FIVE SPACES OF CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY

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This article offers some reflections on the nature and role of space and spatial analysis in criminology. It proceeds in two parts. It starts by comparing and contrasting the spatial legacy of the Chicago School of sociology—seen by most as the progenitors of environmental criminology—with the general approach to space adopted by cultural geographers. The second part breaks new ground for criminology by positing five new areas—or ‘spaces’—of engagement that offer alternative ways of interpreting the relationship between space and crime, the ultimate aim being to challenge contemporary criminologists to think differently about how space is conceptualized and utilized within our discipline.

Keywords: space, cultural criminology, Chicago School of sociology, cultural geography

Introduction

Spatial analysis is fundamental to criminological inquiry. Frequently, however, the way space is utilized and conceptualized within criminology leaves much to be desired. From the statistical abstraction of Quételet’s cartes thematiques to the flawed semiotic interpretation of urban space in Wilson and Kelling’s ‘Broken Windows’ hypothesis, criminology has all too often taken space for granted, proceeding with an implicit notion of spatiality that approaches the environment simply as a geographic site and not as a product of power relations, cultural and social dynamics, or everyday values and meanings. Consider the latest developments in Global Information Systems and computer-aided crime mapping. Promoted as an introductory guide to the science of crime mapping and aimed at ‘crime analysts and other practitioners interested in visualizing crime data through the medium of maps’, the US National Institute of Justice publication Mapping Crime: Principle and Practice (Harries 1999) offers us a somewhat disconcerting glimpse of a future that has already arrived: a world of ‘global satellite orientation’, ‘scatter diagrams’, ‘crime moments’, ‘stick streets’ and ‘choropleth maps’. Abstraction, of course, is fully acknowledged: ‘More abstraction equals greater simplicity and legibility (more effective visual communication). [While] Less abstraction equals greater complexity, less legibility (less effective visual communication)’ (Harries 1999: 10). So goes the thinking behind the latest development in spatial criminology. Sadly, such an implicit spatial logic is also too often apparent within environmental criminology and the ‘geography of crime’ discourse more generally.

Conceptually, there is little new here. Consider, the late-fifteenth-century painting, Ideal City (with Circular Temple), by the Circle of Pierro della Francesca. At one level, this celebrated work of art can be read as a straightforward Renaissance civic vista, all classical columns and architectural detail. However, at another level, the picture tells a different

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story about the relationship between technological development and urban space. If, today, we are witnessing remarkable transformations in the technical representation of space via the combination of computer-aided map making and ortho-rectified imagery (both from satellite and aerial sources), a similar revolution was underway during Pierro della Francesca’s time. Not only had Brunelleschi invented and introduced the use of geometric linear perspective in painting, but also the development of the ‘iconographic plan’ had greatly enhanced the architect’s power of representation. These developments, along with the increasing accuracy and sophistication of Renaissance drawing and surveying instrumentation, contributed to the pronounced distancing of architect from his subject. This ‘distance’ is exemplified by Francesca’s Ideal City, a painting bereft not only of all people, but of any sense of the muddiness and complexity of urban life. This form of representation is interesting, for two reasons. First, these new commissions, designed to absolute standards, overtly reflected the dominant politico-economic order of idealized Renaissance society. Second, as Ruth Eaton states, they highlight ‘the progressive objectification of the city and the detached and intellectual approach adopted by the planner’ (Eaton 2001: 41):

The fact that the buildings themselves have become the main actors in these scenes bears testimony to the fact that the city is considered in an increasingly objective manner. Above all, space… has become rationalised, the human mind has expressed its superiority over natural circumstances, and matters of consequence have become irrelevant. (Eaton 2001: 50)

My point here is that, whether it is fifteenth-century developments in technocratic representation or the newest modes of ‘visual communication’ associated with contemporary crime mapping, fascination with technology has frequently triumphed over other more humanistic approaches. Although this charge should certainly not be levelled at all forms of environmental criminology, specific branches of the field (including certain types of crime mapping and ‘place-based’ rational choice approaches) do have a tendency to prioritize technical developments over and above theoretical and contextual considerations (on this, see Aas 2012): something that, in turn, can result in the uneven integration of empirical and theoretical knowledge (Bottoms 2007: 567). Elsewhere, I have described this tendency as a ‘flight from reality’ (Hayward 2004) whereby certain forms of socio-spatial criminology too readily distil human lived experience and the complex fabric of life to leave only the discourse of demographics, statistics and multi-factorialism.

This article is an attempt to redress the balance. Its goal is a straightforward one: to offer for discussion some alternative, even imaginative, new ways of thinking about space and crime that might help extend the boundaries of current spatial/geographic criminology. If certain subfields of environmental criminology tend to mathematize the issue of environment, emphasizing rational abstractions for the purposes of short-term crime reduction, this paper takes a very different tack. It prioritizes phenomenological place over abstract space in an attempt to take seriously the cultural and structural relationships that contribute to crime and disorder or, for that matter, community safety and stability. Although, at times, my argument is provocative, my intention is not to undermine all aspects of environmental and spatial criminology. On the contrary, much of this work—from Burgess to Bottoms, McKay to Morris—is of profound insight. Instead, my intention is to augment existing research into the relationship between space and crime by drawing on intellectual developments provoked by the ‘spatial turn’ in social theory.
The impact of the spatial turn has been substantive and far-reaching, influencing disciplines from anthropology to religious studies (Warf and Arias 2009). However, developments within one sub-discipline in particular would seem, to my mind at least, especially pertinent to criminology. I refer here to the vibrant field of cultural geography. In this body of work, space is understood almost as if it were a living thing, a multi-layered congress of cultural, political and spatial dynamics. I am not naive enough to suggest that cultural geography and attendant concepts such as non-representational theory will subsume existing criminological methods, but that maybe these more experimental approaches might be useful as a ‘background hum, asking questions of style, form, technique and method’ (Lorimer 2008: 556).

The paper proceeds in two parts. It starts by comparing and contrasting the spatial legacy of the Chicago School of sociology—seen by most as the progenitors of environmental criminology—with the general approach to space adopted by cultural geographers. The second part breaks new ground for criminology by positing five new areas—or ‘spaces’—of engagement that will be of interest to criminologists working on space, be they of a cultural, critical or environmental persuasion.

1925: A Tale of Two Essays

The spatial legacy of the Chicago School

As the history of criminology is told, when it comes to criminology’s relationship with (‘criminogenic’) space, one moment stands out above all others. The work of the Chicago School is so well known that it features in practically every criminology textbook ever written. Typically, the story starts in 1925, the year Robert Park, Ernest Burgess and their student Roderick McKenzie published *The City* (1925). The concept of ecology had been doing the rounds of American sociology since the 1880s (Small and Vincent 1894), but it was this volume, and one essay in particular, Burgess’s (1925) ‘The Growth of the City’, that solidified Chicago-style (urban) sociology by linking ‘human ecology’ and competition for space to what Kimball Young described as Park’s ‘zone thing’ (Lindstrom and Hardert 1988: 270). The specific details of the Chicago School have been well-rehearsed elsewhere and need no further exposition here. Instead, this article starts with recourse to the Chicagoans by way of a provocation. My opening position here is that, for all its numerous theoretical and empirical insights, the Chicago School’s legacy within criminology is not without its problems. Specifically, the School’s interpretation of ‘space’ set the geography of crime down a very particular and, in my opinion, rather narrow conceptual path from which it has rarely deviated. To illustrate this point, we must deviate from the standard account of ‘Chicago-style sociology’ and trace a story that remains unfamiliar to most criminologists.

Contrary to mainstream criminological accounts, the Chicago School did not start with Park, Burgess and a map of concentric circles. Originally, University of Chicago sociology was noted for its association with American pragmatism and the works of Dewey, Mead and Tufts. On occasion, the influence of these ‘first-generation’ Chicagoans on the subsequent work of the School is acknowledged (see Sumner 1994). However,
what is almost never acknowledged is the extent to which these pragmatists influenced groundbreaking spatial analyses of Chicago that predated the work of Park and his followers by several decades. The social reformer and pioneering feminist sociologist Jane Addams had close working relationships with most of the leading Chicago pragmatists and, as such, was committed to social progress through the ‘liberation’ of education and other forms of radical emancipatory practice. Addams’s ‘critical pragmatism’ led her to found the Hull-House settlement and ultimately to publish *Hull-House Maps and Papers* (1895), a collection of essays and micro street maps (compiled by residents) detailing the slum spaces of Chicago east of Hull-House. Given that Addams’s body of work contained a strong spatial component, including the mapping of social and demographic characteristics of populations within a geographic area, why do Addams and Hull-House feature so rarely in the criminological canon? Again, the answer lies in criminology’s fascination with technology, in this case the scientism associated with the statistical methods of demography and human ecology as applied to the ‘city as a social laboratory’ (Park 1925a).

As Mary-Jo Deegan (1988) makes clear in her fascinating book *Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School*, for all their achievements, Park, Burgess and the other key figures of the Chicago School have a stain on their collective reputation in the form of their systematic marginalization of the work of Addams and her fellow Hull-House sociologists. This marginalization took a number of forms. Desperate to create an respectable area of specialized expertise, Park and Burgess did all they could to legitimize the ‘new field’ of sociology. Thus, the ‘Settlement’ was soon rejected in favour of the ‘laboratory of the city’, where, as Park stated in 1919, ‘civilization and social progress have assumed . . . something of the character of a controlled experiment’ (Park, quoted in Deegan 1988: 34). This type of thinking was anathema to Hull-House sociologists, whose humanism meant they flatly rejected such scientism.

The tension over scientific method that existed between University of Chicago sociologists and Hull-House researchers should not be underestimated, not least because it masked other reasons for the ostracism of Jane Addams—not just by the Chicago School, but by succeeding generations of American sociologists. There is no doubt that both Park and Burgess were greatly influenced by Addams and *Hull-House Maps and Papers*—Burgess especially. Prior to his faculty post at Chicago, he had stayed at Hull-House, cited its work in congratulatory tones and was himself something of a would-be social reformer—a position he would later overtly distance himself from.2 However, as time wore on, Park’s influence took hold and Burgess began to downplay Hull-House, dismissing it as ‘social work’ aimed at ‘reporting’ to the public ‘the feelings and sentiments of those living in the ethnic slums’ (Burgess, quoted in Deegan 1988: 63). At the same time, in a bid to promote the ‘scientific and objective’ approach of Chicago sociology, Burgess rushed to take credit for the first official juvenile delinquency maps, even though Hull-House researchers had produced these maps much earlier.3 Park’s role in the marginalization of Addams was even more pronounced. Despite a personal history of advocacy and critical muckraking, it is fair to say that, when it came

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2 The putative title of Burgess’s unfinished autobiography was *I Renounce Reform and the Reformer: The Story of a Conflict of Social Roles*. One can almost feel Park standing over Burgess’s shoulder, nodding approvingly.

3 The full extent of Burgess’s unflinching scientism is outlined in Harcourt’s (2007) fascinating account of Burgess’s role in the attempt to make the US parole system function on a purely scientific (predictive/probabilistic) footing.
to empirical sociology, Park was keen to adopt a safer, ‘value free’ position, as Deegan makes clear: ‘Park profoundly embodied the conflicts of the new sociology. He legitimized a conservative political role for sociologists and left a legacy for future sociologists who worked to maintain the status quo while mildly condemning it’ (Deegan 1988:158). In short, radical politics and social change were not on the agenda for 1920s and 1930s University of Chicago sociologists. Consequently, Addams was ostracized and her ‘status as a sociologist diminished drastically’ (Deegan 1988: 144). Add to this the fact that Addams and her female Hull-House sociologists were further undermined by the anti-feminism that was symptomatic of 1920s Chicago sociology and it is clear that, just as Francesca’s *Ideal City* was emblematic of Renaissance power, Burgess’s concentric circle map was equally an expression of the dominant politico-ideological order of idealized early-twentieth-century American capitalist society (Smith 1988).

And what of the other aspect of Chicago sociology: their ethnographic focus on the ‘the private world of the deviant’? Despite the School’s groundbreaking role in systematizing new research methods like participant observation and the life history, the ‘appreciative’ legacy of the school, as oriented to the urban environment, increasingly fell victim to outside policy influence and rational abstraction (Platt 1994)—processes that, in turn, placed a strong emphasis on various forms of ‘correctionalism’. Matza makes this point clear in his comments on Anderson’s seminal ‘appreciative’ study, *The Hobo*:

Anderson’s study, like most emanating from the Chicago school, was supported and partly financed by municipal agencies and commissions that were interested in ameliorating the grievous conditions associated with vice, alcohol, wandering, vagrancy and begging. Thus, the mixture of naturalist and correctional sentiments was institutionally based as well as existing as an intellectual tension in the work of the Chicago school. (Matza 1969: 26)

Thus, the street is co-opted ‘from above’ in the sense of city planners and governmental and civic agencies inviting in the perspective of the rational policy-oriented ideal—a road that led ultimately to the creation of disciplinary variants such as environmental and administrative criminology. One of the advantages of this approach, of course, is that it produces readily quantifiable results, typically in the form of computer-processed police statistics or surveys. These statistics, in turn, contribute to a wider framework of government networks based around an actuarial and calculative approach to the control and (‘risk’) management of social problems. Under such a system, urban space—like the school, the courtroom and the prison—becomes a focus solely of statistical analysis, at once a place of audit and a testing ground for new policy initiatives. As Garland suggests, the identification of ‘criminogenic spaces’ simply constitutes a new site of intervention for government practices, a new practicable object, quite distinct from the individual offenders and legal subjects that previously formed the targets for crime control’ (Garland 1997: 187).

Complex urban social dynamics are not easily integrated into the type of managerialist, postcode-specific framework that underpins the new space of crime intervention/mapping (Burrows and Gane 2006; Burrows 2008). As a result, micro processes

*This point is substantiated by the unwritten restrictions imposed on critical writing and faculty activism by the University’s administrators. The controversial dismissals of W. I. Small and Edward Bemis are testimony to this atmosphere of control.*
that manifest themselves at street level are stripped of their inherent specificity, meaning and serendipity.

Cultural geography: a brief introduction

A long way from the tenement houses and Louis Sullivan-designed skyscrapers of Chicago, a very different America was under observation. In the dusty canyons of North West Mexico and on the glades of Missouri’s Ozark Highlands, a University of Chicago-trained geographer named Carl O. Sauer was undertaking fieldwork that would later become the foundation stone of American cultural geography. The contrast between Sauer and Park could not be starker. While photographs of Park depict him as the classic academic, all steel-rimmed glasses and Brooke Brothers suits, Sauer was the quintessential field geographer. The photo on the inside of Land and Life, the definitive collection of his work, is typical. Covered in dust, dressed in Khakis, sporting knee-length gaiters and with tobacco pipe clenched resolutely between his teeth, Sauer was no dapper urbanist. His laboratory was ‘the landscape’ and his passion was the mores and norms of indigenous people. Given that criminology, with very few exceptions, has steadfastly ignored matters rural, perhaps it is no surprise that Sauer is entirely absent from the criminological canon. Yet, there is much of value for criminologists in Sauer’s work and its legacy, and where better to start than with his classic article, ‘The Morphology of Landscape’, published in 1925, the very same year as Burgess’s ‘The Growth of the City’?

It would be both unfair and incorrect to suggest that Park and the early figures of the Chicago School were crude environmental determinists in the tradition of Friedrich Ratzeser and Ellen Churchill Semple. Indeed, in many ways, their theory of human ecology was an attempt to go beyond simple neo-Lamarckism. Yet, it is hard to deny the extent to which they ascribed causal influence to the environment, as McKenzie makes clear when defining social ecology as ‘the study of the spatial and temporal relations of human beings affected by the selective, distributive and accommodative forces of the environment’ (McKenzie 1924: 288). Likewise, Park was happy for Chicago’s diverse social and cultural features to be understood not as something of woman’s making, but rather as the product of a geographic ‘super organism’. Sauer’s position was very different. His was an attempt to eschew what he described as ‘causal geography’, his starting premise being that man shaped the environment, not vice versa. In this sense, his work explicitly rejected what he saw as the fundamental errors of geographic environmental determinism. For Sauer, the qualities and activities of man are not ‘products’ of a ‘narrowly rationalistic thesis [that] conceives environment as process’ (Sauer 1925 [1963]: 349), but rather:

[W]hat man does in an area because of tabu or totemism or because of his own will involves use of environment rather than the active agency of the environment. It would, therefore, appear that environmentalism has been shooting neither at cause nor effect, but rather that it is bagging its own decoys. (Sauer 1925 [1963]: 349)

Sauer’s understanding of space differed sharply, then, from that proposed by the Chicagoans. It was a notion that attempted to appreciate and comprehend how individuals and groups lived in place and, in turn, shaped it, not the other way around. Although his principle target was ethnocentric environmental determinism with its
‘rigorous dogma of materialistic cosmology’, Sauer opened out his critique to cover con-
cepts that, at the time, were the stock-in-trade of Park and his adherents. Citing Park et al.’s *The City* in a footnote, Sauer states that ‘Sociologists have been swarming all over
the precincts of human ecology’ (Sauer 1925 [1963]: 353)—a concept that, earlier in
his essay, he dismissed in the following passage (that also hints at his general dislike of
quantitative analysis):

It is better not to force into geography too much biological nomenclature. The name ecology is not
needed... Since we waive the claim for the measurement of environmental influences, we may use, in
preference to ecology, the term morphology to apply to cultural study, since it describes perfectly the
method. (Sauer 1925 [1963]: 342)

The method to which Sauer refers is a critical system of material/spatial phenome-
nology known as ‘the morphology of the cultural landscape’. Central to this method is
an understanding of culture, hence Sauer’s famous statement that ‘The cultural land-
scape is fashioned from a natural landscape by a culture group. Culture is the agent, the
natural area is the medium, the cultural landscape the result’ (Sauer 1925 [1963]: 343).
With such statements, groundbreaking for the time, Sauer laid the foundations for
cultural geography. A focus on ‘cultural areas’, cultural particularism and human geo-
graphic activity, the importance of reading spaces in terms of their history and
chorology, anti-ethnocentrism and an underlying interest in cultural anthropology
are all central concerns of Sauer’s long and distinguished career, and all subsequently
axiomatic concepts of cultural geography.5

For all Sauer’s insights, his research was more geographic than cultural. What was
needed was for someone to shift the focus from landscape to lifeworld and put the
‘cultural’ firmly into cultural geography. The first notable attempt to do this was by
one of Sauer’s students, Wilbur Zelinsky. In his 1973 classic *The Cultural Geography of
the United States*, the arch American assimilationist Zelinsky celebrated culture—but
culture of a particular form. For all its idiosyncrasies, Zelinsky believed that American
culture could still be understood as a totality, a ‘superorganism’—not in the earlier
Parkian sense of an environmentally causal superorganism, but in the sense of shared,
holistic culture that:

... is something both of and beyond the participating members. Its totality is palpably greater than the
sum of its part, for it is superorganic and supraindividual in nature, an entity with a structure, set of
processes, and momentum of its own, though clearly not untouched by historical events and socio-
economic conditions. (Zelinsky 1973: 41)

Like Sauer, Zelinsky was a champion of diverse groups and marginalized ethnicities.
The problem, however, was that he was trying to flesh out an assimilationist theory of
culture and space at the very moment—1973—that the ‘American Dream’ was being
assailed from all sides. In sum, Zelinsky’s cultural geography was at root singular. What
was needed was an assemblage of cultural geographies capable of theorizing dissent and

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5As Gibson and Waitt (2009: 411) make clear: ‘There is no strict definition for cultural geography, and nor should its pursuits be
simplistically summarized. With origins in the early-twentieth-century geography, it is a loose subdiscipline that has come to en-
capsulate a range of perspectives. These vary with place and in time, and due to the manner in which ‘culture’ itself is conceived:
as cultivation, as evidence of civilization and moral development, as way of life, as identity, and as a way of knowing and thinking.’
spatial heterogeneity as much as consent and mutual experience. Thanks to the ‘cultural turn’, this is exactly what happened.

A case could be made that no discipline was more affected by the cultural turn of the 1970s than geography. If the Sauer–Zelinsky debate can be characterized as a small firefight on the edge of the empire, by the mid-1980s, geography’s hinterland had been overrun by something resembling total disciplinary war. At this point, our potted history of cultural geography will become familiar to criminologists. Some of the key influences that transformed human and cultural geography in the 1980s—Foucault, Gramsci, Stuart Hall and the Birmingham School of cultural studies—also greatly influenced criminology, or at least parts of it, most notably sub-cultural and feminist criminology. And this is the difference. While mainstream criminology remained largely unaffected by the social theoretical revolution ushered in by the cultural turn, geography’s relationship was substantive and enduring (Matless 1995)—a point Don Mitchell makes clear in his excellent introduction to cultural geography:

... [t]he ‘cultural turn’ is not limited to the subfield of cultural geography. Rather, in all manner of human geographies—from economic to political, from urban to regional, from feminist to Marxist—‘culture’ has become a primary focal point of study. (Mitchell 2000: 63)

No surprise, then, that the defining book of postmodernism was by a geographer, David Harvey’s *The Condition of Postmodernity*—a brilliant text that eruditely documents how the trajectories of the political, the spatial, the temporal and the economic crosscut the cultural. But what of cultural geography specifically? How did it emerge from the disciplinary turf wars brought on by the cultural and spatial turns? The answer to this question is foreshadowed in earlier critiques of Sauer and Zelinsky.

If, in many disciplines, the cultural turn is seen as an apolitical moment, this was not the case with human and social geography. The debates over space and the cultural–political nature of pluralism and opposition provoked a more pronounced political stance amongst many geographers, resulting in the development of more radical forms of spatio-cultural analysis. Nowhere was this more apparent than in cultural geography (Cosgrove 1983). Three figures stand out: Denis Cosgrove, James Duncan and Peter Jackson, all of whom, in their own way, had been early critics of Sauerian landscape-oriented cultural geography. Significantly, Duncan believed that Sauer and Zelinsky had failed to grasp the role *power* played in shaping culture. As a corrective, he proposed a conception of culture that prioritized ‘the many problematic social, political, and economic relationships’ that dictate the conditions in which we live our lives (Duncan 1980: 198). Jackson (1989) agreed, weighing in later to critique early cultural geography’s rural/ecological bias—the legacy, he claimed, of Sauer’s traditional geographic fieldwork sensibility. If cultural geography was to remain vital in challenging times, it needed to eschew its fascination with barns, allotments and indigenous outposts, and train attention instead on the more pressing problems of civic unrest and the material/spatial consequences of economic recession. Thus, thanks in large part to the efforts of Cosgrove, Duncan and Jackson, ‘the new cultural geography’ was born—a more diverse, politically charged variant than its older country cousin.

It is this latter variant that can be of considerable use to criminology generally and environmental and cultural criminology specifically. First, if contemporary areal/environmental criminology and its attendant practices such as crime mapping and ‘hot spot’ policing are haunted by a failure to consider the intricate nature of space
and the complexity of human actions within space, the new cultural geography, with its emphasis on the relationship between culture and space, can provide a useful corrective. Second, while criminology has a long tradition of considering key issues such as power and meaning, too often these analyses have only peripherally engaged with issues relating to spatiality. With its emphasis on the spatial nature of political and economic influence, and how landscapes function as systems of social reproduction, the new cultural geography can greatly improve existing criminological enquiry into meaning, power and political economy. Finally, despite some exceptions, criminology has fallen some way short of a meaningful engagement with the social theoretical debates that seek to explain the various socio-economic and cultural transformations that one might describe here as ‘late modernity’. Certainly, a great deal of empirical/statistical criminology proceeds as if oblivious to the complexities associated with the late modern condition—whether these complexities relate to the thematics of space, culture or identity. If criminology is to continue to develop as a well-rounded, vital social science attuned both to the current times and to the social theoretical discourse that surrounds these times, it can no longer proceed in this largely isolated intellectual state. With its aim of using contemporary social theory and inter-disciplinarity to celebrate complexity and understand cultural acquiescence and resistance, the new cultural geography can help criminology address this shortcoming.

These are lofty statements and such aims will not be achieved easily—but this should not deter us from trying. In a bid to kick-start the process, the remainder of this article offers some tentative potential ways of achieving at least aspects of these statements. The five examples that follow are not meant to be exhaustive—just some thoughts to provoke further discussion on how we might develop an understanding of criminogenic space that, like cultural geography, is infused with a strong inter-disciplinary approach and an ability to think beyond superficial interpretations—whether theoretical, structural or spatial.

Five Spaces of Cultural Criminology

More-than-representational spaces

Let’s start with ongoing developments in so-called non-representational theory (NRT). Although complex, at the bottom, NRT can be understood as an attempt to move beyond static geographic accounts of landscape in a bid to create an alternative approach that actively incorporates the experiential, affective, and inter-material aspects of space that rarely feature in traditional representational geography (or, for that matter, in most criminology). Expressed differently, the key idea here is that there is an affective wash that soaks everyday spatiality. In NRT, the talk is thus of ‘relational and engaging spaces’, ‘complexity’, ‘event sensations’, the importance of inter-disciplinarity and the need for a ‘multiplicity of theoretical voices’ (Thrift 1996). Such terms confirm the influence of post-structuralism and particularly ‘the avenues for thought opened up by the translation of the work of Deleuze and Latour’ (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 3). However, the relationship between NRT and post-structuralism needs clarification if NRT is not to be dismissed as just another slice of highfalutin postmodern theory. The first thing to state is that, while NRT is clearly indebted to the aforementioned ‘new cultural geography’ (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 5–6), it should not be viewed simply as an extension of
the type of geographic social constructivism that characterized much cultural geography in the 1980s and 1990s. Admittedly, NRT is interested in symbolic meaning and cultural representation, but it also prioritizes the material—something exemplified in a question posed by Anderson and Harrison (2010:6) in their thoughtful introduction to NRT: ‘if life is constructed, how come it appears so immutable?’ Put another way, despite its name, (critical) representation actually matters to NRT. This tension is nicely encapsulated by Hayden Lorimer, who, in a review of NRT, makes the point that, by using the word ‘non’ in its name, NRT is short-changing itself: ‘An alteration to the chosen title might help for starters. I prefer to think of “more-than-representational” geography, the teleology of the original ‘non’ title having proven an unfortunate hindrance’ (Lorimer 2005: 84). Lorimer goes on to offer his own explanation of NRT that is worth quoting here in full. NRT is about:

... [e]xpanding our once comfortable understanding of ‘the social’ and how it can be regarded as something researchoable. This often means thinking through locally formative interventions in the world. At first, the phenomena in question may seem remarkable only by their apparent insignificance. The focus [of NRT] falls on how life takes shape and gains expression in shared experiences, everyday routines, fleeting encounters, embodied movements, precognitive triggers, practical skills, affective intensities, enduring urges, unexceptional interactions and sensuous dispositions. Attention to these kinds of expression, it is contended, offers an escape from the established academic habit of striving to uncover meanings and values that apparently await our discovery, interpretation, judgment and ultimately representation. In short, so much ordinary action gives no advance notice of what it will become. Yet, it still makes critical differences to our experiences of space and place. (Lorimer 2005: 84)

Lorimer’s language is refreshingly clear—something not always the case with NRT. This tendency towards unnecessarily dense conceptualization/reasoning is clearly a product of the aforementioned post-structural influence. It is something that needs to be addressed if NRT is to have value in fields other than cultural and human geography (Lorimer 2007: 97). It is my contention that criminology, with its more practical application, can be of use here, not just in terms of tightening up the worst excesses of post-structural discourse, but in providing a tangible outlet for some of the spatial principles associated with NRT. Let us explore this point by looking at the potentiality of NRT within one specific branch of contemporary criminological theory—cultural criminology (see Ferrell et al. 2008; Hayward and Young 2012 for general summaries).

The possibility of exploiting the broader utility of NRT within cultural criminology has recently been explored by Elaine Campbell in an interesting article that investigates the performative practices of stalking. Campbell highlights the ‘considerable resonance’ between developments in NRT and:

... a cultural criminological approach [that] emphasizes the subjective, affective, embodied, aesthetic, material, performative, textual, symbolic and visual relations of space, as well as recognising that the settings of crime are neither fixed nor inevitable but are relational, improvised, contingent, constructed and contested through an array of creative and dynamic cultural practices, made meaningful within and mediated by wider processes of social transformation. (Campbell 2012: 2)

Campbell has alighted on something important—a relationship that could prove ‘wholly reciprocal and mutually beneficial’. With its accessible and deliberately provocative prose style, coupled with its focus on the excesses of capitalism and the
exclusionary strategies associated with consumerism, cultural criminology could potentially demystify the ‘tantalizing language’ associated with too much NRT, whilst also adding a more robust materialist spine to NRT’s putative political aspirations. In turn, NRT could aid cultural criminology in its ongoing attempt to counter sanitizing criminal justice logics such as ‘hot spots’, ‘secure zones’ and the other postcode-specific actuarial frameworks that constitute much of today’s formalized geography of crime. So what aspects of NRT are most immediately applicable to (cultural) criminology? Three areas stand out.

First, NRT’s focus on affective landscapes or experiential spaces where feelings of *inter alia* fear, danger, ennui, disgust, boredom, isolation, hedonism or excitement pervade. To an extent, this approach has been foreshadowed by feminist criminologists in earlier work that utilized psycho-geography and cognitive mapping to articulate women’s fear(s) of public spaces. However, rather than plotting an emotion like fear on a map, NRT seeks to show how emotions actually influence or shape space more than they arise in space (see Anderson (2004) on the spatiality of boredom, an emotion much discussed by cultural criminologists). What is being sought here is the territorialization of affect (affect in the sense of Pile’s (2005: 48) notion of ‘the social relations of emotion’), a geography of sensation that can be materially represented. This is important for any number of reasons but, by way of example, consider how emotions prefigure physical exclusion and oppression—a point Leo Cheliotis makes when critiquing the lack of attention to empirical reality in Zygmunt Bauman’s sociology/dichotomy of space:

If nothing else, to conclude that the roots of physical exclusion ultimately lie within physical exclusion is to preclude the questions thereby raised: how is it that victims find themselves separated from victimizers in the first instance? Does not prior separation occur under conditions of spatial proximity and optical interpersonal visibility? (Cheliotis 2010:132)

Second, an interest in the multisensual landscape inevitably results in NRT adherents training attention on embodied actions and ‘performances’. Here, once again, many of the more interesting aspects of NRT are shrouded in unfathomable post-structural semantics. However, it is possible to discern some useful insights for broadening criminology’s homogenous reading of modernist space. The emphasis placed on ‘events’, for example, is useful in terms both of mapping performative protest (a representational undertaking) and for understanding how local actions and practices can be incorporated into forms of community activism or ‘cosmopolitics’ (a more non-representational endeavour). In the words of Anderson and Harrison, non-representational theories (and they do prefer the plural expression) ‘are marked by an attention to events and the new potentialities for being, doing and thinking that events may bring forth’ (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 19, emphasis in original). In less abstract terms, consider how this focus on events could be applied to cultural criminology’s interest in resistance, political social movements or alternative community justice actions around issues like policing, gangs or surveillance/sousveillance.

Third, NRT’s focus on so-called ‘relational materialities’ and ‘non-human associations’ offers the potential for establishing a long-overdue link between criminology and ‘actor-network theory’ (as developed by Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, John Law,

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Although humanistic, NRT (unlike feminism) has a fairly pronounced ‘anti-biographical’ streak (Thrift 2008: 7).
Simply stated, actor-network theory is an anti-essentialist social theoretical framework emerging from Science and Technology studies that seeks to understand the networked relations between human and non-human phenomena (see Murdoch 1998; Whatmore 2003 for examples of actor-network theory as applied to space). It rejects technical and social determinism and presents instead a ‘socio-technical’ account in which neither the social nor the technical is prioritized. One obvious example would be the rise of smart phones (i.e. while smart phones would seem to be the product of purely technical developments, in fact they are (in part) designed by software engineers who are informed by the human needs of social networks; correspondingly, social networks are themselves the product of technological innovation). NRT is keen to develop a ‘relational–material’ or ‘associative’ account of ‘the social’ that seeks to understand place/landscape in terms of the interaction between humans, objects, machines, technology and even animals: ‘These entities do not exist independently from one another, neatly separated into discrete ontological domains; rather all co-exist on the same “plane of immanence”’ (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 14). Such statements may appear abstract, but consider how this approach might be useful when it comes to understanding how humans relate to and interact with criminological phenomena such as public and private forms of decentralized surveillance or the type of physical ‘target hardening’ practices advocated by crime preventionists.

**Parafunctional spaces**

From the conceptual to the physical—despite the strides made by NRT proponents in terms of understanding place as if it were a living thing, a multi-layered congress of emotional, embodied, relational, cultural, political and spatial dynamics, the obvious critique exists that it lacks a tangible physical dimension. To some extent, this critique can be countered by other developments within contemporary cultural geography—most notably the notion of ‘parafunctional space’.

As we have seen, crime mapping rests on a morphology of form and function (‘form dictates function; function follows form’). The result is a gapless, utilitarian, purposive and semiotically unambiguous grid that maps onto socio-demographic and economic hierarchies. Parafunctional spaces/maps are very different. My starting point here is a collaborative essay by the sociologist, Nikos Papastergiadis, and the photographer, Heather Rogers (1996). Drawing on the work of de Certeau, they deploy the term *parafunctional space* to refer to city spaces that appear to have ‘given up’ the struggle of shaping time and space, or where the most fundamental of modernist linkages is severed—the (functional) link between use and space as operationalized by names. Consider the following interpretation of parafunctional space as glossed by the teaching team at the School of Architecture and Design, University of South Australia:

… [parafunctional] spaces exist in-between—perhaps they’ve been abandoned or ruined, perhaps they are a set or constellation of surfaces, perhaps they are named ‘waste’, perhaps they are ‘condemned’. These spaces do not ‘function’ as we might think ‘function’ functions—as meaning. These spaces do not do as they are told. (This is a sentence to imagine with: place an emphasis on ‘do’ and

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7 There have been one or two exceptions; see, e.g. Lippens (2010) and Valverde (2008).
‘told’, for example.) That is, they do not serve or operate ‘the kind of action or activity proper’ to their form, shape, (original) intention. (http://ensemble.va.com.au/home/prjct_nts.html)

These functionless, evidently non-modernist, parafunctional spaces represent the exact opposite of discipline. Not only do they typically lack any formal surveillance mechanisms, but they also represent the abandoned, anonymous and seemingly meaningless spaces within our midst—the places on the (metaphorical) edge of society.8

It is problematic parafunctional spaces—the run-down playground, the badly lit side street, the unofficial homeless sleep-space—that are often of interest to administrative criminologists and crime mappers. For example, Papastergiadis describes:

... how state and council authorities try to keep specific spaces to their specificity: seating is changed in railway waiting rooms and on platforms to discourage sleeping by the homeless (UK, USA), just so they do not ‘sink’ into a parafunctional state of ambiguity and contamination. (Papastergiadis 2002: 45)

In this sense, situational crime preventionists are essentially seeking to return spaces that have lost their function back within the ordered planner’s fold of the modernist grid. To re-link ‘space’ and ‘use’ in one unequivocal functionality is thus a project of semiotic disambiguation—the attempt to close down an object/place’s spatial reference so that it has only one unique meaning. Seats are only for sitting on—not for sleeping, skateboarding, partying or busking on. Under this rubric, controlling crime becomes as simple as mapping place, function and meaning so that the rational utility-seeking subject no longer has to deal with any form of complexity whatsoever. However, as anyone who takes the time to walk or cycle through the city will surely tell you, streets and city spaces are rarely, if ever, equivocal.

To sum up, the concept of parafunctional space can help criminologists understand places in terms of hidden micro-cultural practices, distinct spatial biographies, relationships (or non-relationships) with surrounding spaces/structures, intrication with different temporalities, intrinsic social role(s)—both perceived and actual—and networks of feelings and semiotic significance. Categories of knowledge that do not feature in the types of computer-aided map making and ortho-rectified imagery that drives contemporary digital crime mapping.

Container spaces

Following the 2009 London G20 protests and the 2010 Westminster student demonstrations, the term ‘kettling’ entered the vernacular.9 As colloquialisms go, the verb to ‘kettle’ is quintessentially English, ‘a darkly comic version of the national obsession with the serenity and salvation to be found in a “nice cup of tea”’ (Hancox 2011). The reality is very different. Kettling involves the (legally ambiguous) corralling of protestors into a demarcated, confined space for an indeterminate period without access to food, water or toilet facilities. In short, it is mass detention in public space. According to Metropolitan Police Commander Bob Broadhurst, the goal of a kettle is to create a carefully controlled ‘sterile zone’ (or, alternatively, a containment space known as a ‘special detention pen’ such as the one set up near the Excel Centre in London to contain G20 protestors). Such

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8See also Franck and Stevens (2006) on ‘loose space’.

9This is not to say that the term did not exist within police practice prior to 2009.
biological metaphors of sterilization and decontamination suggest a *cordon sanitaire*, a segregated space for the treatment of a sickness or a malady, as if protestors or indeed their political grievances are diseased or infected—a potential threat to the healthy body politic. Police Kettles, of course, are designed to keep people *inside* a perimeter. Increasingly, however, the type of securitized containment-speak that is the stock-in-trade of Kettling is being utilized in new spatial systems of control and conduct regulation designed to keep people *out*.10

In *Mediapolis*, de Jong and Schuilenburg (2006: 45) introduce the ‘Urban Container’. Faced with the onslaught of global urbanization (‘Within twenty years, more than 90% of the world population will live in cities or urban areas’), they assert that the duality of ‘centre’–‘periphery’ is collapsing. The increased urbanity of the lived environment requires new scattered zones of safety and control, where otherness, irrationality and dissent are banished beyond boundaries of exclusion and distinction. The result is the ‘encapsulated interior space’ of the Urban Container—an architectural expression of the culture of control, designed to ‘rebuff people who are a threat to our security’. Similar in (self-contained) form and function to company towns like Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (the walled HQ of the Aramco oil company) or indeed Baghdad’s ‘Green Zone’, Container units are the perfect reflection of the late-capitalist structural order.

De Jong and Schuilenburg are geographic futurologists but, in many ways, they are prophesying the present (Turner 2007; Brown 2010). The conflation of architectural developments with rhizomatic surveillance structures (what Mike Davis (1990) famously described as ‘the architectonics of security’), new digital technologies (face-recognition software, rfid-tags, biometric chips) and prescriptive spatio-behavioural protocols such as curfews and ‘shop bans’ (Schuilenberg 2010) ensures the foundations for the Urban Container are already in place. In shopping malls, privately managed town centres, downtown business ‘bunkers’ and university campuses, such measures represent the regulation of conduct through space: ‘They produce their own normality . . . they demand of the people who stay in the delineated area of the Urban Container that they subject themselves to internal rules and that everyone displays the same behaviour’ (de Jong and Schuilenberg 2006: 52). Like a neutered, passive (spatially inverted) version of Kettling, these safe zones adopt an at-a-distance approach that not only results in the homogenization of the individual and the banishment of spontaneity or resistance from the demarcated space, but, like Kettles, they also provoke questions about the de-realization of rights and citizenship via the creation of a ‘suspended zone’. This is ultimately the cost of a future made certain.

Importantly, the spatialized jurisprudence of the Container is entirely predicated on the ‘precautionary principle’ and, in this sense, it provides the perfect physical manifestation of Zedner’s ‘pre-crime’ logic:

In a post-crime society there are crimes, offenders and victims, crime control, policing, investigation, trial and punishment, all of which are staples of present criminological enquiry. Pre-crime, by contrast, shifts the temporal perspective to anticipate and forestall that which has not yet occurred and may never do so. In a pre-crime society, there is calculation, risk and uncertainty, surveillance, precaution,  

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10One can see a parallel (in terms of containment and perimeter porosity) between the Kettle and the Container and Foucault’s (1977) dualism of the Leper Colony and the Plague Town.
prudentialism, moral hazard, prevention and, arching over all these, the pursuit of security. (Zedner 2007: 261)

This logic is intensified when one considers the extent to which Container spaces are now ‘completely permeated by computer networks and monitoring techniques such as automatic detection and pattern-recognition cameras whose aim is to predict and prevent crime’ (de Jong and Schuilenberg 2006: 55). Such technologies allow the Container space—on the face of it at least—to appear as a place of porosity, providing one has the requisite security and credit record.11 The Urban Container is the perfect nexus of safety, surveillance and ‘knowability’, ring-fenced by the *cordon sanitaire* of digital access—which leads us neatly to our penultimate ‘space’.

**Virtual/networked spaces**

From the physical to the virtual—as the internet and digital communication technology have transformed society, criminology has been employed to explain and counter the myriad forms of crime, danger and deviance that quickly appeared in the wake of the ‘digital revolution’. Some useful work has emerged in the burgeoning field of internet crime (see Jewkes and Yar 2010 for an overview). However, whilst ‘cybercrime’ is now an established area of criminological attention, most research focuses either on explaining and identifying various forms of online crime (e.g. ‘hacking’, ‘scamming’, ‘identity theft’, etc.) or developing ways to combat it, either through regulation and internet law, or by policing the internet and computer forensics. This is understandable, as there are major problems to solve and, moreover, these problems are fluid, mutable and constantly evolving, reflecting the ‘fast twitch’ nature of the internet and its attendant forms of digital technology. What other tools, then, might help criminologists in their understanding of internet crime? In what follows, I will suggest that ongoing developments in cultural geography and associated spatial theory could prove useful for criminologists seeking to make sense of cyberspace and how human beings use and abuse it.

Conceptually, ongoing criminological and legal work on cybercrime is primarily concerned with diffusion, whether in terms of the increased criminal opportunities afforded by decentralized networks or the potential diffusion of victimhood associated with digital crimes such as phisHing scams or identity theft. Consider, for example, the legal/preventionist response to the compression and sharing of digital music files. The initial music industry panic was followed by expensive litigation and a subsequent flurry of excessive governmental legislation/prohibition that not only missed the target, but ultimately missed the point: that, despite claims to the contrary, media conglomerates continue to grow and profit, largely because they have adopted new business models that work with and not against ‘the download generation’. From a spatial perspective, one might say that, rather than emphasizing models of diffusion, a better way of thinking about digital/online (criminal) activities is as process, namely as phenomena in constant dialogue and transformation with other phenomena/technologies. Here, we enter the familiar territory of Castells’s networked ‘space of flows’ (in contrast to the fixed geography of ‘space of place’) and the less familiar, more esoteric social theory of

11See Aas (2011) on what one might describe as the Containerization of the border via transnational surveillance and biometric practices that create ‘multi-speed-citizenship’, i.e. seamless border crossing/migration control for digitally approved ‘supracitizens’, and sticky, gate-closing protocols for so-called ‘crimigrants’.
Deleuze and Guattari’s acented rhizome, a metaphorical subterranean stem that connects any point to any other point. From a spatial perspective, ‘The rhizome pertains to a map that must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 23). Such thinking allows sociologists of the internet to think differently about online space and digital culture, developing concepts such as ‘virtuality’, ‘telepresence’, ‘convergence’ and ‘presence’, all of which I believe have potential criminological application.

The term ‘convergence’ will be well known to many cybercrime experts, for, at one level, it describes the straightforward convergence of the technological (the networkable, compressible and manipulable features of the digital format) and regulatory processes associated with the digital media experience. Here, talk is of ‘weightless money’ (e.g. cash transfers), ‘weightless products’ (e.g. EBooks and ‘virtual goods’ in online gaming platforms) and the ‘weightless economy’ (e.g. ‘intellectual property’ and ‘information colonialism’). Such areas interest criminologists, of course, because they spawn criminogenic counter phenomena such as ‘weightless money launderers’, ‘weightless counterfeiters’ and ‘weightless IP and bio pirates’. At another level, however, convergence is a more complex process, especially when considered in relation to the theoretical discourse surrounding virtuality and the blurring distinction between the virtual and the actual. Consider online crimes perpetrated against cyber profiles/identities such as game avatars. Courts in various jurisdictions have already heard numerous cases involving online theft, fraud and even cyber-bullying and assault in multi-player online role-playing games such as Second Life and World of Warcraft. Although much hyped, this blurring of the virtual and the actual is typically limited to monetary matters, as players find themselves out real money as a result of the theft of, for example, virtual ‘goods’ or ‘land’. However, on occasion, this blurring process is more complex and spatially interesting. Recently, Linden Lab, the company behind Second Life, found themselves at the centre of a media storm after the German TV station ARD claimed that a Second Life player paid for sex with underage players or players posing as (digital) minors. Ultimately, it transpired that the players involved in the incident were a 54-year-old man and a 27-year-old woman who used their online avatars to depict a virtual sex act between a man and a child avatar. At a practical level, this incident highlights issues of jurisdiction—the player involved was German and, in Germany, ‘simulated’ sex with children is punishable by up to five years in prison (in other countries, it is not an offence). However, what is more interesting is how this incident highlighted the nature and role of intentionality within virtual space. For some time now, intentionality has been a sufficient cause for prosecution in real-life cases involving the online ‘grooming’ of minors by paedophiles. However, the Second Life case illustrates that virtual actions/intentions can also lead to actual consequences. ARD passed the images to a state attorney in Halle, while Linden Lab contacted the authorities and subsequently made it abundantly clear that they would not tolerate ‘erotic ageplay’ on their site and would do all they could in the future to bring virtual and real-life paedophiles to justice.

Moving beyond legal questions of intentionality, these incidents raise other questions about how online space is navigated and conceived by individuals. Key here is the notion of ‘telepresence’ that has been used to describe the immersive experience associated with certain aspects of digital culture. Simply stated, communication technologies have the potential to alter the way we experience the sense of being in an environment:
Presence is relatively unproblematic in unmediated situations, we are where we ‘are’... However, when mediated communication or long distance interaction is introduced into the equation, things begin to change. In this situation we gain the ability to simultaneously exist in two different environments at the same time: the physical environment in which our body is located and the conceptual or interactional ‘space’ we are presented with through the use of the medium. (Miller 2011: 31)

The ‘interactional space’ associated with telepresence has interesting criminological connotations. Most obviously, digital technology creates what one might describe as porous spaces of subjectivity in which moves made via the rhizomic, hyperlinked internet appear materially or spatially insignificant but, in reality, have tangible consequences. Obvious examples here include surfing for sub rosa sexual imagery (see Jenkins 2001 on the online sub-cultural practices associated with child pornography) and the type of hate speech that is such a common feature of ‘comment’/‘message’ boards. Indeed, the ‘a-spatial’ nature of online ‘communities’ actually lends itself to ‘emotion dumping’ and other outpourings of personal self-expression that would never be tolerated in physical space, from ‘virtual revenge talk’ and ‘online vigilantism’ (Cottee 2010) to ‘cyber-bullying’ and ‘online stalking’.

Telepresence has been much discussed by cultural geographers interested in digital culture. However, what is even more relevant to criminologists (especially those concerned with diffusion of victimization) is the growing interest in digital ‘presence’ (Licoppe 2004). Of most significance here is geographer Vince Miller’s recent work on how the online self is uploaded and presented via both network profiles, active and non-active forum and chatroom registrations, abandoned blogs and online shopping accounts, and what he describes as ‘phatic’ communication such as status updates, informationless gestures (‘pokes’), microblog ‘shout outs’ and other forms of digital interaction that prioritize ‘connection and acknowledgement over content and dialogue’ (Miller 2011: 205). Such information, Miller argues, constitutes our digital ‘presence’, a quasi-private disembodied virtual ‘persona’ that exists at various points across the spatial architecture of the internet. If, historically, privacy revolved around secrecy, anonymity and solitude, today there is a vast online reservoir of personal information about each and every one of us, from uploaded tagged photographs to our consumer preferences and surfing habits. In virtual space, we never sleep; we are always out there, ‘alive’ so to speak. What’s more, digital ‘personal traces’, unlike ‘hard copy’ information, have a permanent lifespan. As Miller suggests, there is no more ‘social forgetfulness’; our virtual ‘presence’ is there to be trawled, data-mined and profiled by everyone from credit and consumer agencies to anonymous dataveillance and surveillance organizations. Miller’s concept of ‘presence’ has obvious criminological application, not just in terms of specific cybercrimes like identity theft, but in other areas such as the rehabilitation of offenders and how post-release/prosecution identity might be affected by one’s residual online presence or in relation to other areas of digital research such as Mark Poster’s (1995) notion of the digital superpanopticon and connected questions about the legal dimensions of privacy and data collection.

**Soundscape and acoustic spaces**

Recently, a new crime prevention solution to the problem of youths hanging around has emerged. Across the United Kingdom, at bus stops, train stations and late-night shops,
classical music is being piped through vandalism-proof speakers in a bid to disperse
groups of youngsters who apparently find ‘blasts of Mozart or Vivaldi’ so ‘uncool’ as
to be repugnant (O’Neil 2010). This weaponization of music follows hard on the heels
of the deployment by certain local authorities of ‘the Mosquito’, an electronic gadget
that emits a high-frequency noise audible only to young people—once again, the goal
being to drive away ‘unruly youth’ from certain public spaces. Such measures are
disturbing, but not surprising. As the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (1998) points out,
since the earliest human congregation, groups have demarcated and protected their
territory by emitting sounds. Yet, the relationship between man and the sounds of
his environment are seldom studied by social scientists, and almost never by criminol-
gists. As the everyday soundtrack of urban space becomes increasingly cacophonous,
perhaps it is time they were? Just as borders and walls are becoming the subject of greater
 criminological scrutiny, so should the contemporary ‘soundscape’. As the urban geog-
rapher Rowland Atkinson (2007) recently argued, our understanding of space (and
 ergo the relationship between space and crime) must now extend to include the am-
bient, unseen ‘sonic ecology’. This is not the place for a full exposition of what an acous-
tic criminology might look like. Instead, a few tentative thoughts are offered in the hope
of provoking further study.

Atkinson’s argument is that the sonic ecology plays an important part in the social and
spatial patterning (and territorialization; see Labelle 2010) of the city. Most obviously,
the spatio-temporal ‘stickiness’ of certain ‘soundmarks’ (Schafer 1994) such as traffic
noise, the sounds of industry or anti-social noise pollution associated with the night-time
economy, all configure space in terms of its auditory impact.12 Walking around Cam-
bidge in the early 1970s for his BBC documentary series Border Country, the cultural
theorist Raymond Williams nicely illustrates this point when, on leaving the revered
cloisters of Jesus College, he states ‘you can feel almost at once a change in the atmo-
sphere, a different feel, a different sound in the air. This again is crossing a border’. Less
obvious is the imperialistic encroachment of the sound(s) of consumerism into public
space. If Muzak was an early ‘auditory marker’ used to brand space and lubricate con-
sumption, today, more sophisticated sonic ecologies function to demarcate territory for
shopping/lifestyle promotion, from amplified urban music in restaurants and bars to
the use of audio-visual screen advertising in everything from pub toilets to bus headrests.
Less obvious is the growing use of CCTV systems triggered by sudden vacillations in
noise level (e.g. shouting)—even though it remains illegal to use microphone-equipped
camera systems in the public sphere. Such technology potentially replaces the visual
panopticon with an aural ‘panaudicon’ (Rice 2003 in Atkinson 2007: 1908) in which
everyday soundprints become linked to ‘social control, discipline and enforcement’.)

Outside the aural ecology of the city, numerous other developments precipitate the
need for the development of an aural criminology. Consider the following examples, all
of which crosscut criminological concerns: the everyday noise pollution associated with
neighbour noise and other forms of anti-social behaviour; the use of infrasound crowd-
control devices, acoustic torture and other military noise weapons (Goodman 2010);
illegal pirate radio broadcasts and other sub rosa transmission cultures; the politics
of rhythm associated with political protest and social resistance (Labelle 2010: 107–25);

12For two recent tangible examples, see Sayare and de la Baume (2010) and Johnson (2011).
the role of music in military recruitment, as a tool for intensifying the battle experience (Pieslak 2009) and even as a means of garnering support for terrorism (Cottee 2011: 742–5); and even the way music functions as a ‘connective sonic fiction’, facilitating the transference of cultures, ideologies and morals that have nothing to do with material space. If you can aurally immunize yourself from the world (through base sounds or noise-dampening headphones), ‘how are these inner worlds related to the outside world of the city?’ (de Jong and Schuilenberg 2006: 83). The soundscape, then, although seemingly ethereal, requires criminological mapping if the nexus between space and crime is to be a fully understood.

Conclusion

This article offered some alternative ways of interpreting relationships between space and crime, its ultimate aim being to challenge contemporary criminologists to think differently about the role and nature of space within our discipline. Importantly, the five spaces outlined above should not be seen as a positivistic set of factors for categorizing or understanding ‘criminogenic’ space. Instead, they should be seen as threads woven together within the same tapestry, each explaining and enhancing the other, and, consequently, all contributing to the same overall picture—a more nuanced rendering of (urban) space that counters the rational abstractions and rigid multi-factorial analyses that characterize mainstream criminological investigations into crime today. Some years ago, I met the sociologist John O’Neil, whose 1985 book *Five Bodies* helped define the subfield of body sociology. An engaging raconteur, O’Neil was passionate about sociology, but, when pressed on the legacy of his book, he seemed concerned that he had caused the proliferation of the sociology of embodiment: ‘When I got into the body business,’ he told me, ‘there were only five bodies. Now there’s hundreds.’ I differ from O’Neil in that I actively encourage the proliferation of cultural criminological spaces. Indeed, my aim is for ‘five spaces’ to become many. Only then will criminology be in a position to develop policies and practices, from policing strategy to environmental design, that approach space not as an undialectical void, but as a complex constellation of social and power relations.

References


