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# THE REASONER

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VOLUME 9, NUMBER 10  
OCTOBER 2015

[thereasoner.org](http://thereasoner.org)  
ISSN 1757-0522

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82 heavily pragmatic and epistemological developments in medieval Indian logic than they sometimes do with modern Western logic. Through discussion during and after the conference, Birgit and I realized that our interests and expertises dovetailed nicely, and the result was that I got to spend nearly two years in Heidelberg doing truly interdisciplinary work, bringing to Birgit's expertise in Sanskrit and knowledge of the medieval Indian texts my knowledge of contemporary logic and argumentation theory.

86 One of the most important lessons that I learned during my time in Heidelberg is that true interdisciplinary research and collaboration doesn't come without a lot of background work  
88 putting together the right infrastructure and the right people.  
88 One of the most difficult parts about bringing together people from disparate research areas—even when they are brought together by a shared research interest such as argumentation and reasoning—is that before any sort of collaborative research can even begin, everyone must reach a common vocabulary, so that the group doesn't end up speaking at cross-purposes, or fragmenting into subgroups of people of like background. There are many different steps that can be taken to build a structure within which interdisciplinary collaborative research can take place, but one of the simplest and most basic is to simply provide contexts where people can start to develop that shared vocabulary, even if they don't realize that's what they're doing. That is the not-so-secret agenda of my choice of interviewee. Many readers of the *The Reasoner* wouldn't know a *pramāṇa* if they stumbled over one in the street; and yet, anyone interested in the epistemological aspects of reasoning will be interested in reading about 'means of valid cognition'. And it is my hope that anyone interested in valid means of cognition will, by the end of the interview, be at least curious to read more about the developments of standards of good reasoning and argumentation in the medieval Indian tradition, and maybe the next time the reader comes across *pramāṇa* she can at least nod in ac-

## EDITORIAL

Welcome to the October issue of *The Reasoner*. When I was invited to be a guest editor, I knew immediately whom I wanted to interview. Birgit Kellner is Chair of Buddhist Studies at the Universität Heidelberg, in the Cluster of Excellence: Asia and Europe in a Global Context. We first met in summer 2010 at the conference "Modern Formalisms for Pre-Modern Indian Logic and Epistemology" hosted at Universität Hamburg. Birgit attended as one of the experts in the field, while I attended as one of the novices hoping to learn more, because what little I knew made me realize that developments in medieval Western logic—my speciality—seemed like they had more in common with the



quaintance.

SARA L. UCKELMAN  
Durham University

## FEATURES

### Interview with Birgit Kellner

**Sarah L. Uckelman:** Part of your research focuses on the implicit rules of reasoning found in Indian Buddhist philosophy. What drew you to this field in the first place?

**Birgit Kellner:** I have studied Indian logic for a long time—that is, explicit theories of proof and inference that took shape the course of the first millennium CE, in a setting where Buddhist and other religio-philosophical traditions competed with each other, and confronted each other in debate. The study of Indian logic in a modern academic context focused, and still focuses, on its degree of formality, and on its formal characteristics. Is there quantification? Is Indian logic inductive or deductive? These were the type of questions that were pursued. Logicians may be familiar with that angle from Bochénski’s “History of Formal Logic”. But like other historical forms of logic—here I am thinking of medieval European logic by way of comparison—Indian logic also has epistemic features. Inference is not just approached as an abstract logical structure, but as an instrument of knowledge, as a cognitive process. Even more importantly, there is also a strong dialectical or dialogical element to logical analysis in classical Indian philosophy. Debate, as a regulated and often competitive exchange of arguments among philosophers and other kinds of scholars, was one of the main contexts that inspired reflection on the validity of proof and the soundness of inference. Indian philosophical treatises of this period are commonly composed as imaginary dialogues, as sequences of argument and counter-argument, of objection and rebuttal. Indologists who study these texts are faced with dialogical forms of argumentation on a daily basis, yet there have been precious few studies on the norms and standards that might regulate the construction of such extended argumentation—beyond the explicit theoretical concepts and categories of Indian logic. And this is what I became most interested in: argumentation is not just formal logic, it is not just what happens on a formal logical level. It is a wider-ranging intellectual practice, governed by different sets of standards of validity, explicit and implicit. At this point I am interested in opening up this field of study, most directly inspired by the work on the rhetoric of reason by my friend and colleague Sara McClintock (Emory), and also by the work of Joachim Kurtz, my colleague in Heidelberg who works on standards of validity in Chinese intellectual history.



**SLU:** Can you tell us more about the people, and the sources, that you work with? Who are the important historical figures in this area? Do you work with many manuscripts, or are the sources available in edition?

**BK:** I am mainly interested in a historically influential Buddhist tradition that focused on epistemology and logic and formed around the idea that there is a finite number of instruments by which human beings gain and justify knowledge, so-called “means of valid cognition” (Sanskrit *pramāa*). Like other philosophical schools that operate under the umbrella of overarching soteriological goals, this tradition maintained that such instruments, notably sense-perception and inference, are necessary to achieve liberation from the endless cycle of unsatisfactory rebirth in which living beings are entrapped. This Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition, perhaps better described as an assemblage of scholars pursuing a particular intellectual style, was active in India from around the fifth to the twelfth centuries CE, and regarded the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as foundational. Partly because of the decline of institutional Buddhism and its monastic education on the Indian subcontinent thereafter, relatively few Sanskrit manuscripts of works belonging to this tradition survive. It was no longer important to preserve manuscripts of this tradition, which would have meant copying them over and over. Manuscripts were preserved chiefly in Jaina libraries in today’s Gujarat, and even more importantly in Tibet, where emigrating Indian scholar-monks had brought them between the ninth and fourteenth centuries. Research on Buddhist logic spiked after the 1930’s, when an Indian pandit called Rahula Sankrityayana had found many pertinent Sanskrit manuscripts during dedicated search missions to Tibet, and photographed, transcribed and partly edited them, thus enabling scholars around the globe to study these texts in their original language. Sankrityayana’s findings are now supplemented by further manuscripts, preserved in China, that are gradually becoming accessible. As Buddhist logic is a tradition that was active over centuries and produced a large body of literature, there is still a lot to be done in terms of philological groundwork. But a substantial amount of literature is already available in edition, and many studies have been published. With our bio-bibliographical database [EAST Epistemology and Argumentation in South Asia and Tibet](#), we started tracking work in this field, and plan to continue to do so.

**SLU:** Who is your favorite? Or do you have a particular topic rather than a particular person that interests you the most?

**BK:** What I am most interested in at the moment are strategies of argumentation. A lot of work on Indian philosophy—perhaps even on Asian philosophical traditions in general—still confines itself to belief-ascription and is framed in terms of school-affiliation. What ideas did a thinker *A* hold? To what school did thinker *B* belong? What I am more interested in is: How did thinkers defend, prove and rationalize the views they upheld? What methods did they employ in the process, and how and why did these methods change? My most recent work informed by these questions has been on refutations of external reality. There is an important current in Buddhist philosophy called *Yogācāra* that argues our cognitions are not of external objects that exist independently of them, and, even more, that external reality does not exist. Agreed, this is not a position contemporary philosophers are likely to hold, but it’s nonetheless interesting to get a sense of the variety of methods by which historical philosophers attempted to prove it. John Taber and I reexamined a historically influential Buddhist

treatise that proves “mere-cognition” and refutes external reality, Vasubandhu’s ‘Proof of Mere-Cognition in Twenty Stanzas’ (Viśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi), and developed the new interpretation that the work pursues an extended argument from ignorance: external objects do not exist because there is no evidence for their existence. I won’t go into details here—we published a long article on this in the journal *Asiatische Studien* (68/3, 2014, pp. 709–756)—but I then started looking further into how Dignāga and Dharmakīrti refuted external reality in their works. I was excited to discover that they did so in quite different ways, and came up with the idea that in Dharmakīrti’s case this was at least in part because in his logical theory he rejects arguments from ignorance as invalid. So the path chosen by Vasubandhu was not open to him. This is an example for something I want to pursue further: to look at the role of strategies, methods and practices of argumentation in the history of particular philosophical debates.

**SLU:** What do you think are the biggest stumbling blocks for someone who doesn’t know Sanskrit or Tibetan to studying this material? Do you have any suggestions for how these could be removed?

**BK:** To study historical knowledge systems—and this is what we are talking about here—means that one has to study their historical context and the nature of the problems that their proponents set out to address. But this does not involve any significantly bigger stumbling blocks for Indian logic than, for instance, for medieval European logic. Scholarship is now in a position, I think, where the big historical outlines have been established, and there are good Western-language publications (in English and German in particular) that offer guidance. The analogy with medieval European logic is also illuminating because I think the study of Indian or Tibetan logic shares one particular predicament with this field: these forms of philosophical logic are practiced in a particular style. They come with a regimented language, with exacting standards and established scholarly conventions that appear quite forbidding at first. It’s not just that Indian logical treatises are written in a foreign language (Sanskrit), but that they are informed by a different intellectual culture. Philosophers sometimes approach me and ask for good translations of Indian philosophical texts—and often they end up being disappointed because the type of “literalist”, philological translations that Indologists produce are barely intelligible for them. Some of my colleagues think that Indologists therefore have to change their translation style, but I am sceptical that this will help much considering the technical nature of the literature in question. What we need are not just more decent translations of Sanskrit philosophical texts, but “bridging scholarship” that opens this material up (also for students!): running commentaries that explain terminology and provide contextualization, summaries of the content of individual treatises, and more problem-oriented studies. I think that in order to produce such scholarship it would be best to more closely collaborate with logicians or philosophers who will after all be among the intended target audience. Specialists are, after all, often blind to the real stumbling-blocks for the neophyte!

**SLU:** In particular, can you suggest any good introductions to Indian logic which are accessible to those who don’t have the necessary linguistic background?

**BK:** Brendan Gillon’s ‘Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy’, and Tom Tillemans’ ‘Dharmakīrti’ in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* are good and readily accessible starting-points, with helpful pointers to further reading. Sara McClintock’s monograph ‘Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason’. Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla on *Rationality, Argumentation and Religious Authority* (Boston 2010: Wisdom Publications) is a great example for the focus on practices of argumentation that I am interested in, and is also quite accessible because it contains more general introductory chapters.

**SLU:** There is clearly a lot of material in both traditions that should be of interest to members of the other tradition. You and I and other colleagues in Heidelberg have worked quite a bit to build a dialogue between Indologists and logicians. What motivates you to pursue these collaborations, and do you have any suggestions for how best to bring them about? What works? What doesn’t?

**BK:** What motivates me is, quite simply, that I want to learn. I know that a lot of interesting work is being done in logic and argumentation theory, and my work with you has fully convinced me that the study of Indian logic has much to gain from this field. In Heidelberg we fostered transdisciplinary collaboration through a series of three workshops, with different participants. In each of these workshops we focused on one particular text, in English translation. First we needed to get a grasp on the overall structure and content, and then we could pick out aspects that were interesting in view of our interest in dialogical and dialectical aspects of reasoning. The second and third workshop were devoted to the same text, and at the end of the third we finally arrived at a point where logicians and Indologists were convinced they had found out something new and significant which they couldn’t have found out just by themselves—the ideal result of such collaboration. We would now really like to move this work ahead and produce a publication, but this proves difficult given that we are now spread across Europe and Northern America, and that each member of the working group has many other obligations. In an ideal world we would all spend half a year in the same place and have no other obligations apart from studying one particular text, and writing up our discoveries. You ask: What works? Mutual interest, respect and trust, patience, and lots of time, preferably in the same place. Collaborative projects over a longer period of time definitely help if they can be spaces for unexpected discoveries. When you were in Heidelberg I once invited you to attend one of my seminars where we read a second century Buddhist dialectical treatise (Nāgārjuna’s ‘Dispeller of Disputes’), because there was a particular argument pattern that I was curious about and wanted you to look at. While we discussed this pattern (and wrote conference papers on it), you found a type of self-refutation in it that apparently hasn’t been the focus of theories of self-refutation in contemporary logic. And so we ended up co-authoring an article on it (‘Dialectical Self-Refutation and Nāgārjuna’s Discussion in Six Points (śakoiko vāda)’), to appear in: Gregor Paul (ed.): *Logic in Buddhist Scholasticism: From Philosophical, Historico-Philological and Comparative Perspectives*; Lumbini, Nepal: Lumbini International Research Institute). This probably wouldn’t have happened if you hadn’t been around in Heidelberg, with enough time on your hands to come to my seminar and to work on this particular text. There was no way we could have planned for this to happen. This is

what we need more of: spaces for the unexpected!

## Formalising Entailments

The language of modern logic is incomplete, and in a way that blocks the proper representation of entailments. As the following valid argument shows, there are types of individual term which were not recognised in mainline twentieth century logic:

Pythagoras' Theorem is that the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle on a Euclidean plane is the sum of the squares on the other sides, and Pythagoras' Theorem is true, so that the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle on a Euclidean plane is the sum of the squares on the other sides is true.

The example demonstrates that in natural language 'is true' is a predicate of 'that'-clauses, in which the word 'that' turns a sentential expression into a nominal phrase. It therefore demonstrates that truth in natural language is a property of propositions. For the referent of 'Pythagoras' Theorem' is not a sentence, but the common meaning of many different inter-translatable sentences.

These facts, while widely ignored in twentieth century logic, were nevertheless recognised in William and Martha Kneale's historical reference book *The Development of Logic* (O.U.P., 1962). See p. 588, and p. 591 for the point about propositions being the bearers of truth, p. 585 for the point about 'that' being a nominaliser, and p. 539 and pp. 602–3 about the symbolisation of such nominalisers. The Kneales were also very aware of their separation from Tarski's theory of truth because of all this. Indeed it is immediately evident that truth as a property of propositions is entirely consistent. For, quite generally, an operator expression like 'It is known/obligatory that p' is equivalent to a predicative expression like 'That p is known/obligatory'. So 'that p is true' is equivalent to 'It is true that p' and 'It is true that' is the null or vacuous modality in the system KT, which is consistent.

How is it that the propositional locution does not fall foul of self-referential paradoxes like The Liar? That is because the fixed-point theorem does not hold in languages, such as our natural one, that contain individual terms which either have no referent (like 'Phlogiston'), or many, contextually determined ones (like 'Aristotle'). The propositions expressible in such languages are given through the pragmatic use of sentences, but do not always have distinct syntactic forms that could be the basis for some Gödelian-type numbering (see my 'Gödel's and other Paradoxes', forthcoming in *Philosophical Investigations*).

But many other remarkable conclusions can be deduced from the above facts just as readily, for instance with regard to the notion of Entailment. For it also follows that entailments are not conditionals. Pythagoras' Theorem entails that a 3-4-5 triangle on a Euclidean plane is right angled, for example, but 'x entails that q' is not of the 'If p then q' form. 'The Axiom of Determinacy entails the Continuum Hypothesis' is even more

evidently just a relational verb between two names. The former entailment is equally a relational expression, 'xEλq', where 'λ' formalises 'that', and while it is then the case that if xEλq then if Tx then q (where 'T' is 'is true'), there is no equivalence between the relational form and the conditional because of the paradoxes of material implication. For, as is well known, we can say 'There is jam in the cupboard, if you want some', and also 'If there is jam in the cupboard, then I am a Dutchman', and in neither case is there any claim that the consequent is implicated in the antecedent. Note that the point would hold even if such an expression as 'xEy' was written, by fiat, 'Tx → Ty' for some '→'. For the point, in that case, would simply show that the introduced arrow cannot be read as 'If ... then ...'.

The symbolism of twentieth century logic is littered with a variety of arrows leading to the supposition that there are many different conditionals. But arrow-type connectives have been extended well beyond their proper range of applicability, on account of the lack of 'that'-clauses in the symbolism with which to express propositional relations like entailment. There is only one conditional locution in natural language, 'If ... then ...', and that allows for there being no relation between antecedent and consequent as in the well-known examples above.

Conditionals backed by entailments are certainly a distinct class of conditionals, but the entailments that back them are not themselves some stronger kind of conditional. In line with this a further conclusion is deducible—now about the so-called paradoxes of strict implication—from the above bare distinction between 'xEy' and 'If Tx then Ty'. For it follows that denying that Pythagoras' Theorem entails the Law of the Excluded Middle, for example, does not mean denying that if Pythagoras' Theorem is true then so is the Law of the Excluded Middle. So the thought that 'if p then q ∨ ¬q' does not represent an entailment must be able to be substantiated without showing that it is not a true conditional. And that is quite simply done. For entailments are relations between propositions, as we have seen, but the propositional content of 'p' does not come into the derivation of 'if p then q ∨ ¬q'. Hence there is nothing wrong with C.I. Lewis' derivation of this conditional, merely with his conclusion that the conditional expressed an entailment.

It is worth mentioning that similar remarks may be made about the separation between causal claims and the associated subjunctive conditionals. For the verb 'causes' has a similar grammar to 'entails', and, parallel to the above, that kind of consideration supports, for instance, the 'structuralist' account of causation that Judea Pearl formulated in opposition to David Lewis (Pearl, J. 2000: *Causation*, C.U.P., Cambridge). For the alternative worlds that are involved are only discoverable once the causal mechanisms are known—not every world similar to the actual one comes into it. Also supported, of course, are Realist accounts of causation such as that of Michael Tooley (Tooley, M. 1988: *Causation, A Realist Approach*, Clarendon, Oxford).

HARTLEY SLATER

University of Western Australia

## NEWS

### Epistemic Vices, 2–3 September

The conference on Epistemic Vices at Durham on 2–3 September 2015 was, to my knowledge, the first of its kind. It was

devoted to what Quassim Cassam, in his talk, dubbed ‘vice epistemology’—the study of the nature, identify, and significance of the negative epistemic character traits that are the vices of the mind. Although virtue epistemology has focused upon what Linda Zagzebski dubbed the ‘virtues of the mind’, the contrasting vices of the mind are no less interesting.

The event opened with Heather Battaly’s account of three analyses of epistemic vice. Two of these, reliabilism and responsibility, are familiar, but Battaly identified a neglected third. ‘Personalists’ agree that virtues and vices must be personal, but deny that an agent must be responsible for having them. Our epistemic characters are shaped by contingent environmental conditions, which suggests that the study of vices is more crucial to understanding ‘the epistemological predicament of human beings’ than the study of virtues. Self-knowledge requires understanding our vicious characters and Cassam offered a cogent program for vice epistemology, including the objections it will meet—how, for instance, can one respond to scepticism about the very existence of epistemic character traits?

Such scepticism typically comes, these days, from ‘situationists’. Kathy Puddifoot explored the idea that one can avoid epistemic vice by taking control of the situations that one finds oneself in. Drawing on work on implicit bias, she suggested that an epistemically responsible agent could actively influence their environment and engage in what Battaly dubbed ‘epistemic engineering’. Another response to sceptics is to articulate the role that vices play in our social and epistemic life, including in our critical practices. My talk described one such practice, ‘*epistemic vice-charging*’, whereby one agent criticises another by charging them with vices. Although this practice is possible in principle, it is, I argued, very difficult in practice: not only are vices themselves complex, but an agent’s responsibility for their character is complicated—as Battaly, Cassam, and Puddifoot deftly described.

The second day turned to specific vices. Maria Altepeter asked whether certain forms of scepticism might not incorporate a viciously excessive desire for knowledge, while Caleb Cohoe illuminated the nature of the vice of ‘false pride’ by contrasting it with a virtue, ‘receptivity’. Altepeter and Cohoe exemplified two ways of studying vice—namely, vicious stances, and contrastive virtue-vice analysis—that were both employed by Wayne Riggs. In an unapologetically ‘big picture’ talk, Riggs suggested that we think about vices in terms of a ‘perspective’: a holistic ‘representational system’, some akin to a ‘worldview’. The exciting idea that certain vices may be embedded in perspectives or worldviews then set the stage for the last pair of talks, both on the vice of arrogance. Kyle Scott considered arrogance in the context of the epistemology of disagreement, thereby connecting two vigorous areas of modern epistemology, while Alessandra Tanesini traced the ways that arrogance and haughtiness manifest in our social and linguistic practices. She used the example of violations of conversational rules, such as turn taking, to illuminate these two vices, thereby showing that vice epistemology is not an abstract exercise for the armchair, but a real contribution to the understanding and amelioration of our social world. Clearly there is both space and need for vice epistemology.

IAN JAMES KIDD  
Durham University

## Calls for Papers

**THE CHARACTER OF PHYSICALISM:** special issue of *Topoi*, deadline 15 October.

**UNCERTAIN REASONING:** special issue of *Journal of Applied Logic*, deadline 15 October.

**CONNEXIVE LOGICS:** special issue of *IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Application*, deadline 15 October.

**REASONING, ARGUMENTATION, AND CRITICAL THINKING INSTRUCTION:** special issue of *Topoi*, deadline 30 October.

**SCIENTIFIC FICTION MAKING:** special issue of *The Monist*, deadline 31 October.

**UNCERTAIN REASONING:** special issue of *International Journal of Approximate Reasoning*, deadline 16 November.

**LOGICAL PLURALISM AND TRANSLATION:** special issue of *Topoi*, deadline 30 April.

## WHAT’S HOT IN . . .

### Uncertain Reasoning

The problem of making meaningful predictions on the basis of information known to be incomplete or otherwise unreliable has always been central in scientific enquiry. Over the past four centuries or so, the question has been rephrased in a number of ways, eventually giving rise to full-blown disciplines such as probability, statistics and machine learning. Building on concepts and techniques developed within those subjects, economic theory has recently revived its own interest in the formalisation of inductive inference. Interestingly enough—at least for us logically minded uncertain reasoners—in doing this, economic theorists seem to make do without the explicit use of the inferential machinery offered by logic. One relatively recent case in point is provided by I. Gilboa and L. Samuelson (2012: “Subjectivity in inductive inference”, *Theoretical Economics* 7, 183–215).

The aim of the paper is to argue that successful learning requires agents to depart from what the authors call “purely objective criteria”. Therefore, despite being quite technical in its development, the paper tackles one of the oldest philosophical conundrums in the field, namely the contrast between *objective* and *subjective* (methods, techniques, approaches, etc.). The key idea is roughly as follows. In non-trivial cases, past observations will normally be consistent with a number of distinct hypotheses (or “theories”) which explain how the data is being generated—think for instance of the problem of continuing a sequence of natural numbers. So the problem boils down to selecting from alternative, but otherwise equally consistent-with-the-data, rules for predicting future observations. Gilboa and Samuelson (2012) contend that this choice cannot be fruitfully achieved unless a subjective element is allowed in the model.

This conceptual framework therefore articulates the problem of inductive inference in terms of the selection of a data-generating process. This leads quite naturally to interpreting subjectivity as “a reason to prefer” which does not depend on



past observations. By formalising this notion of preference, and investigating the conditions under which it gives rise to a suitably defined maximising behaviour, the problem of inductive inference is effectively rephrased in the standard language of decision theory. Nevertheless, this notion of induction is quite reminiscent in spirit (and in the technical detail) of the machine learning approach, which in turn is closely related to algorithmic information theory. Gilboa and Samuelson do point out those connections. They also note, albeit rather cursorily, that the Bayesian understanding of induction can be recovered in their setting essentially by considering the preference relation over “theories” as the basis for a qualitative notion of probabilistic induction. The details of this do not appear to be entirely obvious especially if we observe that the copious literature on “confirmation” tends not to adopt the qualitative approach in the standard axiomatic presentations. An explicit bridge between the two frameworks should be of great foundational interest.

As a final remark, one cannot help but notice that the way inductive inference is characterised in this paper is closer to the notion of *abductive* than to *inductive* inference, at least according to the way those rather elusive concepts are usually cashed out by logicians; see e.g. D. Gabbay and J. Woods (2005: *The practical turn in logic*, in D.M. Gabbay & F. Guentner ed., *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*, 2nd Edition, 15–122). This is another question that probably deserves further attention.

HYKEL HOSNI

Department of Philosophy, University of Milan

## Evidence-Based Medicine

Last month saw the [25th First Annual Ig Nobel Prize ceremony](#). The Ig Nobel prizes aim to honour achievements that first make people laugh and then make people think. Here is a quote from their [website](#):

The prizes are intended to celebrate the unusual, honor the imaginative—and spur people’s interest in science, medicine, and technology.

The award ceremony takes place every September. This year’s ceremony can be viewed on [the Improbable Research website](#). And past ceremonies can be viewed at the [Improbable Research YouTube channel](#).


There is an award for medicine, and sometimes other health-related awards. (The list of past award winners is available on the [website](#).) Past award winners in these categories include Ian Humphreys, Sonal Saraiya, Walter Belenky and James Dworkin for [using the method of nasal packing with strips of cured pork to treat life-threatening nose-bleeds](#), and Emmanuel Ben-Soussan and Michel Antonietti for [giving advice to doctors who perform colonoscopies on how to minimize the chance that their patients will explode](#). Other past winners include Kasian Bhanganada, Tu Chayavatana, Chumporn Pongnumkul, Anunt Tonmukayakul, Piyasakol Sakolsatayadorn, Krit Komaratal, and Henry Wilde for their research on the surgical management of penis amputations ‘usually performed by angry wives on philandering husbands’. They are cautious not to recommend their techniques ‘in cases where the amputated penis had been partially eaten by a duck’.

This year’s winner of the diagnostic medicine prize went to Diallah Karim, Anthony Harnden, Nigel D’Souza, Andrew Huang, Abdel Kader Allouni, Helen Ashdown, Richard


J. Stevens, and Simon Kreckler for determining that ‘[presence of pain while travelling over speed bumps was associated with an increased likelihood of acute appendicitis](#)’. But even this year’s award for chemistry has implications for medicine.

The chemistry prize was awarded this year to Callum Ormonde, Colin Raston, Tom Yuan, Stephan Kudlacek, Sameeran Kunche, Joshua N. Smith, William A. Brown, Kaitlin Pugliese, Tivoli Olsen, Mariam Iftikhar, and Gregory Weiss for [partially unboiling an egg](#). [Here](#) is a cartoon to explain. One newspaper reports that the upshot is that the same device for partially unboiling an egg can be used to more precisely deliver a chemotherapy drug for ovarian and lung cancers. The newspaper article can be found [here](#).

MICHAEL WILDE  
Philosophy, Kent



smbc-comics.com



xkcd.com

## EVENTS

### OCTOBER

**CPK:** Workshop on Capturing Scientific Knowledge, Palisades, New York, 7 October.

**EKP:** Extended Knowledge Project, University of Edinburgh, 8–9 October.

**URSW:** Uncertainty Reasoning for the Semantic Web, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, October 11–12.

**NOR:** Is There No Objective Reality? Ripoll, Spain, 13–15 October.

**DBD:** Conference on Defining the Boundaries of Disease, Macquarie University, 15–16 October.

**P&N:** Pluralism and Normativity, University of Bologna, 22–24 October.

**EoM:** Epistemology of Modality, Stirling, Scotland, 22–24 October.

**LORI:** 5th International Conference on Logic, Rationality and Interaction, Taipei, Taiwan, 28–31 October.

### NOVEMBER

**SI&SR:** Special Interests and Scientific Research, University of Notre Dame, 5–6 November.

**SSE:** 50 Shapes of Scientific Explanation, Ghent University, 13–14 November.

**EN:** Epistemic Norms Conference, KU Leuven, 9–11 November.

**SB:** Subjective Bayesian, Newcastle University, 13 November.

**AMBN:** Advanced Methodologies for Bayesian Networks, Yokohama, Japan, 16–18 November.

**WoK:** Ways of Knowing: Feminist Philosophy of Science and Epistemology, Dublin, Ireland, 27–28 November.

## COURSES AND PROGRAMMES

### Programmes

**APHIL:** MA/PhD in Analytic Philosophy, University of Barcelona.

**MASTER PROGRAMME:** MA in Pure and Applied Logic, University of Barcelona.

**DOCTORAL PROGRAMME IN PHILOSOPHY:** Language, Mind and Practice, Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, Switzerland.

**HPSM:** MA in the History and Philosophy of Science and Medicine, Durham University.

**MASTER PROGRAMME:** in Statistics, University College Dublin.

**LoPhiSC:** Master in Logic, Philosophy of Science & Epistemology, Pantheon-Sorbonne University (Paris 1) and Paris-Sorbonne University (Paris 4).

**MASTER PROGRAMME:** in Artificial Intelligence, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands.

**MASTER PROGRAMME:** Philosophy and Economics, Institute of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth.

**MA IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE:** School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen's University Belfast.

**MA IN LOGIC AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS:** Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol.

**MA PROGRAMMES:** in Philosophy of Science, University of Leeds.

**MA IN LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE:** Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion, LMU Munich.

**MA IN LOGIC AND THEORY OF SCIENCE:** Department of Logic of the Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary.

**MA IN METAPHYSICS, LANGUAGE, AND MIND:** Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool.

**MA IN MIND, BRAIN AND LEARNING:** Westminster Institute of Education, Oxford Brookes University.

**MA IN PHILOSOPHY:** by research, Tilburg University.

**MA IN PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY:** TiLPS, Tilburg University.

**MA IN PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES:** Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol.

**MA IN RHETORIC:** School of Journalism, Media and Communication, University of Central Lancashire.

**MA PROGRAMMES:** in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, and Philosophy of Mind and Psychology, University of Birmingham.

**MRES IN METHODS AND PRACTICES OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH:** Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen.

**MSc IN APPLIED STATISTICS:** Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck, University of London.

**MSc IN APPLIED STATISTICS AND DATAMINING:** School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of St Andrews.

**MSc IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:** Faculty of Engineering, University of Leeds.

### MA IN REASONING

A programme at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. Gain the philosophical background required for a PhD in this area.

Optional modules available from Psychology, Computing, Statistics, Social Policy, Law, Biosciences and History.

**MSc IN COGNITIVE & DECISION SCIENCES:** Psychology, University College London.

**MSc IN COGNITIVE SYSTEMS:** Language, Learning, and Reasoning, University of Potsdam.

**MSc IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE:** University of Osnabrück, Germany.  
**MSc IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY/NEUROPSYCHOLOGY:** School of Psychology, University of Kent.  
**MSc IN LOGIC:** Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam.  
**MSc IN MIND, LANGUAGE & EMBODIED COGNITION:** School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh.  
**MSc IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY:** University of Twente, The Netherlands.  
**MRES IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES: LANGUAGE, COMMUNICATION AND ORGANIZATION:** Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language, and Information, University of the Basque Country (Donostia San Sebastián).  
**OPEN MIND:** International School of Advanced Studies in Cognitive Sciences, University of Bucharest.

## JOBS AND STUDENTSHIPS

### Jobs

**RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP:** in Historical & Philosophical Studies, University of Cambridge, deadline 1 October.  
**ASSISTANT PROFESSORSHIP:** in Applied Ethics, University of Nottingham, deadline 8 October.  
**ASSOCIATE PROFESSORSHIP:** in Statistics, University of Bath, deadline 11 October.  
**POST DOC:** in Statistical Methodology, University of Oxford, deadline 12 October.  
**PROFESSORSHIP:** in History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, deadline 31 October.  
**ASSOCIATE PROFESSORSHIP:** in Statistics, University of Oslo, deadline 1 November.  
**POST DOC:** in Justifying Intuitive Judgments, Aarhus University, deadline 1 November.  
**ASSISTANT PROFESSORSHIP:** in Philosophy of Economics, Lehigh University, deadline 1 November.  
**POST DOC:** in Intuitions in Science and Philosophy, Aarhus University, deadline 1 November.

### Studentships

**PHD POSITION:** in Philosophy of Science, University of Edinburgh, deadline 15 October.  
**PHD POSITION:** in Philosophy of Mind/Cognition, University of Wollongong, deadline 17 October.  
**PHD POSITION:** in Philosophy of Science and Technology, Karlsruhe University, deadline 25 October.  
**PHD POSITION:** in Justifying Intuitive Judgments, Aarhus University, deadline 1 November.  
**PHD POSITION:** in Philosophy of Science, University of Vienna, deadline 13 November.