**Using these four sources in their historical context assess how far they support the view that Churchill did not work effectively with his generals in the period 1940 to 1945.**

***Source A: Diary entry of Sir Alan Brooke, Britain’s most senior commander, written on 27 April 1941.***

John Kennedy (Director of Military Operations) tried to give the Prime Minister a discourse on strategy in which he contemplated an evacuation of Egypt! This infuriated the P.M. and we had some trouble calming him down. The Kennedy incident was a very typical one. Poor old John had only intended to express that there might be worse things to lose than Egypt. It was, however, at once taken up by Winston as being a defeatist attitude, and Kennedy was relegated amongst those “many generals who are only too ready to surrender, and who should be made examples of”’.

***Source B: Major-General Henry Rowan-Robinson, veteran of the First World War and military writer, writing in a military publication, 1941***

‘A present, the efforts of the fighting forces are co-ordinated, most ineffectively, by the War Cabinet. Mr Churchill is, indeed, Minster of Defence and is in theory responsible for co-ordination; but, without a ministry and a staff to support him and to set the problem before him in every one of its aspects, he is utterly unequal, superman though he is, to the task…Why was it that we were seven months in Crete without organising the defence of our aerodromes there and why did we decide, to our heavy loss in warships and troops, to defence the island without aircraft?’

***Source C: Speech made by Aneurin Bevan in the House of Commons, 2 July 1942.***

‘Why is the strategy wrong? I say, first, that it is because the Prime Minister, although possessing many other qualities, sometimes conceives of the war, it seems to me, in medieval terms…Get the enemy where he really is 21 miles away, not 14,000 miles. Get him by the throat…Send some politicians out. Send some of us and let us risk our lives’.

***Source D: Minutes of a meeting between General Bernard Montgomery and Winston Churchill, in which Churchill had been unhappy about arrangements for D Day, 19 May 1944.***

‘I understand, sir that you want to discuss with my staff the proportion of soldiers to vehicles landing on the beaches in the first flights. I cannot allow you to do so. My staff advise me and I give the final decision. They then do what I tell them. That final decision has been given. In any case I could never allow you to harass my staff at this time and possibly shake their confidence in me. They have had a terrific job preparing the invasion. That work is now almost completed, and all over England the troops are beginning to move towards the assembly areas, prior to embarkation. You can argue with me but not with my staff’.