The first week of classes certainly affirmed my excitement for ‘Mastering Law’ at the University of Kent. One seminar which particularly stood out for me was the introduction to the Death and Dying module. Professor Robin Mackenzie poignantly kicked off the course by reminding us of the one certainty in life: that we are all going to die. A sobering thought to be mindful of as we delve into academic debates and ethical concerns surrounding various end of life issues.
Death and dying, as a topic, is mysterious and apparently taboo. Even defining ‘death’ has proven to be a challenge; through discussions in seminar during Week 2 about the evolving definitions of death and their shortcomings, it was unanimously agreed that ‘death’ is very much a socially constructed concept. We also touched on the fact that new life-preserving technologies challenge this constructed concept as it allows for patients to be kept ‘alive’ far beyond their natural limits.
Understandably, people might be afraid of something so unfathomable as death, but the response should not be to avoid discussing or thinking about it altogether. Considering the fact that our death is inevitable and that dying is a part of life, we would be better off confronting the ethical issues that permeate end of life care, and that affect each and every one of us.
Article 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 safeguards the right to life – but should there be a right to die? And, given our limited resources of life-preserving technologies that can keep futile patients ‘alive’, is there ever a duty to die?
These are deeply philosophical questions with significant practical implications. For example, if one believes there should be a right to die, who then should be obligated to carry out this right? Medical professionals would conceivably be the best suited to do so, but would this not conflict with the Hippocratic Oath? (The Oath under which physicians promise to cure and prevent illness to the best of their ability and to do no harm). Here, we need to consider an important underlying presumption being made about death; namely, that death constitutes harm. Surely those such as the late Tony Nicklinson who desperately sought permission for physician assisted suicide would argue that death is not harm, but the sole remedy to end their pain and suffering.
In the United Kingdom, the withdrawal of treatment happens regularly; while euthanasia and physician assisted suicide remain illegal. A closer look at these procedures might lead one to ask whether or not there is a significant difference between the withdrawal of treatment, euthanasia, and physician assisted suicide. Peering through a critical lens one might find that under the status quo some patients are being granted the ‘right to die’ qua exercising autonomy over their decision to end their life, while others are not.
I look forward to continuing my legal, ethical, and philosophical exploration of contemporary issues in death and dying, and hope to ignite some discussions on what I believe are among the most important issues in medical law and ethics.