**Using these four sources in their historical context assess how far they support the view that Churchill was most to blame for the loss of the 1945 election.**

***Source A: Conservative Party Beveridge Report Committee, report on the Beveridge proposals, 19 January 1943***

‘Sir William Beveridge’s Report expresses the views of one man on a number of highly technical subjects, and although he had the advantage of the assistance of many eminent Civil Servants, the Report is his alone and does not contain, as is widely assumed, the recommendations of a well qualified expert committee. There is no doubt, however, that the great publicity which the Report has received in the press, on the platform and over the wireless has unfortunately led many people to assume that it represents Government policy and is likely to be carried into speedy effect as soon as the war is over’.

***Source B: Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs 1931-1945, published in 1957. Dalton was a Labour MP and Cabinet member during the Second World War***

‘As the war in Europe drew towards the end, the P.M., I heard, said to the Air Chief Marshal Harris: “I suppose that, when the election comes, I can count on the votes of most of the men in the Air Force?” “No Sir”, replied Harris, “eighty per cent of them will vote Labour”. “Well at least that will give me 20 per cent”, said the P.M., sharply taken aback. “No sir, the other 20 per cent won’t vote at all”.

The Laski affair was most irritating, though I don’t think it turned many votes against us, and it may have encouraged Churchill to launch his broadcast attack on us as dangerous dictators, a new Gestapo etc. This, followed by Attlee’s quiet, and constructive reply, certainly turned many votes our way’.

***Source C: The Editor of the Manchester Guardian newspaper, interviewing Churchill, 20 March 1941***

‘The necessary thing was to win the war, and any statement on peace aims would either be a collection of platitudes or would be dangerous to the present unity. We did not want a statement that dealt with any of the hotly disputed things in domestic affairs, and it was going to be difficult at the end of the war not to have a breach on questions like property and Socialism. We could not expect the Conservatives to swallow the things that would be put forward by the Socialists…What he felt was that Socialism would impair or destroy the individual initiative of millions of small people in the country, which was an immense element in the national strength’.

***Source D: Article in The Economist Magazine, broadly claiming that Churchill was behaving like a petulant child with a bad temper on issues of post-war social reform, probably due to the influence of people like Lord Beaverbrook, 8 April 1944***

‘The advice the Prime Minister is getting is bad advice. If it goes on it will finish by doing the impossible – that is, alienating him from a large section of the country…The leadership of the war is not in question but for every one elector who, two months ago, suspected that the Government was needlessly obstructing reform or who doubted whether Mr Churchill was the man to head the country in peace as well as in war, there must be now be three or four’.