflicts, people see ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’ conflicts mainly between capital and labour or the political left and right (although both in lower shares than in 1980) as well as (increasingly) between the poor and the rich, whereas conflicts between the young and the old, parents and childless people, or working people and retired people are rarely seen as ‘(very) strong’ and have all declined as compared to 1980. Thus, it seems that distributive conflicts con-
continue to be framed in terms of vertical distribution of resources among classes and income strata.

--- Figure 7 about here ---

This picture of modest or even strong acceptance of new social policy norms, declining perceptions of conflict, and non-appearance of new lines of conflict becomes gloomier, however, when we turn to perceptions of social justice and citizens’ trust into the government’s capacity to improve social conditions. When asked how social justice has developed in Germany over the past few years, in 2008 three out of four respondents said that social justice has declined (75.2 per cent), with further 19.7 per cent stating that it has remained stable and only five per cent perceiving an increase (Nüchter et al. 2010: 26). In addition, Figure 8 shows that a large majority of citizens think that income inequalities in Germany are too high, and after a decline in the late 1990s, this share has risen again in the past years. While in East Germany this perceptions has been widespread since the unification, in West Germany it has increased over the long term against the background of rising actual income inequalities. Yet, a considerably lower share of people – especially in West Germany – agrees to the statement that the government should redistribute income from the affluent to the less affluent (see also Sachweh et al. 2009: 13); it thus seems that while the population is skeptical of recent market developments, it is skeptical of state intervention into the market as well.

--- Figure 8 about here ---

Even more telling is that a majority of people in Germany (71.5 per cent) do not expect the government to be able to resolve the existing problems of the social security system. This goes along with a low degree of satisfaction with the social security system as a whole, although the developments in East Germany and West Germany differ somewhat: While in West Germany, satisfaction has drastically declined between the 1980s and 2006 and has since then stabilized, in East Germany a positive trend after unification peaked in 1998 and then also declined and lately stabilized (Nüchter et al. 2010: 73ff.). Moreover, citizens express little trust in the individual social security schemes, although health care and accidents insurance receive more positive judgments than the other schemes, with old-age pensions and basic unemployment benefits receiving the worst evaluations (Nüchter et al. 2010: 72).
Accordingly, the citizens’ expectations for the future of social security are dull: While about a third of the population demand higher spending on social benefits in general (see Figure 9), a large majority also says that they expect a ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’ social protection for the future than today; this judgment applies even to those social insurance schemes – such as health care – which are currently still viewed relatively favorable (Krömmelbein et al. 2007: 149f.). Indeed, while most Germans do not seem to fear immediate deprivation or socio-economic hardship, a significant share of the middle classes is concerned about their future standard of living (Schöneck-Voß et al. 2011).

Attitudes towards immigration: Welfare chauvinism as a future policy issue?

Germany has witnessed high and rising immigration levels over the last years, with net migration climbing from to 181,000 persons in 2010 to 677,000 in 2014 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2015: 8). In 2014, 16.4 million people living in Germany (20.3 per cent of the total population) had a migratory background, among them about 10 million immigrants. In light of these developments, the issue whether immigrants put a strain on the welfare system has moved up the public agenda. Although the labor market was able to absorb a significant part of these people and studies show that foreign nationals pay more taxes and social security contribution than they receive in terms of welfare benefits (Bonin 2014), there is a non-negligible perception that immigrants receive more than they contribute: welfare chauvinism exists in Germany as in many other European countries. Comparative studies have demonstrated that the native population of liberal and conservative welfare states are more reluctant to grant immigrants welfare benefits than those living in social-democratic regimes (van der Waal et al. 2013). However, it has also been shown that the general link between migration and welfare status support is at best weak (Mau & Burkhardt 2009).

Actually we have little data to show how attitudes toward the migration-welfare nexus has developed over time. Data from the German ALLBUS survey (see Table 2), polled in 1996 and 2006, show hardly any change in approval for the statement that foreign-

--- Figure 9 about here ---

12 It is noteworthy that the education pattern of immigrants has significantly changed, with a rising share of highly educated migrants as well as a considerable number of migrants without secondary school qualifications (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015).
ers take jobs away from Germans. There is also hardly any change with regard to the statement that foreigners living in Germany are a burden for the social net, while approval of the opinion that foreigners help to secure old age pensions was declining.13 With regard to all three items, a non-negligible group seems to have a rather negative view on the influx of foreigners and their link to the welfare system, but it seems that this group is not drastically expanding over time. Qualitative research emphasizes that despite apparent perceived problems due to immigration of people – in particular in schools and neighborhoods – people also see the need to help with regard to humanitarian migration and highlight the important function of migrants to fill open labor market position (in particular if they are qualified) and even to secure the long-term financial sustainability of the social security system (Burkhardt et al. 2011). For the vast majority of people, the willingness to include foreigners into the welfare system is underpinned by issues of reciprocity. However, in the long run – and given the presence and popularity of new right-wing populist parties and movements which mobilize against migrants – welfare chauvinism will probably become a pertinent issue instigating conflicts over the boundaries of solidarity. New manifestations of outright anti-foreigner attitudes indicate that this fault line has now become more present in the German political landscape and future attitude research may find more significant changes.

--- Table 2 about here ---

6. Conclusion: What future for the German welfare state?

Our overview of social policy developments and welfare attitudes in Germany leaves a mixed picture: On the one hand, the population seems to (gradually) accept the new principles accompanying the shift towards ‘social investment’ policies, employment universalism, activation strategies, increased individual responsibility for social security, and, although to lesser degree, needs-based basic security benefits. On the other hand, satisfaction with and trust in main social security systems is low, and beliefs that the political system will be able to resolve the problems of the social security system are even lower. Moreover, given significant migration movements increasing the di-

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versity of the population, welfare chauvinism has moved up the public agenda making the influx of migrants into the country and the integration into the welfare system a more politicized issue. So what does this imply for the future of welfare policies, in particular the notions of solidarity embodied in and surrounding the welfare arrangements?

By and large, it is apparent that although people express discomfort with (increased) inequalities, they do not turn back to the redistributive agenda of the past. They seem to have largely accepted some of the core principles of welfare state restructuring, in particular the notions of individual responsibility and social investment. Both notions seem to resonate well with the productivist and commodifying understanding of welfare where the state takes on an enabling and competitiveness-enhancing role, rather than a compensating and inequality-compressing one. In some sense, social objectives become subordinate to economic goals, so that justifications of welfare policies that can relate to economic benefits (and not to issues of need alone) have a better standing. In particular for the middle classes the emphasis on education, human capital and investment seems to be an attractive way to go, notwithstanding long-term redistributive implications (see Mau 2015).

The centrality of the labor market for the welfare system remains unquestioned, but is has taken another form. Now female labor market participation is a well-entrenched social norm and the dual earner household trumps the old male breadwinner model. With the inclusion of ever more women into the labor market, the demand for new social policy offerings has become more pressing. This explains major changes in the field of family policies which facilitate the balancing of work and family responsibilities (e.g. though parental leave schemes) and provide better access to child care facilities as to enhance women’s labor market participation. Rather than providing better security independent of the labor market and employment, the labor market is considered as the primary source of welfare for most of the people in working age, and social policies are designed as to assist when family obligations take central stage. This is what has been called employment universalism, which makes long-term welfare dependency or the life as an income-earner-dependent house-wife more unpleasant and less rewarding.
So what are the major challenges ahead? Generally, Germany’s export-driven growth model is dependent on global economic development and on the competitiveness of its economy. Competitiveness, in turn, depends on labour costs, innovations, and supply of (high-skilled) labour. In light of population ageing and low fertility rates, a particular pressing issue might become shortage of skilled labour, and as the main response is immigration of qualified labour, immigration and integration of immigrants into the social security system might play a leading role in future welfare policy. However, this might produce new social conflicts and cleavages that overlap the traditional (vertical) conflicts. Especially if perceptions of widening gaps in incomes and life chances continue and if political entrepreneurs use this for mobilization against immigrants, the welfare state as well as the broader political and social sphere might be put under considerable pressure. In short, the main challenge for the German welfare state might become mitigating ‘traditional’ vertical distributive conflicts as well as new horizontal ones and generally to find the balance between openness and closure without undermining welfare state legitimacy and instigating fierce conflicts.
References


Figure 1: Shares of social spending for different policy domains in Germany, 1990-2014

Percentages of social spending for different policy domains (total social spending = 100 per cent). Domains: illness and disability; old age and bereaved people; children, spouses and maternity; unemployment; other (housing and general living aids). Data for 2014 are estimates.

Source: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2015: 13)
Figure 2: Inequalities in disposable incomes in Germany, 1991-2011

Income inequalities measured by the Gini-coefficient (range: 0 = perfect equality; 1 = maximal inequality) for disposable incomes of persons in private households in Germany (in prices of 2005); grey area: 95 per cent confidence interval.

*Source: Grabka & Goebel (2013: 18); calculations by DIW Berlin based on SOEP v29*
Figure 3: Attitudes towards female labour market participation in Germany, 1982-2012

Original question: “People have different opinions about the role of women in the family and in bringing up children. For each of the statements on the card, please tell me whether you completely agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, or completely disagree.”

Table 1: Attitudes towards activation policies on the labour market (measured via proxy) in Germany, 1990-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for activation policies (mean values on a scale from 1 to 10)</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old federal states</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New federal states</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explanation: Participants were asked to indicate their attitude on a ten-point scale, 1 being labelled “people who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits” and 10 “people who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want”. In order to measure support for activation policies, coding was reversed; thus, 1 indicates weak support for activation policies, 10 indicates strong support.

Figure 4: Attitudes towards self-responsibility in provision for old age, health, and unemployment in Germany, 2007

Original question (translated from German): „To what extent should individuals take more self-responsibility for the following things, which also means increased self-financing? Standard of living in old-age; health care; unemployment.”

Original question (German): “Inwieweit sollte der Einzelne für die folgenden Dinge mehr Verantwortung übernehmen, d.h. auch mehr Eigenfinanzierung leisten? Lebensstandard im Alter; Gesundheitliche Versorgung; Arbeitslosigkeit.”

**Figure 5: Attitudes towards needs-based basic security benefits in old age and for long-term job seekers in Germany, 2007**

Variable 1, full statement: “The most important thing is that people in old-age receive an appropriate basic security pension even if this means higher taxes.” (German: “Das wichtigste ist, dass die Menschen im Alter eine angemessene Grundsicherung erhalten, auch wenn das höhere Steuern bedeutet.”)

Variable 2, full question: “How well does the newly introduced basic security pension in old-age protect from poverty in your opinion: well, rather well, rather badly, or badly?” (German: “Wie gut schützt die neu eingeführte Grundsicherung im Alter Ihrer Meinung nach vor Armut: Tut sie dies gut, eher gut, eher schlecht oder schlecht?”)

Variable 3, full statement: “Even in case of long-term employment, benefits should depend on the previous level of income to secure the standard of living.” (German: “Auch bei längerer Arbeitslosigkeit sollte die Leistung vom vorherigen Lohn abhängen, damit der Lebensstandard gesichert wird.”)

Variable 4, full question: “Benefits for long-term unemployed are only granted when people cannot cover living expenses on their own. This means that previous income and wealth is taken into account when granting long-term unemployment benefits. Is this, in your opinion, completely fair, rather fair, rather unfair or completely unfair?” (German: Die Grundsicherung für Arbeitssuchende wird erst gewährt, wenn man aus eigenen Mitteln seinen Lebensunterhalt nicht mehr decken kann. Das bedeutet, dass vorhandenes Einkommen und Vermögen auf das Arbeitslosengeld II angerechnet wird. Ist das aus Ihrer Sicht vollkommen gerecht, eher gerecht, eher ungerecht oder vollkommen ungerecht?”)

*Source: Survey “Einstellungen zum Sozialstaat” 2007.*
Figure 6: Attitudes towards various areas of government spending in Germany, 1985-2006

Original question: “Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say ‘much more’, it might require a tax increase to pay for it.”

Original question: “It is often said that there are conflicts of interest between different groups in the Federal Republic – for example between different political groups, between men and women, etc. However, these conflicts are not all equally strong. I’ll list a few groups and please tell me whether, in your opinion, these conflicts are very strong, rather strong, fairly weak, or whether you think there is no conflict at all between these groups.”

Figure 8: Attitudes towards income inequalities and government redistribution in Germany, 1984-2010

Original questions as they appear in the legend.

Figure 9: Attitudes towards future spending on social benefits in Germany, 1984-2014

Original question as it appears in the legend.

Table 2: Welfare chauvinism in Germany, 1996 and 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1996 (mean)</th>
<th>2006 (mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The foreigners who live in Germany are a burden on the social welfare system.</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>4,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They help to secure old age pensions.</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>3,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They take jobs away from Germans.</td>
<td>3,8</td>
<td>3,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participants were asked to specify their approval to the statements above on a seven-point scale, 1 being labeled ‘completely disagree’ and 7 ‘completely agree’. The figure depicts the mean values for the survey years 1996 and 2006.