Back in February, the contrast in response to the renegotiation deal in the UK and elsewhere in the EU could not have been more stark. While politicians and media commentators in the UK variously described the deal as \u2018thin gruel\u2019, \u2018flimsy\u2019, and \u2018the great delusion\u2019, elsewhere in the EU it was\u00a0seen<\/a>\u00a0as rather more significant for the future of European integration, heralding a more pliable EU and even bringing treaty change in \u2018through the back door\u2019.<\/p>\n At the heart of the Prime Minister\u2019s renegotiation was his vision of a flexible EU. And what\u2019s so new about this, one might ask? It is clearly the case that EU member states do not partake equally in all EU activities. Differentiated integration, used interchangeably with ideas of flexibility, has existed in the EU since the UK and Danish governments opted out of Economic and Monetary Union in the Treaty of Maastricht. The subsequent treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon added new opt-outs and opt-ins across a range of policies, as well as the possibility for further flexibility with the mechanism of enhanced cooperation, where a smaller group of member states could move forward and cooperate more closely in specific areas, subject to certain conditions.<\/p>\n Since then it is fair to say that variations in the level and intensity of participation of member states in various EU policies have become even more evident. Solutions to the Euro debt crisis added to the EU\u2019s differentiation and the response to the refugee crisis has further amplified disparities between member states. Described by\u00a0Guy Verhofstadt<\/a>\u00a0as \u2018a hotch potch of opt-ins, opt-outs and rebates and a laundry list of other exceptions\u2019, differentiation between member states\u2019 commitments to EU policies is thus an ever-increasing reality in the EU.<\/p>\n Yet in its early days, the use of such differentiation was somewhat contentious. In the late 1990s a vigorous debate took place about various models of differentiation such as \u2018multi-speed Europe\u2019, a Europe of \u2018variable geometry\u2019 (with a hard core at the centre) and\u00a0\u00e0<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>la carte Europe. Symbolically, for many the phenomenon of differentiation was seen as the exception and temporary, a tool to help member states overcome gridlock and move at different speeds in the same direction. Equated with fragmentation, differentiation was something to be avoided if at all possible (and not to be overtly acknowledged). This is where Cameron\u2019s deal comes back in. As well as exempting the UK from any further political integration, excluding the UK from \u2018ever closer union\u2019 and providing further safeguards for non-Eurozone members, Section C on Sovereignty of the UK\u2019s Settlement, with its declaration of different paths of integration,\u00a0affects all EU member states<\/a>. In so doing it brings ideas of differentiation and flexibility back into the political debate. More significantly, it means that no matter what the outcome, the UK\u2019s referendum result will have implications for the future of the EU.<\/p>\n If the UK electorate votes to remain in the EU, it is quite possible that other EU member states, looking at what the UK has achieved through its negotiation in gaining a \u2018special status\u2019, may also wish to claw back powers from Brussels in response to nationalist pressures. Indeed, if ever and whenever a new EU treaty is negotiated in the future, negotiations could very well focus on \u2018less Europe\u2019 for some member states rather than solely on \u2018more Europe\u2019 as was the case in the past.<\/p>\n Some will argue that this will destabilise the EU, giving rise to centrifugal pressures as flexibility becomes both a brake and an enabler of European integration. It would certainly increase the complexity of the EU. On the other hand, greater flexibility might be seen as a good thing, as reflected in Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond and Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni\u2019s\u00a0call<\/a>\u00a0last December for \u2018a flexible reformed EU in which different paths of integration can coexist successfully to build a Europe fit for the future\u2019. For them, \u2018a successful EU will be one which can combine these different visions of Europe and embrace that diversity\u2019.<\/p>\n And what if the UK votes to leave? As the most differentiated EU member state, the departure of the UK would certainly decrease policy complexity and divergence in the EU. It would also mean that the EU would be more likely to remain on the \u2018multiple speed\u2019 track of integration, particularly with the possibility of further integration of the Eurozone down the line.<\/p>\n Whatever the outcome on June 23, the question \u2018quo vadis Europa?\u2019 will be back on the agenda.<\/p>\n Dr Jane O\u2019Mahony, Senior Lecturer in European Politics, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent<\/strong><\/p>\n This blog also appeared on the ESRC’s<\/strong>\u00a0UK in a Changing Europe<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>website available at: http:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/dont-forget-the-deal-how-camerons-uk-eu-settlement-could-herald-a-more-flexible-eu\/<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"![\"Flexible](\"http:\/\/blogs.kent.ac.uk\/uk-eu-ref-watch\/files\/2016\/06\/Flexible-Europe-300x169.jpg\")
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