A New Social Compact to Grapple with ‘Mirror Life’

On 3 October 2025, the ASU Washington Center hosted Biosafety and Biosecurity Considerations for Mirror Life, a one-day hybrid workshop convened to advance international dialogue on the governance of mirror biology. The event was part of a wider series of global science discussions on mirror biology and featured panel presentations, audience polling, and open debate. Sessions explored the state of mirror-life research, emerging biosafety and governance frameworks, lessons from past scientific controversies, and approaches to meaningful public engagement.

The workshop was jointly organised by the Consortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes (CSPO) at Arizona State University and the University of Nevada, Reno, with support from the National Institute of General Medical Sciences (Award #1R01GM155913-01) and the Mirror Biology Dialogues Fund.

We are pleased to publish a commentary by the workshop organisers—David R. Gillum, Arthur Daemmrich, and Kathleen M. Vogel—alongside an anonymised transcript of the full proceedings.

Their commentary argues that mirror life should be approached as a “learning technology”: an opportunity to develop adaptive, anticipatory, and participatory governance. They propose a model of tiered oversight incorporating “evidence gates”—pre-defined scientific milestones that trigger staged reassessment—creating checkpoints rather than chokepoints in the research process. The authors advocate permitting low-risk research to advance, restricting work on self-replicating systems, strengthening biosafety capacity, and building multi-level governance supported by iterative and inclusive public engagement.

A New Social Compact to Grapple with ‘Mirror Life’

(For the PDF version of this article with full event transcript in the appendix, please download HERE)

David R. Gillum (dgillum@unr.edu)
Associate Vice President for Compliance and Research Administration, and Adjunct Faculty, School of Public Health, University of Nevada, Reno.

Arthur Daemmrich (arthur.daemmrich@asu.edu)
Director of the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes (CSPO) and Professor of Practice, School for the Future of Innovation in Society, Arizona State University.

Kathleen M. Vogel (Kathleen.Vogel@asu.edu)
Professor, School for the Future of Innovation in Society, and Senior Global Futures Scientist, Julie Ann Wrigley Global Futures Laboratory, Arizona State University.

 

In a conference room near the U.S. Capitol, an unusual group gathered this October. Scientists, biosafety officers, policy analysts, ethicists, and congressional staffers filled the Arizona State University Barbara Barrett & Justice O’Connor Washington Center to confront a provocative question: What if life itself could be built from a mirror image?

Mirror biochemistry already exists in chemical laboratories and chiral compounds have been identified and studied since the 1840s. However, the subject of “mirror life”, or synthetic organisms constructed from mirror-image biomolecules, is still a futuristic consideration. Rather than debating whether such work should ever occur, the conversation focused on how governance, safety, and public dialogue might evolve in tandem with the science. The meeting, Biosafety and Biosecurity Considerations for Mirror Life, was co-hosted by Arizona State University and the University of Nevada, Reno, with support from an NIH grant and the Mirror Biology Dialogues Fund. It drew more than 125 participants, about a third of whom were in person and the rest online, making it one of the first large-scale policy dialogues in the United States in this new frontier.

The day opened not with panic, but with a sense of responsibility and curiosity. The speakers and participants were not there to debate incremental questions of biological or chemical safety; they were there to examine how governance could anticipate and respond to scientific change.

From Chiral Chemistry to Mirror Life

Chemists have long been intrigued by the orientation of atoms that form the structure of molecules. In many cases, though not always, the reactivity of a molecule depends on its chiral (or “handedness”) form. Ibuprofen, for example, exists as both (R)- and (S)-isomers, but only the (S) variant reduces inflammation and pain. Predicting the impact of such compounds in the body is fiendishly complex. At one point, scientists thought that it was only the (R)-enantiomer of the notorious teratogen Thalidomide that inhibited limb growth in the womb. Further research showed that in the course of being metabolized, both forms of the compound were generated in the human body.

The concept of mirror life builds on the observation that many of the building blocks of life are chiral, existing in both left-handed and right-handed forms. Natural biology uses only one orientation, L-amino acids, to build proteins, while D-sugars are found in DNA and RNA. But chemists have shown that mirror versions can be synthesized in the laboratory.

These mirror biomolecules behave differently. DNA and RNA built from the opposite chirality do not seem able to be read by natural enzymes. Proteins composed of mirror amino acids are believed to be resistant to degradation. Collectively, these properties make them attractive for biotechnology. Several mirror aptamers, often referred to as Spiegelmers, are already in clinical trials. For example, NOX-H94 (lexaptepid pegol) targets the hormone hepcidin to treat anemia. In contrast, NOX-A12 (olaptesed pegol) binds CXCL12 and is being tested in glioblastoma and leukemia. Another candidate, NOX-E36 (emapticap pegol), is under investigation for inflammatory and metabolic disorders. Mirror peptides are also being explored as diagnostic tools and molecular sensors, possibly leading to larger applications in medicine and biotechnology.

So far, the field has been limited to molecules. But the possibility of assembling mirror ribosomes, or even entire mirror organisms, is beginning to appear on the horizon. A self-replicating system composed of mirror biomolecules is believed to be immune to viral infection and may sit entirely outside natural evolutionary pathways, since mirror molecules are not thought to interact or exchange genetic material with the enzymes, ribosomes, or viruses of natural life. For some, this represents an alluring platform for manufacturing or medicine. For others, it is a red line not to be crossed.

Divergent Views

To gauge the room, organizers conducted live polls among the 125 participants, including biosafety officers, life scientists, ethicists, policy analysts, and congressional staff, many of whom work in university biosafety programs or federal oversight roles. Their perspectives matter because they represent the professionals who would both conduct and regulate future research in this area.

When asked how risky it would be to create mirror life, participants expressed notable uncertainty: 36 percent responded, “don’t know,” 27 percent “moderately risky,” 18 percent “very risky,” 16 percent “extremely risky,” and 3 percent “slightly risky.” None considered it “not risky at all.”

Asked whether research explicitly aimed at creating mirror organisms should be prohibited at this stage, the group again divided: 42 percent were unsure, 31 percent opposed prohibition, and 27 percent supported it.

Yet, there was broad agreement that governance should begin early, with 80 percent saying governments should already be considering regulatory measures. In comparison, only 6 percent were opposed, and 14 percent were uncertain.

These results bring forward two themes that resurfaced throughout the day: first, deep uncertainty even among experts about the potential risks of mirror life, and second, a shared recognition that governance must precede, not follow, technological breakthroughs.

Looking Back to Move Forward

The uncertainty surrounding mirror life echoes to earlier scientific debates. The workshop repeatedly returned to the case of recombinant DNA in the 1970s. At the time, community anxieties about gene splicing led the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, to pass stringent ordinances on local university labs. The biotech industry challenged the rules, but the state’s highest court upheld Cambridge’s authority to regulate research for public health.

Rather than deterring investment, the ordinances created stability. Biogen chose Cambridge as the site of its pilot plant precisely because the rules were consistent, transparent, and enforceable. Over the following decades, Cambridge became the world’s leading hub for biotechnology. Regulation, in this case, proved not an obstacle but an asset for biotech development in the United States.

Other historical parallels were also raised. The Asilomar Conference on recombinant DNA, often held up as a model of responsible self-governance, was criticized in retrospect for being exclusionary, with little public involvement. More recently, debates over “gain-of-function” experiments and potential pandemic pathogens demonstrated the perils of secrecy and delayed engagement. Lessons from these episodes weighed heavily on the mirror life discussion: avoid elitism, build transparent governance, and engage the public early.

The Governance Puzzle

If mirror life poses risk we do not yet understand, how should governance proceed? A rough consensus emerged around the need for differentiated rules. Research on mirror biomolecules, such as Spiegelmers, peptides, and aptamers, could continue under existing biosafety structures. But attempts to build self-replicating mirror organisms were viewed as risky and should be highly scrutinized, if not banned completely, at least for now.

Between these two poles lies a vast middle ground: mirror ribosomes, partial translation systems, and protocells. These steps could one day enable replication, but they are not yet whole organisms. For this “yellow zone,” participants argued for adaptive oversight. A system of “evidence gates” could be created, specifically defined scientific milestones that trigger review, allowing policymakers and biosafety committees to reassess risks and benefits before further progress is made.

Such tiered governance resembles approaches discussed in other controversial areas of science such as gene editing and AI oversight: embedding checkpoints, not necessarily chokepoints, into the research process. But these checkpoints can also “sound the alarm” in case research becomes too risky to continue.

Underlying the technical debates was a broader theme: legitimacy. Governance cannot succeed if it is seen as imposed by experts without regard for broader values. Communities bring diverse priorities to the table, including desiring safety, fairness, autonomy, and prosperity. Unless those priorities are reflected in policy, regulations risk being rejected or undermined.

The workshop polls highlighted just how unsettled even expert opinion remains. If uncertainty prevails within the biosafety and research communities, it is likely stronger among the general public. Several participants argued that governance must be accompanied by structured public engagement, processes that allow people to articulate their values, shape policy options, and revisit them as science progresses.

Engagement must also be iterative, not a one-time consultation. Technologies evolve, and so do public perceptions. Mechanisms that bring in diverse voices quickly, such as participatory assessments completed in weeks rather than years, were seen as critical to maintaining legitimacy over time.

Equally important, participants noted, are the practical capacities required to make governance work. Biosafety officers, often under-resourced, are the frontline implementers of oversight. Without investments in training, data-sharing, and institutional consistency, even well-designed frameworks can falter in practice. Building governance infrastructure is as vital as designing the rules themselves.

Tensions

The discussion also made clear that governance does not end with high-level policy. It must be implemented in laboratories, often by biosafety officers with limited resources and budgets. Rules that appear straightforward at the national level can become ambiguous in practice. For example, a regulation requiring containment “appropriate to the level of risk” offers little guidance when evaluating mirror biomolecules that do not fit existing biosafety categories. Enforcement involves training, staffing, and institutional culture dimensions that are often not explicitly outlined in technical regulations or policies.

Participants emphasized the importance of minimum biosafety standards applicable across institutions to prevent a patchwork of uneven practices. They also called for better reporting structures, so that incidents, near misses, and lessons learned are shared rather than buried. Professional development and continuing education were highlighted as vital for keeping biosafety practices aligned with the scientific frontiers. Without such practical supports, there was concern that even the most thoughtful governance frameworks could fail once translated to the bench.

The workshop also highlighted that governance readiness varies widely across institutions. Participants called for shared reporting systems, harmonized standards, and ongoing education to prevent fragmentation in biosafety and biosecurity. These discussions are already informing follow-up work by the organizers, who are conducting surveys, interviews, and policy briefs to identify institutional needs and opportunities for collaboration.

One of the thorniest questions raised was where authority should lie. Local governance, like Cambridge’s ordinances, has clear advantages: it engages communities directly and allows for tailored responses. But mirror life is a technology with potential global implications. Without international coordination, research could migrate to jurisdictions with weaker oversight and create risks of regulatory arbitrage.

The consensus was that both levels are necessary. Local authority builds legitimacy and accountability, while international norms ensure fairness and prevent unsafe “races to the bottom.” Building such a multi-level governance system, however, will require the establishment of new institutions and channels of cooperation that do not yet exist in the biosafety field. Participants suggested this could include partnerships among research institutions, funding agencies, and professional societies to translate governance principles into operational practice.

By the end of the workshop, participants were framing mirror life less as a single scientific goal than as a test case for governance. Like recombinant DNA in the 1970s or CRISPR in the 2010s, mirror life represents a learning technology, an opportunity to experiment not just with science but with governance itself.

This means designing adaptable policies, testing public engagement strategies, and developing new models for tiered oversight. It also means recognizing that the stakes are not only technical but also social.

Moving Forward

Some points of consensus emerged. Research on mirror biomolecules should proceed. Efforts to create self-replicating mirror organisms should not. Intermediate steps require special oversight, with evidence gates guiding progress. Public engagement must be ongoing and inclusive. Biosafety professionals need resources and support. And governance must operate at both local and global levels.

The workshop reinforced that anticipatory governance is not necessarily a constraint on discovery, but an essential enabler of responsible innovation. By viewing mirror life as a “learning technology,” scientists and policymakers can experiment not only with molecules but with new forms of cooperative oversight.

In the coming months, the organizing team plans to synthesize workshop findings, conduct follow-up interviews, and develop collaborative proposals and educational initiatives to carry this conversation forward. Whether mirror life remains a thought experiment or becomes a practical reality may depend less on what is technically possible than on whether society can build a governance compact that is transparent, adaptive, and legitimate. New governance approaches are pressing for emerging areas of biotechnology, mirror life and others, and institutionalizing approaches to deliberation and community consent that go beyond current permitting hearings is necessary to advance innovation in these areas. The transcript of the workshop has been deidentified of personal and institutional data (see Appendix).