Media reactions to Lavinia Woodward’s sentence have wrongly amplified class, race and gender bias in the judiciary

An article by Antonia Porter, Graduate Teaching Assistant at Kent Law School and practising criminal prosecutor

According to one tabloid newspaper, Lavinia Woodward is the ‘Oxford University Slasher’ who was spared imprisonment for assaulting her boyfriend with a knife because she was clever, privileged and female. The allegation, now rife throughout traditional and social media: that if the same defendant was male, not a university student and with fewer career prospects, he would currently be enjoying detention at her majesty’s pleasure. The charge: that domestic abuse perpetrated against men is treated less seriously and that the judiciary displays sentencing leniency based on class, race and gender.

Having already deferred sentence for four months under s1 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, HHJ Ian Pringle QC outlined the facts of the case at September’s sentencing hearing:

In October 2016 you [Woodward] began a relationship with a student from Cambridge University. Sadly, you were still suffering from the effects of a very damaging previous relationship with another who had introduced you to class A drugs. You clearly had both drug and alcohol addictions. On 30 December 2016, your partner paid you a visit in your accommodation in Christchurch College in Oxford. It rapidly became clear to him that you had been drinking. He tried to discourage you from continuing your drinking without success. As the evening progressed, you became increasingly volatile. At one stage your partner contacted your mother over Skype in order to seek her assistance over what to do about you. When you discovered this, you became extremely angry, starting to throw objects around. It is clear from the transcript of the 999 call that your partner summoned the help of the police before you picked up a bread knife which was in the room and struck a blow with it to his lower leg [resulting in a 3cm cut requiring 3 stitches]. In the course of the incident two of his fingers also received cuts [two 1cm cuts treated at the scene]. Your partner managed to partly restrain you, albeit you then started to turn the knife on yourself and he had to further disarm you to prevent further self-harm. When the emergency services arrived it was abundantly clear that you were intoxicated, deeply distraught and mentally disturbed. You were taken to a police station in a very distressed state [and attempted to take her own life in police custody].

In a clear bid to undermine the sentencing judge, both personally and professionally, media portrayals would have us believe that Woodward’s recently passed sentence, ten months imprisonment suspended for 18, defied justice. Just as with media commentary following January’s Supreme Court Brexit ruling, criticism appears to be levied at the judiciary’s inability to exercise independence and impartiality. The narrative becomes one of how pre-existing attributes render judges compromised in applying the law and legal principles fairly. The story in Woodward’s case became one of how calculating Lavinia and her legal team were able to seduce, manipulate and appeal to a seemingly gullible and ‘out of touch’ male member of the judiciary; Woodward’s privilege, race and gender all acted as her mitigation.

There was nothing unduly lenient about the sentence on my reading of the case and the relevant sentencing principles and guidelines. The assertion that Woodward profited from her social status, it follows, is exaggerated. Broadly, the principles of sentencing, as outlined in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, are five-fold; punishment, reduction of crime (including by deterrence), rehabilitation, protection of the public and the making of reparation. Clearly, these principles are likely to compete in practice and it will be for the Judge to determine how to balance them. Most notably the goals of punishment and rehabilitation often conflict as prison is commonly associated with entrenching criminal behaviours and labelling (a theory where the offender self-identifies as criminal and thereby lives up to that expectation).

The potential to rehabilitate was offered to Woodward through use of the deferred sentence which allowed her to continue receiving counselling and the opportunity to address her drug and alcohol use (cited as the trigger for her violent episode). Moreover, the suspended custodial sentence imposed in September will clearly act as a deterrent from the future use of drink and drugs, lest it prompt further violence leading to activation of the sentence. Punishment, for someone of previous good character anticipating a career as a surgeon as Woodward was, is clearly present by virtue of the associated stigma of having a conviction for violence and the very real difficultly that such a conviction is likely to have on her prospects.

Looking to whether the level of seriousness of the incident ought to have tipped the judge into favouring custody by way of punishment, the Sentencing Advisory Guidelines detail features that might both aggravate and mitigate an offence of unlawful wounding contrary to s20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. These are guidelines that must be adhered to by the sentencing judge (unless the interests of justice merit otherwise). The court starts by determining which offence category the assault falls under. To do this, they must assess the degree of harm caused and the culpability of the defendant. The Judge determined there was a lesser degree of harm caused in the context of an unlawful wounding offence. Given that unlawful wounding may include serious life changing injuries, a 3cm cut to the leg and two 1cm cuts to the finger would rightly be considered less serious. The use of the knife indicates that there was higher culpability. The combination of a lower degree of harm and higher degree of culpability rendered this a category 2 s20 offence. The sentencing range stipulated by the Sentencing Advisory Council for a category 2 offence is between 12 and 36 months imprisonment, with a starting point of 18 months.

Next, aggravating and mitigating features are taken into account which allows the 18 month starting point to increase or decrease within the range. The Judge rightly identified that the aggravating feature in this case was Woodward’s intoxication and drug misuse. Mitigating factors on the other hand were more numerous; she had no previous convictions, she evidenced clear remorse, she demonstrated lack of maturity despite her intelligence, she suffered a mental disorder known as unstable personality disorder and not just drug misuse but dependency. The judge also commended her commitment to rid herself of her drug and alcohol use during the period of the deferred sentence. These factors appear to have duly reduced the starting point to 15 months. By virtue of her early guilty plea, as is usual in all cases (to induce guilty pleas and save the court the time and expense of a trial), this sentence was reduced by one third; ten months.

In terms of deciding whether that sentence should be suspended, the Judge, according to the Sentencing Advisory Council again, is entitled to take into account the following; whether there is a realistic prospect of rehabilitation and whether there is strong personal mitigation to do so (such as her commitment to university studies or previous good character). Immediate custody might have been merited where the defendant posed a significant risk to the public, if there was a history of poor compliance with court orders or if the only appropriate punishment was custody. Clearly, none of the factors meriting immediate imprisonment were deemed present, whereas those factors justifying suspending the sentence appear met. Unsurprisingly, Baroness Helena Kennedy QC, recently appearing on radio 4’s Woman’s Hour, described the Judge’s approach to sentencing in this case as ‘scrupulous’.

The ManKind Initiative, who help men experiencing domestic abuse, has however been vocal in its condemnation of the case outcome, suggesting that had the genders been reversed, the sentence would not have been suspended. They have used the case to wrongly assert that the treatment of this woman, who incidentally had been abused herself by a previous partner, in some way demonstrates that male victims of domestic abuse are not taken seriously or that violence against women is afforded unjustified priority. The augmented focus on this case by an outraged media has the effect of detracting from the gendered nature of domestic abuse (which overwhelmingly and demonstrably is perpetrated by men against women who notoriously rarely report). It also undermines the idea that judges are able to act impartially in applying sentencing principles and guidelines appropriately to defendants, irrespective of gender.

Woodward’s education and privileged opportunities have also been cited as axiomatic for not sending her to prison and have caused concern for others including those representing Black and Minority Ethnic groups. Progressive approaches to criminal justice support current sentencing practice that says that personal mitigation ought to include the fact that you have never been convicted before, that you have employment prospects or that you have been treated for the mental health disorders or addictions that prompted the offending behaviour. It is possible to make the case that someone with such mitigation is less likely to be found within a deprived community where higher education is less accessible and social services have to be relied upon for support. As such, perhaps the charge of judicial bias in this case might better have prompted a reflection of how structural societal failures negatively impact the lives of those growing up in deprived communities wholesale.

However, if this case ought to have aired any issue, perhaps it should have been less about criticism of judicial leniency towards privileged classes, and rather about another inequality; the inequality of legally aided defendants versus those that can afford to privately pay. Woodward clearly benefitted from her family’s ability to pay for Queens Counsel to represent her, for medical reports to be written about her and for the support and counselling received at the drug rehabilitation centre during the deferment period. Such aspects can be available to publically funded defendants but require determined and ‘meritorious’ applications by a committed legal representative for funding and are frequently unsuccessful in any event. The additional factors afforded to Woodward facilitated the judge to apply the facts of the case to the law and to make the decision he did based on full and complete information in the knowledge that Woodward had conquered her drug dependency. To that extent at least, this case highlights how the criminal justice system might not otherwise be able to fund sentencing reports by experts coupled with highest quality legal advocacy in every case. Woodward’s advantage was being able to afford a team and support around her that ensured the Judge applied the principles of sentencing as they were intended.

Antonia Porter is a Graduate Teaching Assistant at Kent Law School and practising criminal prosecutor